Working Papers by George J. Mailath

Paper Number Author Title
20-002 Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath, Yena Park Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword
19-001 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference
19-018 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
18-029 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath The Curse of Long Horizons
16-013 Venkataraman Bhaskar, George J. Mailath The Curse of Long Horizons
16-018 George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris, Andrew Postlewaite Laws and Authority
15-012 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Buying Locally
15-008 George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Lucy White When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
15-034 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
13-028 Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
13-044 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version
13-060 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
13-034 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Reputations in Repeated Games
12-043 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
12-003 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
12-008 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
12-032 Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Matching with Incomplete Information
12-042 Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
11-012 Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence
10-037 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets, Second Version
10-032 George J. Mailath, Ernest-Ludwig Thadden Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications
10-007 George J. Mailath Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version
10-003 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Pricing in Matching Markets
09-029 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
08-027 George J. Mailath Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
08-019 George J. Mailath Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
07-034 George J. Mailath Reputation Effects
07-024 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version
07-022 George J. Mailath, Georg Noldeke Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?
07-018 Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Common Learning
06-003 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Social Assets, Third Version
05-014 George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version
04-033 George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
04-031 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version
04-025 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Social Assets, Second Version
04-008 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
04-007 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices, Second Version
04-004 V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
04-039 George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Lucy White When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
03-021 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version
03-018 George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version
03-016 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version
03-014 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
02-035 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite The Social Context of Economic Decisions
02-021 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
02-018 George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities, Second Version
02-012 George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke, Andrew Postlewaite The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities
02-004 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria
02-003 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Social Assets
01-014 George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
01-009 George J. Mailath, Steven Matthews, Tadashi Sekiguchi Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
01-10 George J. Mailath, Steven Matthews, Tadashi Sekiguchi Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
00-10 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
00-20 George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
00-07 George J. Mailath, Alvaro Sandroni Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
00-06 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Investment and Concern for Relative Position
00-05 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
99-09 George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
98-13 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
98-12 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Who Wants a Good Reputation?
98-009 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Who Wants a Good Reputation?
98-11 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be
98-008 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
98-07 George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
98-006 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be
98-06 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search
98-004 George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
98-002 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search
98-001 George J. Mailath Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory
98-01 George J. Mailath Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory
97-011 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen Swinkels How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
97-006 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
96-04 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
95-16 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
95-14 Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models