Skip to main content
University of Pennsylvania
School of Arts and Sciences
P
enn
E
conomics
IER
PIER
PFSRDC
PISM
Toggle navigation
Main navigation
Home
About
Undergraduate
Graduate
People
Courses
Events
News
Research
Search Results
Search
The Implementation Duality
Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
Revealed Willpower
Joel Sobel
Market Design and Walrasian Equilibrium
Online: R < 1 as an Economic Constraint: Can We “Expand the Frontier” in the Fight Against Covid-19?
Micro Theory Seminar
Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games
On the Asymptotic Efficiency of Stable Matchings
Monotone Additive Statistics
Inertial Updating
Flexible Renegotiation and Persistent Private Information
Florian Scheuer
Jeff Ely
Pagination
First page
« First
Previous page
‹‹
Page
1
Current page
2
Page
3
Page
4
Page
5
Page
6
Page
7
Page
8
Page
9
…
Next page
››
Last page
Last »
© 2024 The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania