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Information Linkages in Repeated Games
Proper Robustness and the Efficiency of Monopoly Screening
Selling a Personalized Recommender System
Serial Experimentation with Career Concerns
Robust Model Misspecification and Paradigm Shifts
Serial Experimentation with Career Concerns
Serial Experimentation with Career Concerns
The Two Faces of Information
The Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification: A Decomposition
The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm
Innovation Races with Endogenous Transparency
Uncertainty about multiple events and preference for simplicity
Affirmative Action and Instrumental Discrimination
Optimal Recommender System Design
Persuasion, Posteriors & Polymatroids
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