Junior Recruiting Seminar

• Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games

• Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages

• Mechanism Design with Endogenous Information Acquistion, Status, and Participation

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  Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition

• Matching and Price Competition with Multiple Vacancies

• Pricing and Entry Incentives with Exclusive Contracts: Evidence from Smartphones

• Anant Nyshadham

• Hee Kwon Seo

• Hidden Rust Models

• Competing Auctioneers

• Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics

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  Job Risk, Separation Shocks and Household Asset Allocation

• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis

• External Financing and the Role of Financial Frictions over the Business Cycle: Measurement and Theory

• Gregor Jarosch