18-001 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
A Very Robust Auction Mechanism |
15-026 |
Patrick DeJarnette, David Dillenberger, Daniel Gottlieb, Pietro Ortoleva |
Time Lotteries, Second Version |
17-026 |
Drew Fudenberg |
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
17-025 |
Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan |
The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete? An Application to Human Perception of Randomness |
17-024 |
Xiaosheng Mu |
Complementary Information and Learning Traps |
17-023 |
Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis |
Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition |
17-022 |
Yiran Chen, Hanming Fang |
Inferring the Ideological Affliations of Political Committees via Financial Contributions Networks |
17-021 |
Aislinn Bohren, Alex Imas, Michael Rosenberg |
The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence |
17-020 |
Rodrigo Azuero, David Zarruk Valencia |
The Effects of Student Loans on the Provision and Demand for Higher Education |
17-019 |
Jere R. Behrman, Dante Contreras, Isidora Palma, Esteban Puentes |
Wealth Disparities for Early Childhood Anthropometrics and Skills: Evidence from Chilean Longitudinal Data |
17-018 |
Guido Menzio |
The (Q,S,s) Pricing Rule: A Quantitative Analysis |
17-017 |
Francis X. Diebold, Minchul Shin |
Beating the Simple Average: Egalitarian LASSO for Combining Economic Forecasts |
17-016 |
Thorsten Drautzburg, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde , Pablo Guerrón-Quintana |
Political Distribution Risk and Aggregate Fluctuations |
17-015 |
Harold L. Cole, Daniel Neuhann, Guillermo Ordonez |
A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information |
17-014 |
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde , Tano Santos |
Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case |
17-013 |
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, Pietro Ortoleva, Gil Riella |
Deliberately Stochastic |
17-012 |
Juan Pablo Atal, Hanming Fang, Martin Karlsson, Nicolas Ziebarth |
Exit, Voice or Loyalty? An Investigation into Mandated Portability of Front-Loaded Private Health Plans |
17-011 |
Yuichi Yamamoto |
We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known |
17-010 |
Nicholas Janetos |
Voting as a signal of education |
17-009 |
Nicholas Janetos |
Fads and imperfect information |
17-008 |
Robert Barro, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde , Oren Levintal, Andrew Mollerus |
Safe Assets |
17-007 |
Aislinn Bohren, Daniel Hauser |
Bounded Rationality And Learning: A Framwork and A Robustness Result* |
17-006 |
Laura Liu |
Density Forecasts in Panel Models: A semiparametric Bayesian Perspective* |
17-005 |
Hanming Fang, Zenan Wu |
Life Insurance and Life Settlement Markets with Overconfident Policyholders |
17-004 |
Audrey Hu, Steven Matthews, Liang Zou |
Low Reserve Prices in Auctions |
17-003 |
Francis X. Diebold, Laura Liu, Kamil Yilmaz |
Commodity Connectedness |
17-002 |
Julio Carrillo, Enrique G. Mendoza, Victoria Nuguer, Jessica Roldan-Pena |
Tight Money-Tight Credit: Coordination Failure in the Conduct of Monetary and Financial Policies |
17-001 |
|
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification* |
16-029 |
|
Inference of Preference Heterogeneity from Choice Data |
16-028 |
|
Games of Incomplete Information Played by Statisticians |
16-027 |
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde |
The Economic Consequences of Labor Market Regulations |
16-026 |
Maryam Farboodi, Gregor Jarosch, Guido Menzio |
Intermediation as Rent Extraction |
16-025 |
Sarah Baird, Aislinn Bohren, Craig McIntosh, Berk Ozler |
Optimal Design of Experiments in the Presence of Interference*, Second Version |
16-024 |
Aislinn Bohren |
Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem |
16-023 |
Aislinn Bohren, Troy Kravitz |
Optimal Contracting with Costly State Verification, with an Application to Crowdsourcing |
16-022 |
Laura Liu, Hyungsik Moon, Frank Schorfheide |
Forecasting with Dynamic Panel Data Models |
16-021 |
R. Jason Faberman, Guido Menzio |
Evidence on the Relationship between Recruiting and the Starting Wage |
16-020 |
Enrique G. Mendoza |
Macroprudential Policy: Promise and Challenges |
16-019 |
Pablo D'Erasmo, Enrique G. Mendoza |
Optimal Domestic (and External) Sovereign Default |
16-018 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris, Andrew Postlewaite |
Laws and Authority |
16-017 |
Edward Herbst, Frank Schorfheide |
Tempered Particle Filtering |
16-016 |
Hanming Fang, Zenan Wu |
Multidimensional Private Information, Market Structure and Insurance Markets |
16-015 |
David Dillenberger, Colin Raymond |
Group-Shift and the Consensus Effect, Second Version |
16-014 |
Daniel Hauser |
Promoting a Reputation for Quality |
16-013 |
Venkataraman Bhaskar, George J. Mailath |
The Curse of Long Horizons |
16-012 |
Yuichi Yamamoto |
Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version |
16-011 |
David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna, Philipp Sadowski |
Subjective Dynamics Information Constraints |
16-009 |
|
Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments, Third Version |
16-008 |
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde |
Can Currency Competition Work? |
16-007 |
|
Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition |