Information Choice in Auctions
-Micro Theory Seminar
Nina Bobkova
Rice University
Fragile Financial Coalitions under Belief Coordination Frictions
-Micro Theory Seminar
George Mailath
University of Pennsylvania
Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
-Micro Theory Seminar
Rakesh Vohra
University of Pennsylvania
Misspecified Politics and the Recurrence of Populism
-Micro Theory Seminar
Gilat Levy
London School of Economics
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
-Micro Theory Seminar
Takuo Sugaya
Stanford University
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching
-Micro Theory Seminar
Joyee Deb
Yale University
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
-Micro Theory Seminar
Ran Shorrer
Penn State University
Auctions with frictions
-Micro Theory Seminar
Asher Wolinsky
Northwestern
Knowledge Hierarchies
-Micro Theory Seminar
Alex Frankel
Chicago Booth
Attention Please!
-Micro Theory Seminar
Colin Stewart
University of Toronto