Sticky Incentives and Dynamic Agency
-Micro Theory Seminar
John Zhu
University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School
Competition in Persuasion
-Micro Theory Seminar
Emir Kamenica
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
Subjective Learning
-Micro Theory Seminar
David Dillenberger
University of Pennsylvania
Search and Satisficing
-Micro Theory Seminar
Mark Dean
Brown University
Mediation and Peace
-Micro Theory Seminar
Francesco Squintani
University of Essex
Revealed Willpower
-Micro Theory Seminar
Yusufcan Masatlioglu
University of Michigan
Imperfect Platform Competition: A General Framework
-Micro Theory Seminar
E. Glen Weyl
Harvard University (Post-Doctoral Fellow)
Fixed-Point Methods for Auction Theory
-Micro Theory Seminar
Srihari Govindan
The University of Iowa
Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk
-Micro Theory Seminar
Lawrence E. Blume
Cornell University
Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
-Micro Theory Seminar
Rakesh Vohra
Northwestern University