Working Papers by Harold L. Cole

Paper Number	Author	Title
23-006	Harold L. Cole, Thomas F. Cooley	Rating Agencies
22-017	Harold L. Cole, Daniel Neuhann, Guillermo Ordonez	Information Spillovers and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets the Eurozone Crisis
21-011	Harold L. Cole, Daniel Neuhann, Guillermo Ordonez	Information Spillovers in Sovereign Debt Markets
20-002	Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath, Yena Park	Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword
20-003	Mark Aguiar, Satyajit Chatterjee , Harold L. Cole, Zachary Stangebye	Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited
17-015	Harold L. Cole, Daniel Neuhann, Guillermo Ordonez	A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information
14-023	Harold L. Cole, Soojin Kim, Dirk Krueger	Analyzing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Trade-off between Short Run Insurance Benefits vs. Long Run Incentive Costs
12-047	Harold L. Cole, Soojin Kim, Dirk Krueger	Analyzing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Trade-off between Short Run Insurance Benefits vs. Long Run Incentive Costs
10-038	Harold L. Cole, Felix Kubler	Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets
08-025	Harold L. Cole	Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims
00-10	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
00-06	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Investment and Concern for Relative Position
00-05	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
98-008	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
98-13	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
96-04	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
95-14	Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite	Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models