Joonbae Lee
Wage Dynamics with Developing Asymmetric Information
A worker's ability to switch jobs is important in understanding individual wage growth and wage offered in the labor market, as shown by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). This paper reconciles the tension between the theory of wage growth by on-the-job search and the negative correlation between job mobility and wage. Workers are heterogeneous in productivity, and when a poaching firm contacts an employed worker, it is possible that the incumbent firm knows the worker's type, while the poaching firm does not. This introduces asymmetry of information when a poaching firm and the incumbent firm plays first-price auction game as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). When the incumbent is better informed than the poaching firm, low-type workers change jobs more frequently and job-to-job transitions convey negative information about worker type. The model implies that the policy which bans employers from inquiring about applicants' wage histories decreases wage dispersion between types, but might have an unintended consequence of increased adverse selection.
Ranking and Search Effort in Matching (with Hanna Wang)
This paper studies the equilibrium of an application game where applicants have to pay a cost (search effort) to match with a vacancy. We analyse a strategic situation where an applicant knows his/her ranking in the cohort, while applicants' preferences over employers are idiosyncratic. This introduces a coordination problem because an applicant faces uncertainty over where competing applicants have applied. We characterize the equilibrium in which an applicant's optimal number of applications is determined by his/her matching probability, which is in turn determined by equilibrium applications of other applicants. We show that in equilibrium, high-ranked and lower-ranked applicants send fewer applications than applicants of mid-range rank. This mechanism is shown to exacerbate differences in outcome for high and low rank applicants. Comparative statics show that low rank applicants can benefit from an increase in application cost. A planner who treats all applicants equally chooses monotone increasing application choice.
|
Graduate level courses at UPenn |
|||
| Economics for Social Policy (Masters) Teaching Assistant for Prof. Ioana Marinescu |
Fall, 2018 School of Social Policy and Practice |
||
| Math Camp for Incoming Graduate Students Instructor |
Summer, 2016 Dept. of Economics |
||
| Graduate Game Theory Teaching Assistant for Prof. George Mailath and Prof. Mallesh Pai |
Fall, 2015 Dept. of Economics |
||
| Graduate Game Theory Teaching Assistant for Prof. George Mailath and Prof. Mallesh Pai |
Fall, 2014 Dept. of Economics |
||
|
Undergraduate level courses at UPenn |
|||
| Statistics for Economists Instructor |
Summer, 2018 Dept. of Economics |
||
| Intermediate Microeconomics Recitation Instructor for Prof. Kenneth Burdett |
Spring, 2018 Dept. of Economics |
||
| Strategic Reasoning Teaching Assistant for Prof. Deniz Selman |
Fall, 2017 Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program |
||
| Strategic Reasoning Teaching Assistant for Prof. David Dillenberger |
Spring, 2015 Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program |
Applied Microeconomic Theory, Labor Economics
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics
133 South 36th St. Philadelphia, PA19104-6297
Kenneth Burdett
Benjamin Lester
|
Professor Kenneth Burdett (Advisor, on Leave) |
|
Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics 133 South 36th St., Office 524 |
|
|
|
Benjamin Lester, Ph.D. (Advisor) |
|
Senior Economic Advisor and Economist Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Ten Independence Mall Philadelphia, PA19106-1574 |
|
|
|
Professor George Mailath |
|
Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics 133 South 36th St., Office 522 |
|
|
|
Professor Andrew Postlewaite |
|
Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics 133 South 36th St., Office 515 |