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Muddled Information
Bruno Strulovici
Michihiro Kandori
Sylvain Chassang
Image-Building Persuasion
John Quah
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
Moral Hazard in Continuous-Time Stochastic Games: Beyond Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
Network Hazard and Bailouts
The Core of Bayesian Persuasion
Allais, Ellsberg, and Preference Hedging
Itay Fainmesser
Franz Ostrizek
Contracting with Private Information, Moral Hazard, and Limited Commitment
Waiting for Good or Bad News
Pagination
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