Imperfect Platform Competition: A General Framework
-Micro Theory Seminar
E. Glen Weyl
Harvard University (Post-Doctoral Fellow)
Fixed-Point Methods for Auction Theory
-Micro Theory Seminar
Srihari Govindan
The University of Iowa
Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk
-Micro Theory Seminar
Lawrence E. Blume
Cornell University
Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
-Micro Theory Seminar
Rakesh Vohra
Northwestern University
Weak Selection versus Strong Selection of Rationalizability via Perturbations of Higher-order Beliefs
-Micro Theory Seminar
Siyang Xiong
Rice University
Voting on Multiple Issues
-Micro Theory Seminar
David Ahn
University of California
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection
-Micro Theory Seminar
Sergiu Hart
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem