Alberto Ramirez de Aguilar
Debt, Inflation, and Government Reputation
This paper develops a theoretical framework to explain the correlation between public debt and inflation through different episodes, focusing on the role of government reputation (defined as the public's belief in the government's commitment to low inflation) in shaping inflation expectations. I propose a dynamic game model with incomplete information where private agents (wage setters) and a consolidated government (a player taking fiscal and monetary policy decisions) interact over time. The government's type is private information, and wage setters learn the type of the government through the observed history of implemented policies. The government can be either prudent, prioritizing low inflation, or imprudent, favoring short-term output and debt gains through higher inflation. Wage setters form inflation expectations based on the government's debt trajectory and its perceived reputation. The model implies a monotonic relationship between inflation and reputation, in the sense that higher government reputation implies lower inflation. In addition, as the government's reputation increases, the incidence of the current debt state on inflation is reduced. Hence, when reputation is strong, a government can sustain low inflation even with high debt. I calibrate the model using data from four emerging markets (Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, and Thailand), illustrating how government reputation influences inflation dynamics. The findings underscore the importance of maintaining low inflation as debt rises to build and preserve government credibility while also providing insights into the periods of high correlation between debt and inflation observed in these economies.
University of Pennsylvania
Spring, 2024 Introduction to Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Fall, 2023 Introduction to Microeconomics, Undergraduate, Teaching Assistant
Summer, 2023 Math Camp, Ph.D. Course, Main Instructor
Spring, 2023 Game Theory and Applications, Ph.D. Course, Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2022 Microeconomic Theory I, Ph.D. Course, Teaching Assistant
Summer, 2022 Math Camp, Ph.D. Course, Main Instructor
Spring, 2022 Microeconomic Theory II, Ph.D. Course, Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2021 Macroeconomic Theory I, Ph.D. Course, Teaching Assistant
Summer, 2021 Math Camp, Ph.D. Course, Main Instructor
Spring, 2021 Introductory Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Teaching Assistant
Fall, 2020 Macroeconomic Theory I, Ph.D. Course, Teaching Assistant
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
Summer, 2024 Advanced Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Summer, 2023 Advanced Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Summer, 2022 Advanced Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Summer, 2021 Advanced Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Fall, 2020 Intermediate Microeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Summer, 2020 Advanced Macroeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Spring, 2019 Intermediate Microeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Fall, 2018 Intermediate Microeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Spring, 2018 Intermediate Microeconomics, Undergraduate, Main Instructor
Other Working Papers
“Fiscal Policy and Inflation: Understanding the Role of Expectations in Mexico” with Bernabe Lopez-Martin and Daniel Samano, Inter-American Development Bank Working Papers, 2018
Macroeconomic Theory, Fiscal and Monetary Policy
133 South 36th Street, Office 635
Harold L. Cole
Harold L. Cole
Advisor
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
133 S. 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
+1 (215) 898 7788
George J. Mailath
Committee Member
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
133 S. 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
+1 (215) 898 7908
Alessandro Dovis
Committee Member
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
133 S. 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
+1 (215) 898 5421
Diego Dominguez Larrea
Teaching Reference
Department of Economics
Instituto Tecnologico Autónomo de Mexico
Rio Hondo 1
Mexico City, Mexico, 01080
+ 52 (55) 1728 6049