Working Papers by Richard McLean

Paper Number Author Title
18-001 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite A Very Robust Auction Mechanism
15-011 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational size and two-stage mechanisms
15-023 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite A Dynamic Non-direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version
13-005 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version
11-029 Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version
06-007 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
05-024 Ichiro Obara, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
05-016 Dino Gerardi, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Aggregation of Expert Opinions
04-040 Richard McLean, James Peck, Andrew Postlewaite On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies
03-027 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information
03-011 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size and Efficient Auctions, Second Version
03-003 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty, Second Version
02-020 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
01-015 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Information Size and Incentive Compatibility
01-011 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information
01-02 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information
01-053 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility without Negligible Aggregate Uncertainty
01-030 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Interdependent Valuations and Multidimensional Signals
99-14 Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility