Joonbae Lee

Joonbae Lee Picture
Job Market Paper

Wage Dynamics with Developing Asymmetric Information

A worker's ability to switch jobs is important in understanding individual wage growth and wage offered in the labor market, as shown by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). This paper reconciles the tension between the theory of wage growth by on-the-job search and the negative correlation between job mobility and wage. Workers are heterogeneous in productivity, and when a poaching firm contacts an employed worker, it is possible that the incumbent firm knows the worker's type, while the poaching firm does not. This introduces asymmetry of information when a poaching firm and the incumbent firm plays first-price auction game as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). When the incumbent is better informed than the poaching firm, low-type workers change jobs more frequently and job-to-job transitions convey negative information about worker type. The model implies that the policy which bans employers from inquiring about applicants' wage histories decreases wage dispersion between types, but might have an unintended consequence of increased adverse selection.

Download Paper

Other Research

Ranking and Search Effort in Matching (with Hanna Wang)

This paper studies the equilibrium of an application game where applicants have to pay a cost (search effort) to match with a vacancy. We analyse a strategic situation where an applicant knows his/her ranking in the cohort, while applicants' preferences over employers are idiosyncratic. This introduces a coordination problem because an applicant faces uncertainty over where competing applicants have applied. We characterize the equilibrium in which an applicant's optimal number of applications is determined by his/her matching probability, which is in turn determined by equilibrium applications of other applicants. We show that in equilibrium, high-ranked and lower-ranked applicants send fewer applications than applicants of mid-range rank. This mechanism is shown to exacerbate differences in outcome for high and low rank applicants. Comparative statics show that low rank applicants can benefit from an increase in application cost. A planner who treats all applicants equally chooses monotone increasing application choice.

Download Paper

Teaching Experience

Graduate level courses at UPenn

     
Economics for Social Policy (Masters)
Teaching Assistant for Prof. Ioana Marinescu
  Fall, 2018
School of Social Policy and Practice
Math Camp for Incoming Graduate Students
Instructor
  Summer, 2016
Dept. of Economics
Graduate Game Theory
Teaching Assistant for Prof. George Mailath and Prof. Mallesh Pai
  Fall, 2015
Dept. of Economics
Graduate Game Theory
Teaching Assistant for Prof. George Mailath and Prof. Mallesh Pai
  Fall, 2014
Dept. of Economics
     

Undergraduate level courses at UPenn

   
Statistics for Economists
Instructor
  Summer, 2018
Dept. of Economics
Intermediate Microeconomics
Recitation Instructor for Prof. Kenneth Burdett
  Spring, 2018
Dept. of Economics
Strategic Reasoning
Teaching Assistant for Prof. Deniz Selman
  Fall, 2017
Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program
Strategic Reasoning
Teaching Assistant for Prof. David Dillenberger
  Spring, 2015
Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program
Interests

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Labor Economics

Address

Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics
133 South 36th St. Philadelphia, PA19104-6297

Phone

267-777-2676

Email

joonbae@sas.upenn.edu

Download CV

Advisors

Kenneth Burdett

Benjamin Lester

References

Professor Kenneth Burdett (Advisor, on Leave)

Department of Economics

University of Pennsylvania

The Ronald O. Perelman Center for

Political Science and Economics

133 South 36th St., Office 524

kennethb@econ.upenn.edu

 

Benjamin Lester, Ph.D. (Advisor)

Senior Economic Advisor and Economist

Research Department,

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Ten Independence Mall

Philadelphia, PA19106-1574

Benjamin.Lester@phil.frb.org

 

Professor George Mailath

Department of Economics

University of Pennsylvania

The Ronald O. Perelman Center for

Political Science and Economics

133 South 36th St., Office 522

gmailath@econ.upenn.edu

 

Professor Andrew Postlewaite

Department of Economics

University of Pennsylvania

The Ronald O. Perelman Center for

Political Science and Economics

133 South 36th St., Office 515

apostlew@econ.upenn.edu

Job Market Candidate Status
I will be available for interviews at the European Job Market, on December 6-7 2018, in Naples, Italy, and at the 2019 ASSA meetings in Atlanta.