| 24-035 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Information Requirements for Mechanism Design |
| 23-018 |
Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite |
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication |
| 23-019 |
John Knowles, Andrew Postlewaite |
Future Orientedness |
| 23-008 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Information Requirements for Mechanism Design |
| 23-009 |
Tatiana Daddario, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities |
| 22-008 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology |
| 22-013 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Theories and Their Dueling Interpretations |
| 21-003 |
Wayne Yuan Gao , Andrew Postlewaite, Holger Sieg |
Using Monotonicity Restrictions to Identify Models with Partially Latent Covariates |
| 20-025 |
Rong Hai, Dirk Krueger, Andrew Postlewaite |
On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods |
| 18-001 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
A Very Robust Auction Mechanism |
| 18-026 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
What Are Axiomatizations Good For? |
| 18-027 |
Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future |
| 16-003 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Memorable Consumption |
| 16-004 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism, Second Version |
| 16-018 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris, Andrew Postlewaite |
Laws and Authority |
| 15-011 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational size and two-stage mechanisms |
| 15-013 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Consumer Choice as Constrained Imitation |
| 15-023 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version |
| 15-034 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
| 15-012 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Buying Locally |
| 15-004 |
Rong Hai, Dirk Krueger, Andrew Postlewaite |
On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods, Second Version |
| 15-005 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Memory Utility |
| 15-006 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Plausible Cooperation, Fourth Version |
| 15-009 |
David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen |
Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Fifth Version |
| 14-026 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
A Model of Modeling |
| 14-012 |
Rong Hai, Andrew Postlewaite, Dirk Krueger |
On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods, Second Version |
| 13-007 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Models as Analogies, Third Version |
| 13-017 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Auctions, Second Version |
| 13-020 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Belief free equilibria |
| 13-022 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Folk Theorems, Second Version |
| 13-028 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
| 13-039 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Rhetoric and Analogies |
| 13-046 |
Rong Hai, Dirk Krueger, Andrew Postlewaite |
On the Welfare Cost of Consumption Fluctuations in the Presence of Memorable Goods |
| 13-060 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
| 13-068 |
David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen |
Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Fourth Version |
| 13-001 |
David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen |
Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Third Version |
| 13-008 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Plausible Cooperation, Third Version |
| 13-005 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version |
| 12-001 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Models as Analogies |
| 12-008 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
| 12-027 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Belief Formation, Second Version |
| 12-030 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Models as Analogies, Second Version |
| 12-031 |
David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen |
Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility, Second Version |
| 12-032 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Matching with Incomplete Information |
| 12-042 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
| 11-029 |
Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version |
| 11-036 |
David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen |
Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility |
| 10-019 |
Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Norms and Preferences, Chapter for the Handbook for Social Economics |
| 10-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Pricing in Matching Markets |
| 10-040 |
Benjamin Lester, Andrew Postlewaite, Randall Wright |
Information, Liquidity, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Second Version |
| 10-039 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Plausible Cooperation, Second Version |
| 10-037 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets, Second Version |
| 10-031 |
Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Norms and Preferences, Chapter for the Handbook for Social Economics, Edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin and M. Jackson |
| 09-019 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Effecting Cooperation |
| 09-004 |
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite |
Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? |
| 08-043 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality, Second Version |
| 08-039 |
Benjamin Lester, Andrew Postlewaite, Randall Wright |
Information, Liquidity and Asset Prices |
| 08-026 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing |
| 08-003 |
Philipp Kircher, Andrew Postlewaite |
Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation |
| 08-002 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling, Second Version |
| 07-023 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Probabilities in Economic Modeling |
| 07-001 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality, Second Version |
| 07-020 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments, Fourth Version |
| 06-002 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Second Version |
| 06-001 |
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite |
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies. Second Version |
| 06-028 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Third Version |
| 06-025 |
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite |
Active Courts and Menu Contracts |
| 06-024 |
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite |
Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?, Second Version |
| 06-007 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations |
| 06-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Assets, Third Version |
| 05-027 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Thomas R. Palfrey, Andrew Postlewaite |
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections, Second Version |
| 05-024 |
Ichiro Obara, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games |
| 05-021 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Thomas R. Palfrey, Andrew Postlewaite |
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections |
| 05-016 |
Dino Gerardi, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Aggregation of Expert Opinions |
| 05-002 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Fact-Free Learning, Second Version |
| 05-001 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Dan Silverman |
Social Isolation and Inequality, Second Version |
| 04-040 |
Richard McLean, James Peck, Andrew Postlewaite |
On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies |
| 04-025 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Assets, Second Version |
| 04-023 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Confidence-Enhanced Performance, Third Version |
| 04-021 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments and Preferences for Risk |
| 04-017 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Dan Silverman |
Social Isolation and Inequality |
| 04-013 |
Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite, Dan Silverman |
The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, Third Version |
| 04-011 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Rationality of Belief Or: Why Bayesianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality |
| 04-007 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices, Second Version |
| 03-036 |
Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite, Dan Silverman |
The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, Second Version: December 3, 2003 |
| 03-027 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information |
| 03-023 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Fact-Free Learning |
| 03-021 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version |
| 03-018 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite |
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version |
| 03-014 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
| 03-026 |
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite |
Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? |
| 03-011 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions, Second Version |
| 03-009 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Confidence-Enhanced Performance, Second Version |
| 03-003 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty, Second Version |
| 02-035 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
The Social Context of Economic Decisions |
| 02-027 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler |
Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off |
| 02-020 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions |
| 02-018 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite |
The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities, Second Version |
| 02-012 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite |
The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities |
| 02-004 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria |
| 02-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Assets |
| 01-053 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility without Negligible Aggregate Uncertainty |
| 01-050 |
Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite, Dan Silverman |
The Effects of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height |
| 01-030 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Interdependent Valuations and Multidimensional Signals |
| 01-015 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Information Size and Incentive Compatibility |
| 01-02 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information |
| 01-011 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information |
| 01-010 |
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite |
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies |
| 01-057 |
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite |
Confidence Enhanced Performance |
| 00-10 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy |
| 00-06 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
| 00-05 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
| 99-004 |
Enriqueta Aragones, Andrew Postlewaite |
Ambiguity in Election Games |
| 99-14 |
Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility |
| 98-008 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments |
| 98-13 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments |
| 97-14 |
Andrew Postlewaite |
The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences |
| 96-04 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms |
| 95-14 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models |
