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Auctions with Limited Commitment
Risk Aversion and the Value of Information
Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment
Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
Alessandro Pavan
Micro Theory Seminar - Goncalves
Coalitional Bargaining in Stationary Markets
A Theory of Firm-Level Production Networks
Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games
Robust Performance Evaluation
Marzena Rostek
Conflict and Failure of Learning in Bargaining
Larry Epstein
Dynamic Monitoring Design
Erik Madsen
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