Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition
-Junior Recruiting Seminar, Micro Theory Seminar
Weijie Zhong
Columbia University
Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler’s Fallacy in Optimal-Stopping Problems
-Junior Recruiting Seminar, Micro Theory Seminar
Kevin He
Harvard University
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
-Junior Recruiting Seminar, Micro Theory Seminar
Julien Combe
University College London
Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry
-Junior Recruiting Seminar, Micro Theory Seminar
Nikhil Vellodi
New York University
Competition and Manipulation in Derivative Contract Markets
-Junior Recruiting Seminar, Micro Theory Seminar
Anthony Lee Zhang
Stanford University
Strategic Interpretations
-Micro Theory Seminar
Kfir Eliaz
Tel Aviv University
On Dynamic Pricing
-Micro Theory Seminar
Rohit Lamba
Penn State University
Consumer Theory with Misperceived Tastes
-Micro Theory Seminar
Geoffroy de Clippel
Brown University
Just a Few Seeds More: Value of Network Information for Diffusion
-Micro Theory Seminar
Mohammad Akbarpour
Stanford University
Preference Structures
-Micro Theory Seminar
Efe Ok
NYU