From Bad Institutions to Worse: The Role of History in Development
-Political Economy Workshop
Stephen Parente
University of Illinois
PIER Lecture -Testing Contract Theory
-Political Economy Workshop
Pierre Andre Chiappori
University of Chicago
An Equilibrium Model of Federal Mandates
-Political Economy Workshop
Thomas Palfrey
Caltech visiting NYU and Princeton
Deliberation and Voting Rules
-Political Economy Workshop
Timothy Feddersen
Northwestern University
Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication
-Political Economy Workshop
Dino Gerardi
Yale University
Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda
-Political Economy Workshop
Stephen Coate
Cornell University
Careerist Judges
-Political Economy Workshop
Gilat Levy
London School of Economics
A Dynamic Model of Voting
-Political Economy Workshop
Arianna Degan
University of Pennsylvania
Financial Crises and Political Crises
-Political Economy Workshop
Roberto Chang
Rutgers University
Democratically Elected Aristocracies
-Political Economy Workshop
Uzi Segal
Boston College
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