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Uncertainty about multiple events and preference for simplicity
Affirmative Action and Instrumental Discrimination
Optimal Recommender System Design
Persuasion, Posteriors & Polymatroids
Fairness and Machine Learning
Affirmative Action in Contest Design: Information vs. Allocation Rules
Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction
Reviews and Ratings: Information Loss and Coarsenings
Optimal Team Formation under Asymmetric Information
Notes on Multidimensional Signaling
Equal Pay Laws: A Matching Theory Approach
Information Acquisition in Fragmented Markets
Splitting Players Into Groups
How Can I Know How Much I Like You? Valuation and V-stability for Matching Markets with Incomplete Information
Micro Theory Club
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