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Information Design with Many Parameters
Fairness and Machine Learning
Affirmative Action in Contest Design: Information vs. Allocation Rules
Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction
N-Player Continuous-Time Repeated Games
Optimal Team Formation under Asymmetric Information
Notes on Multidimensional Signaling
Equal Pay Laws: A Matching Theory Approach
On the Nonpurifiability of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Splitting Players Into Groups
How Can I Know How Much I Like You? Valuation and V-stability for Matching Markets with Incomplete Information
Micro Theory Club
Micro Theory Lunch
Monitoring of AI with Reputation Concerns
The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts
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