Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
-Micro Theory Seminar, Junior Recruiting Seminar
Shengwu Li
Stanford University
Games with Unrestricted Information Acquisition
-Micro Theory Seminar, Junior Recruiting Seminar
Tommaso Denti
MIT
Evidence and Commitment in Allocation Mechanisms
-Micro Theory Seminar
Bart Lipman
Boston University
Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities
-Micro Theory Seminar
Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Drexel University
Motivational Ratings
-Micro Theory Seminar
Johannes Hörner
Yale University
Random Choice and Learning
-Micro Theory Seminar
Paulo Natenzon
Washington University in St. Louis
Biased Learning and Permanent Reputation
-Micro Theory Seminar
Ju Hu
Penn Graduate Student
Competition with Buyer Side Externalities
-Micro Theory Seminar
Mariann Ollar
Post Doctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania
Network Hazard and Bailouts
-Micro Theory Seminar
Selman Erol
Penn Graduate Student
The Optimal Design of a Criminal Justice System
-Micro Theory Seminar
Francisco Silva
Penn Graduate Student
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