Sequential Equilibrium Distributions in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions
-Micro Theory Seminar
Philip Reny
University of Chicago
Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games
-Micro Theory Seminar
George Georgiadis
Boston University
Randomization in Mechanism Design for Voting Models
-Micro Theory Seminar
Arunava Sen
Indian Statistical Institute
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money
-Micro Theory Seminar
Yingni Guo
Northwestern University
The Implementation Duality
-Micro Theory Seminar
Larry Samuelson
Yale University
Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
-Micro Theory Seminar
Nageeb Ali
University of California, San Diego
Warren Center Distinguished Lecture - Gossip: Identifying Central Individuals in Networks and Diffusion Processes
-Micro Theory Seminar
Matthew Jackson
Stanford University
Stable Matching under Forward-Induction Reasoning
-Micro Theory Seminar, Junior Recruiting Seminar
Luciano Pomatto
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
A Theory of "Interspection" in Games
-Micro Theory Seminar, Junior Recruiting Seminar
Mikhail Panov
Stanford Graduate School of Business
Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games
-Micro Theory Seminar, Junior Recruiting Seminar
Kirill Pogorelskiy
California Institute of Technology
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