Skip to main content
University of Pennsylvania
School of Arts and Sciences
P
enn
E
conomics
IER
PIER
PFSRDC
PISM
Toggle navigation
Main navigation
Home
About
Undergraduate
Graduate
People
Courses
Events
News
Research
Search Results
Search
Simplifying Auction Designs via Market Feedback
Maher Said
Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry
Dynamic Information Acquisition from Multiple Sources
Optimal Dynamic Matching
Investment Timing and Reputation
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
Yingni Guo
Yuhta Ishii
Social Choice Under Gradual Learning
Julia Salmi
Outside options, reputations, and the partial success of the Coase conjecture
Waiting for Good or Bad News
Juuso Valimaki
Recruiting Talent
Pagination
First page
« First
Previous page
‹‹
Page
1
Page
2
Page
3
Page
4
Current page
5
Page
6
Page
7
Page
8
Page
9
…
Next page
››
Last page
Last »
© 2025 The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania