Delegating Resource Allocation: Multidimensional Information vs. Decisions
-Micro Theory Seminar
Simone Galperti
University of California, San Diego
On the Speed of Social Learning
-Micro Theory Seminar
Philipp Strack
University of California, Berkeley
Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies
-Micro Theory Seminar
Michael Richter
Yeshiva University
Optimal Dynamic Matching
-Micro Theory Seminar
SangMok Lee
University of Pennsylvania
Sequential Equilibrium Distributions in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions
-Micro Theory Seminar
Philip Reny
University of Chicago
Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games
-Micro Theory Seminar
George Georgiadis
Boston University
Randomization in Mechanism Design for Voting Models
-Micro Theory Seminar
Arunava Sen
Indian Statistical Institute
Dynamic Mechanisms without Money
-Micro Theory Seminar
Yingni Guo
Northwestern University
The Implementation Duality
-Micro Theory Seminar
Larry Samuelson
Yale University
Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
-Micro Theory Seminar
Nageeb Ali
University of California, San Diego
© 2025 The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania