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Self-confirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty
Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result
Simone Galperti
Julia Salmi
Stephen Morris
Alex Frankel
Sequential Information Design
Incentives for Spot Market Labor When Output is Unverifiable
Bayesian Learning and Corruption Detection on Networks
Masaki Aoyagi
Marcin Pęski
On Dynamic Pricing
Cancelled: Micro Theory Seminar
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
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