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Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games
On the Asymptotic Efficiency of Stable Matchings
Flexible Renegotiation and Persistent Private Information
Florian Scheuer
Ian Ball
Informational Requirements for Cooperation: Theory and Applications
Xiaosheng Mu
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
Micro Theory Seminar - Goncalves
Matching to Produce Information
Warren Center Distinguished Lecture - Gossip: Identifying Central Individuals in Networks and Diffusion Processes
Imperfect Platform Competition: A General Framework
Juan Pablo Xandri
Omer Tamuz
The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring
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