Equilibrium Selection in Participation Games, with Applications to Security Issuance
-Micro Theory Seminar
David Frankel
Melbourne Business School
Social Learning with Endogenous Timing
-Micro Theory Seminar
Juuso Välimäki
Aalto University School of Business
Continuous-time Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
-Micro Theory Seminar
Benjamin Bernard
University of Wisconsin-Madison
A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms
Micro Theory Seminar
Aram Grigoryan
University of California, San Diego
Recursive Hurwicz Expected Utility
-Micro Theory Seminar
Simon Grant
Australian National University
Decision Making Under Multidimensional Risk
-Micro Theory Seminar
Mu Zhang
University of Michigan
Dynamic Monitoring Design
-Micro Theory Seminar
Yu Fu Wong
University of Warwick
The Core of Bayesian Persuasion
-Micro Theory Seminar
Laura Doval
Columbia Business School
Diversity, Disagreement, and Information Aggregation
-Micro Theory Seminar
Tilman Börgers
University of Michigan
Monotone Additive Statistics
-Micro Theory Seminar
Xiaosheng Mu
Princeton University