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Serial Experimentation with Career Concern
Deliberately Stochastic
Social Learning with Heterogeneous Preferences
Data Collection without Price Discrimination
Dynamic Misspecification Averse Preferences
Selling Linear Forecasts
Optimal Allocation with Noisy Inspection
The Aversion to Uncertainty about Multiple Issues
Randomization and Linearity in the Robust Principal-Agent Problem
Wage dynamics with developing asymmetric information
Data Neutrality and Market Competition
Large Games with Heterogeneous Players
Positive Biased Evidence Acquisition
Rewarding Bad News
Micro Theory Lunch
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