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This paper explores the role that political institutions play in sparking or mitigating ethnic identification. I provide a formal model of ethnic identification as a function of institutional design and social context that focuses on one question: What kinds of institutions will induce individuals to identify with the state rather than along ethnic lines? Varying the size and number of ethnic groups, the distribution of preferences across and within ethnic groups, and the wealth of groups, the model offers predictions about: when political institutions are capable

of inducing a national identity; when economic aid and/or redistribution is capable of inducing a national identity; the types of societies that are most prone to strong ethnic identities; and, the types of groups an institution should favor when the institutional goal is to induce identification with the state. I conclude with an application of the model to the question of institutional design in Iraq. The model provides one explanation for why a period of low Sunni representation in Iraqi government would dramatically increase sectarianism, and why a more proportional Iraqi parliament may not necessarily remedy the problem.

For more information, contact Antonio Merlo.