| 20-002 |
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath, Yena Park |
Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword |
| 19-001 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference |
| 19-018 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
| 18-029 |
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath |
The Curse of Long Horizons |
| 16-013 |
Venkataraman Bhaskar, George J. Mailath |
The Curse of Long Horizons |
| 16-018 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris, Andrew Postlewaite |
Laws and Authority |
| 15-012 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Buying Locally |
| 15-008 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Lucy White |
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime |
| 15-034 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
| 13-034 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Reputations in Repeated Games |
| 13-028 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
| 13-044 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version |
| 13-060 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
| 12-003 |
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory |
| 12-008 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
| 12-032 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Matching with Incomplete Information |
| 12-042 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
| 12-043 |
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games |
| 11-012 |
Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence |
| 10-037 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets, Second Version |
| 10-032 |
George J. Mailath, Ernest-Ludwig Thadden |
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications |
| 10-007 |
George J. Mailath |
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version |
| 10-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Pricing in Matching Markets |
| 09-029 |
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games |
| 08-027 |
George J. Mailath |
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version |
| 08-019 |
George J. Mailath |
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring |
| 07-024 |
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version |
| 07-022 |
George J. Mailath, Georg Noldeke |
Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? |
| 07-018 |
Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Common Learning |
| 07-034 |
George J. Mailath |
Reputation Effects |
| 06-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Assets, Third Version |
| 05-014 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version |
| 04-039 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Lucy White |
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games |
| 04-033 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
| 04-031 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version |
| 04-025 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Assets, Second Version |
| 04-008 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
| 04-007 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices, Second Version |
| 04-004 |
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
| 03-021 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version |
| 03-018 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite |
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version |
| 03-016 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version |
| 03-014 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
| 02-035 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
The Social Context of Economic Decisions |
| 02-021 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
| 02-018 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite |
The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities, Second Version |
| 02-012 |
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite |
The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities |
| 02-004 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria |
| 02-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Social Assets |
| 01-10 |
George J. Mailath, Steven Matthews, Tadashi Sekiguchi |
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
| 01-014 |
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi |
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
| 01-009 |
George J. Mailath, Steven Matthews, Tadashi Sekiguchi |
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
| 00-10 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy |
| 00-20 |
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi |
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
| 00-07 |
George J. Mailath, Alvaro Sandroni |
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information |
| 00-06 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Investment and Concern for Relative Position |
| 00-05 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies |
| 99-09 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring |
| 98-13 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments |
| 98-12 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
| 98-009 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
| 98-11 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be |
| 98-008 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments |
| 98-07 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
| 98-006 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be |
| 98-06 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search |
| 98-004 |
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris |
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective |
| 98-002 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search |
| 98-001 |
George J. Mailath |
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory |
| 98-01 |
George J. Mailath |
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory |
| 97-011 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen Swinkels |
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? |
| 97-006 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
| 96-04 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms |
| 95-16 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
| 95-14 |
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite |
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models |
