Latent Heterogeneity in the Marginal Propensity to Consume*

Daniel Lewis  Davide Melcangi  Laura Pilossoph†
FRBNY       FRBNY       FRBNY
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Abstract

We estimate the unconditional distribution of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) using clustering regression and the 2008 stimulus payments. Since we do not measure heterogeneity as the variation of MPCs with observables, we can recover the full distribution of MPCs. Households spent at least one quarter of the rebate, and individual households used rebates for different goods. While many observables are individually correlated with our estimated MPCs, these relationships disappear when tested jointly, except for non-salary income and the average propensity to consume. Household observables explain at most one quarter of MPC variation, highlighting the role of unobserved heterogeneity.

Keywords: Marginal Propensity to Consume, Consumption, Tax Rebate, Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Clustering, C-means

JEL Codes: D12, D91, E21, E32, E62

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†daniel.lewis@ny.frb.org, davide.melcangi@ny.frb.org, laura.pillosoph@ny.frb.org.
1 Introduction

Recent work highlights the importance of heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory income shocks for fiscal policy, the transmission of monetary policy, and welfare.\(^1\) Despite their importance, estimates of the distribution of MPCs are largely elusive. Even with plausibly identified transitory income shocks, estimating individual-level MPCs requires panel data with long horizons, which are typically not available; it also usually requires the unappealing assumption that an individual’s marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is time invariant.\(^2\) The existing literature, therefore, has followed one of two avenues: estimating a fully structural model and simulating a distribution of MPCs, or grouping observations by some presupposed observable characteristics and estimating group-specific MPCs out of transitory income shocks.\(^3\) However, because both of these approaches require taking a stance on the source of MPC heterogeneity, they may fail to uncover the true degree of heterogeneity, miss other relevant dimensions of heterogeneity that predict an individual’s MPC, or both.

In this paper, we estimate the distribution of MPCs directly. We adopt a Gaussian mixture linear regression (GMLR) (e.g., Quandt (1972)), which jointly (i) groups households together that have similar latent consumption responses to the 2008 tax rebate and (ii) provides estimates of the MPCs within these groups. Specifically, the algorithm takes a standard regression of consumption changes on the tax rebate receipt and basic controls (Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006), Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013)), but allows the coefficient on the rebate to be heterogeneous across unknown groups; the groups as well as their rebate coefficients are then jointly estimated.

This approach offers four advantages over existing efforts to recover the distribution of MPCs. First, it allows us to estimate the full unconditional distribution of MPCs, which can be driven both by latent factors and observable characteristics, broadly defined; understanding the range of such a distribution casts light on whether there is potential value, in principle, in attempting to target fiscal transfers to households more likely to spend

\(^1\)The MPC distribution is a crucial object in Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models of monetary policy (see Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018)). For example, Auclert (2019) shows that the response of aggregate consumption to monetary policy shocks depends on the covariance of the distribution of MPCs with the cyclicality of income, net nominal position, and unhedged interest rate exposure.

\(^2\)Nearly all theories of MPC heterogeneity have some form of state dependence. For example, in Carroll (1992) the MPC is a declining function of gross household wealth.

\(^3\)For the former, see for instance Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka, and White (2017). For the latter, Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik (2016) exploit randomized lottery winnings to identify transitory income shocks, and subsequently group observations on observables to estimate group-level MPCs. See also Johnson et al. (2006), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), Parker et al. (2013), Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014), and Crawley and Kuchler (2018).
the funds. Standard methods that rely on sample splitting by observable characteristics can recover only the extent to which the MPC varies with the chosen household characteristics, as opposed to a true distribution, and cannot recover heterogeneity in MPCs associated with latent factors (by definition) or different observables. Indeed, we find that the majority of MPC heterogeneity can be attributed to such latent traits; household observable characteristics explain only a small portion of the variance in MPCs. Second, because our approach does not require taking an ex ante stand on what observables correlate with MPC heterogeneity, we can “let the data speak” by investigating ex post which observables predict the recovered individual MPCs. Third, we show formally that our approach potentially overcomes the loss of statistical power which appears to affect the sample-splitting approach in existing studies. We find that a household’s MPC is correlated with various observable characteristics individually, and that these relationships are generally statistically significant, where previous studies obtained null results in the same data. Finally, by estimating household-level MPCs we are able to project them on various explanatory variables jointly. When doing so, we find that the majority of aforementioned significant univariate relationships disappear, leaving non-salary income and the average propensity to consume (APC, average consumption divided by income) as exceptions, both correlating positively with the MPC. By the same token, we can quantify the share of MPC variations explained jointly by observables, finding it lies below a quarter.

Our contribution hinges on the fact that clustering algorithms like the one we adopt assign individuals to groups not based on observable characteristics, but based on how well each set of estimated group-specific parameters describes the observations within the group. This feature allows us to bypass the ex ante decision of which observables matter for MPC heterogeneity, and instead estimate the heterogeneity directly first. GMLR specifies a linear regression model with different parameters for each group or “cluster”. It is a probabilistic clustering approach, in which individuals are not assigned to groups in a binary fashion, but instead have posterior weights derived from a Gaussian distribution of regression errors. Conditional on these weights, GMLR simply represents a weighted least squares (WLS) regression. When the panel dimension present in “hard clustering” approaches like that in Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) or Bonhomme et al. (2019) is absent, as is the case in our empirical setting, it is unrealistic to think that group assignment can be determined binarily in the presence of noise, so such continuous posterior weights are desirable to represent the level of uncertainty that exists in the assignment. Despite this uncertain assignment, GMLR estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal (e.g., Desarbo and Cron (1988)).
Applying our estimator to study the MPC distribution using the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act, we uncover a substantial degree of heterogeneity. In particular, households spend at least one fourth of the rebate within one quarter, with some households displaying an MPC above one. Generally, the share of households with a particular MPC declines as the MPC increases. At the same time, we estimate sizable MPCs even at the bottom of the distribution. Fagereng et al. (2016) and Olafsson and Pagel (2018) find evidence of similar behavior in Norway and Iceland respectively, and recent papers have proposed models of limited cognitive perception to rationalize such behavior (e.g., Ilut and Valchev (2020)).

We next estimate the distribution of MPCs for specific spending categories. For non-durable expenditure, a lower bound for the MPC of 16 cents on the dollar emerges. On the other hand, spending on durables is dichotomous, with a nontrivial fraction of households not spending any of the rebate on durables, while a significant share spent the entire rebate on such goods. Finally, since our approach provides household level, good-specific MPCs, and we compute their correlation. We find that households with higher nondurable MPCs also display higher durable MPCs, although the correlation is weak (~0.12).

Having characterized the distribution of marginal propensities to consume, we recover its observable drivers. Historically, the literature has found mixed empirical evidence and generally weak relationships between MPCs and observable household characteristics, with the possible exception of liquid wealth. This is likely due to a loss of statistical power when re-estimating the MPC with interactions or sample splits. We formally show that our approach may allow us to sidestep these issues. In practice, we indeed find that our estimated MPCs are significantly correlated, individually, with many observable drivers, despite the fact that we use the same identification strategy and dataset that previously delivered insignificant relationships. For example, we find that homeowners have significantly higher MPCs than renters, and households with a mortgage display even greater marginal propensities to consume than outright homeowners. The correlations hold for all expenditure categories that we consider.

Our estimates for household-level MPCs also allow us to study multivariate relationships without further losses of power. We find that only two observables are robust to the inclusion of additional regressors and positively correlate with MPCs: households’ non-salary income and their APC. Kueng (2018) also finds that high-income households have higher MPCs in Alaska Permanent Fund data. We highlight how our result cru-

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4Parker et al. (2013) find statistically insignificant differences by age, income, and liquid wealth. Broda and Parker (2014) and Fagereng et al. (2016) find significant relationships for the latter.
cially hinges on the non-salary component of income, such as business and financial income. Examining how MPCs vary jointly with income and the APC, we uncover three groups of households. “Poor-savers”, with low total income and a low APC, have the lowest MPCs. Households with high total income and a low APC, or vice versa, display intermediate marginal propensities to consume. The greatest MPCs are found among “rich-spenders”, who not only have high total income, but also typically spend a large portion of it. This group of households has not received much attention in models of consumption and savings.

Importantly, our best array of observable predictors is able to explain at most one quarter of the variation in estimated MPCs. With the vast majority of heterogeneity unexplained by standard observables, our results suggest that a relevant portion of MPC heterogeneity is driven by latent household traits. For example, heterogeneity in discount rates and/or intertemporal elasticities of substitution (Aguiar, Boar, and Bils (2019)) would deliver heterogeneity in MPCs, and is further supported by the aforementioned significance of APCs in predicting MPCs, as APCs can also be a function of the same unobserved traits. This type of unobserved heterogeneity could never be recovered by simply splitting the sample on observable characteristics and estimating within-subsample homogeneous MPCs, as is typically done in the literature.\textsuperscript{5}

Our results have four important policy implications. First, we find that 2008 Economic Stimulus payments increased spending of all households, at least in partial equilibrium. Second, the fact that we uncover considerable MPC heterogeneity suggests that, in principle, aggregate spending could be further increased by targeting fiscal transfers to high MPC households. Our robustly significant correlations suggest that it might be desirable to target relatively higher-income households to maximize the aggregate consumption effects of stimulus checks.\textsuperscript{6} Such a strategy may imply a tension between the stimulus and relief/insurance purposes of lump-sum transfers.\textsuperscript{7} However, since we find that observable characteristics predict little of the variation in MPCs, it is likely that any attempt at targeting will only exploit a limited share of the overall variation in MPCs, given the information available to fiscal authorities.

\textsuperscript{5}This is true unless preference heterogeneity is explicitly elicited in survey questions so that it can be used as an observable control. Using Nielsen panel data, Parker (2017) finds that the MPC out of the tax rebate is indeed strongly correlated with a self-reported measure of impatience.

\textsuperscript{6}Stimulus checks were phased out for households whose income was above $150,000 ($75,000 for single filers), implying that higher earners did not receive the rebate. Thus, our findings on the positive correlation of MPCs with total income are limited to households within the income range of stimulus checks recipients.

\textsuperscript{7}Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) find that low-income individuals were more likely to use the 2008 rebates to pay off debt. Similar patterns have been observed for the CARES act transfers in 2020, see Armantier et al. (2020). Our analysis focuses on the consumption effects of fiscal transfers but is consistent with a potential distributional trade-off.
We also believe our findings can be used to discipline heterogeneous agent models in three ways. First, our estimated full distribution of MPCs is an agnostic target, regardless of a model’s characteristics. Second, individual correlations between MPCs and observable characteristics are crucial objects for many heterogeneous agent models, and we are able to estimate them with statistical precision. Third, we provide researchers with an explicit number for the joint importance of observable and unobservable drivers for the distribution of MPCs.

Our paper is related to an extensive literature estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income shocks, and a smaller, complementary literature examining how it varies across households. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of existing papers study observable drivers of the MPC; we relate our findings to this literature. A burgeoning literature has turned its attention to unobserved household traits and preference heterogeneity. Our findings corroborate the importance of this dimension, recently highlighted by Alan, Browning, and Ejrnaes (2018), Parker (2017), Aguiar et al. (2019), and Gelman (2019).

Our approach allows us to flexibly and non-parametrically combine observed and unobserved MPC heterogeneity. In this respect, Misra and Surico (2014) is closest in spirit to our work. They estimate a quantile regression of consumption responses to the 2008 tax rebate using the same data, and find substantial heterogeneity. However, quantile regression estimates the role of regressors at specific points in the overall conditional distribution of the dependent variable. In Supplement B, we show how this approach is sensitive to the correlation of MPC heterogeneity with other forms of heterogeneity, since other factors may be quantitatively larger drivers of the conditional distribution of consumption than the tax rebate.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe our empirical strategy based on the 2008 tax rebate. In Section 3, we formulate the problem at hand and describe our clustering approach in detail. We also compare our methodology – recovering unconditional heterogeneity in the MPC and then regressing on observables – to previous approaches, stipulating correlates of the MPC and using them to estimate interacted regressions. Our results are outlined in Section 4, where we provide estimates of the distribution of MPCs for various consumption categories. Section 4.3 discusses observable characteristics that are correlated with the estimated MPCs. Section 4.5 shows the longer-run consumption responses to stimulus checks. Section 5 concludes.

8Other papers have used the “reported preference” approach, eliciting MPC heterogeneity directly from responses to survey questions. Recent examples include Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) and Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar (2018).
2 Empirical methodology

In order to estimate the marginal propensity to consume, and how it varies across households, we consider an off-the-shelf well-identified quasi-natural experiment: the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act (ESA), as studied by Parker et al. (2013), among others. Between April and July of 2008, $100 billion in tax rebates was sent to approximately 130 million US tax filers.\footnote{We defer to Parker et al. (2013) and Sahm et al. (2010) for an exhaustive discussion of the Economic Stimulus Act.} Importantly, the timing of rebate receipt was determined by the last two digits of the recipient’s Social Security Number (SSN), making the timing of receipt random. As in Parker et al. (2013), we exploit the randomized timing of the rebate receipt, but instead estimate heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume rather than a homogeneous marginal propensity to consume.

Our data come from the 2008 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which contains comprehensive and detailed measures of household-level consumption expenditures. The 2008 CEX wave also has supplemental questions on the ESA, including the amount of each stimulus payment received. While CEX expenditures are reported at the quarterly frequency, new households enter the survey at each month, making the frequency of our data monthly. Since we depart from Parker et al. (2013) by allowing for treatment heterogeneity, we present their homogeneous specification first as a useful benchmark, introducing our generalizations thereafter.

2.1 Homogeneous MPC

Parker et al. (2013) consider the following specification:

\[
\Delta C_j = \beta' \omega_j + \lambda R_j + \alpha + \epsilon_j, \quad j = 1, \ldots, N, \tag{1}
\]

where \(\Delta C_j\) is the first difference of consumption expenditure for \(j = (i, t)\), corresponding to household \(i\) in quarter \(t\).\footnote{To maintain consistent notation throughout the paper, we refer to \(j\) as the \((i, t)\) combination of household \(i\) in quarter \(t\). While we have information on the same households \(i\) in different periods \(t\), identification is not obtained by comparing individual responses over time, as in Parker et al. (2013). We do not exploit any limited panel structure, except to construct consumption changes for the left-hand-side variable. We return to this point below.} \(\omega_j\) is a set of controls including month dummies aimed at absorbing common time effects such as aggregate shocks, as well as seasonal factors.\footnote{In Parker et al. (2013), the other controls are age, change in number of adults in the household, and change in the number of children in the household. The controls we will use are the same, but additionally include age squared.} The independent variable of interest is \(R_j\), which denotes the amount of the tax rebate.
received by each household. \( \lambda \) is then interpreted as the causal effect of the rebate on expenditures, where identification is achieved by comparing expenditure changes of households that received the rebate in a certain period to expenditure changes of households that did not receive the rebate in the same period.\(^{12}\)

### 2.2 Heterogeneous MPCs

We depart from the homogeneous specification in Equation (1) and allow for heterogeneity in expenditure responses to the tax rebate across households. In particular, we augment the specification in Parker et al. (2013) as follows:

\[
\Delta C_j = \beta' \omega_j + \sum_{g=1}^{G} 1 \left[ j \in g \right] \left( \lambda_g R_j + \alpha_g \right) + \epsilon_j, j = 1, \ldots, N, \quad \forall g = 1, \ldots, G, \quad E \left[ \epsilon_j \mid \omega_j, R_j, j \in g \right] = 0,
\]

where \( 1 \left[ j \in g \right] \) is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if household \( i \) in period \( t \) belongs to a certain group \( g = 1, \ldots, G \). That is, we assume that heterogeneity in responses to the rebate can be summarized with \( G \) groups, characterized by the vector of coefficients \( \{ \alpha_g, \lambda_g \} \). We include group-specific intercepts, \( \alpha_g \), to correctly interpret \( \lambda_g \) as a marginal propensity to consume. For example, since we do not observe quarterly changes in income, failing to include group-specific level effects may bias MPC estimates due to heterogeneity in income changes unrelated to the tax rebate. We assume that the usual conditional mean independence assumption holds separately within each group; in practice, we instrument for \( R_j \) with an indicator for the timing of rebate receipt as in Parker et al. (2013) to make this assumption plausible. Our object of interest is \( \lambda = \left( \lambda_1 \ldots \lambda_G \right)' \), which describes MPC heterogeneity, while \( 1 \left[ j \in g \right] \) encodes the group membership of each household. The vector of coefficients, combined with \( 1 \left[ j \in g \right] \), gives an approximation of the MPC distribution. In the next section we discuss our clustering methodology to jointly estimate \( \lambda \) and \( 1 \left[ j \in g \right] \).

\(^{12}\)Kaplan and Violante (2014) discuss why \( \lambda \) may not correctly measure the marginal propensity to consume out of a transitory income shock, but is instead better thought of as a “rebate coefficient”. We address these issues in Supplement C.5.
3 A clustering approach to MPC estimation

To estimate group-specific MPCs according to (2), we must somehow assign individuals to groups. Previous papers have grouped individuals based on observable characteristics and estimated MPCs within those groups, but doing so presupposes the determinants of the MPCs *a priori*, and rather than a true distribution of MPCs, simply measures how the MPC changes with the chosen household characteristics. Instead, we do not suppose to know these determinants in advance (there is indeed considerable empirical and theoretical disagreement on this point), but rather aim to investigate correlates of the MPC *ex post*, requiring us to remain agnostic while recovering the MPCs.\(^{13}\) Moreover, we are interested in recovering the full degree of “latent” MPC heterogeneity, including variation not associated with observables. For these reasons, we group individuals on the basis of their heterogeneous MPCs themselves (and potentially other group-specific parameters). Clustering methods are tailored to this goal.\(^ {14}\)

### 3.1 Gaussian Mixture Linear Regression

The model (2) can be rewritten more compactly as

\[
y_j = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \mathbf{1}[j \in g] \psi^G_g x_j + \epsilon_j, \quad (3)
\]

where \(y_j = \Delta C_j\), \(x_j = \left(1 \ R_j \ \omega_j \right)\)'', and the elements of \(\psi^G_g\) corresponding to \(\omega_j\) are restricted to be constant across \(g\). In this section, we include the \(G\) superscript on \(\psi^G_g\) to make explicit the dependence of the parameter values on the specified number of groups, but omit it subsequently for compactness. In general, clustering models posit an objective function of the form

\[
Q \left( Y, X; \Psi^G \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{g=1}^{G} w_g \left( y_j, x_j, \Psi^G \right) \left( y_j - \psi^G_g x_j \right)^2 / \sigma_g^2, \quad (4)
\]

\(^{13}\)We cover the extensive literature on MPC heterogeneity in Sections 1 and 4.3.

\(^{14}\)Apart from clustering approaches, quantile regression is used by Misra and Surico (2014) to characterize heterogeneous responses to the 2008 tax rebate. Quantile regression differs from clustering; because quantile regression computes relationships at percentiles of the overall conditional distribution, the estimated MPC distribution depends on the correlation of MPCs with other forms of heterogeneity. If the “ranking” of the conditional distribution is mostly driven by factors other than responsiveness to the rebate (like fixed effects or other covariates), and these factors are uncorrelated with the rebate, heterogeneity of the MPC distribution will be underestimated in the presence of noise. We provide a simple example in Supplement B.
where the vector $\Psi^G$ collects group-specific parameter vectors, $\psi^G_g$, $\sigma^2_g$ are group-specific variances of $\epsilon_j$, $y_j$ is a scalar outcome, $x_j$ is a $k \times 1$ vector of explanatory variables, and $w_g(\cdot)$ are group membership weights that sum to 1. Exchanging the order of summations, minimizing (4), conditional on $w_g(\cdot)$, constitutes $G$ weighted least squares (WLS) problems, with weights $w_g(\cdot)$. When $\sigma^2_g \equiv \sigma^2$, minimizing jointly over $w_g(\cdot)$ and $\Psi^G$ delivers the “hard K-means” algorithm considered by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). In this algorithm, each observation has binary weights, assigned with certainty to whichever group minimizes its residual. However, in the cross-sectional setting we consider, and short-panel settings in general, the panel dimension is not long enough to meaningfully diminish the noise in group assignment, so one must treat group membership as probabilistic.\footnote{Bonhomme et al. (2021) investigate how estimating models like (2) can also serve to discretize and recover continuous forms of unobserved heterogeneity, but their results are also tailored to large-$T$ panel settings.}

To accommodate probabilistic group membership, we postulate a likelihood for $Y$, which gives rise to continuous posterior weights, $w_g(\cdot)$. The standard parametric choice is a Gaussian mixture regression or “switching regression” (e.g., Quandt (1972); Desarbo and Cron (1988)). In particular, the probability of observing $(x_j, y_j)$ is given by

$$\Pr \left( y_j, x_j; \Psi^G, \Sigma \right) = \sum_{g=1}^G \pi_g \phi \left( y_j; \psi_g^G' x_j, \sigma^2_g \right),$$

where $\pi_g$ is the unconditional probability that any observation belongs to group $g$, $\Sigma^G$ collects $\sigma^2_g$ across groups, and $\phi \left( y_j; \psi_g^G' x_j, \sigma^2_g \right)$ is the p.d.f. evaluated for mean $\psi_g^G' x_j$ and variance $\sigma^2_g$. For such a model, the complete-data (where group membership is known) likelihood is

$$L \left( Y, X, D; \theta^G \right) = \prod_{j=1}^N \prod_{g=1}^G \pi_g \phi \left( y_j; \psi_g^G' x_j, \sigma^2_g \right)^{d_{jg}},$$

where $D$ collects $d_{jg}$, binary indicators for whether observation $j$ is a member of group $g$, and $\theta$ collects $\Psi^G$, $\Sigma$, and $\pi_g$ across groups. Since $d_{jg}$ are latent variables, $L$ cannot be maximized directly. Integrating $L = \log L$ over $d_{jg}$ (conditional on $(y_j, x_j)$) yields

$$E_{D|Y,X} \left[ L \left( Y, X, D; \theta \right) \right] = \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_{jg} \left( \log \pi_g + \log \phi \left( y_j; \psi_g^G' x_j, \sigma^2_g \right) \right),$$
where
\[ \gamma_{jg} = \Pr \left( d_{jg} = 1 \mid y_j, x_j \right) = \frac{\pi_g \phi \left( y_j; \psi_{g}^G x_j, \sigma_{g}^2 \right)}{\sum_{h=1}^{G} \pi_h \phi \left( y_j; \psi_{h}^G x_j, \sigma_{h}^2 \right)} . \]

Thus, \( \Psi^G \) can be obtained from minimizing
\[
l_{\phi} \left( Y, X; \theta^G \right) = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_{jg} \log \phi \left( y_j; \psi_{g}^G x_j, \sigma_{g}^2 \right) = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_{jg} \left[ \log \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_{g}^2}} \right) - \frac{\left( y_j - \psi_{g}^G x_j \right)^2}{2\sigma_{g}^2} \right] .
\]

Conditional on \( \gamma_g \) and \( \Sigma^G \), this implies minimizing
\[
Q_{\phi} \left( Y, X; \Psi^G \right) = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_{jg} \left( y_j - \psi_{g}^G x_j \right)^2 / \sigma_{g}^2 ,
\]

which is exactly (4), but with \( w_{g} \left( y_j, x_j, \Psi^G \right) \) specialized to posterior weights \( \gamma_{jg} \). In practice, given the dependence of \( \gamma_{jg} \) on \( \pi_1, \ldots, \pi_g, \Psi^G \), and \( \Sigma^G \), the model is solved using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al. (1977)), where the E-step updates the posterior weights \( \gamma_{jg} \) conditional on a set of parameters and the M-step updates \( \pi_1, \ldots, \pi_g, \Psi^G \), and \( \Sigma^G \) as in WLS. For a detailed discussion of the GMLR problem and its implementation via the EM algorithm, see Desarbo and Cron (1988) or Jones and McLachlan (1992).

An advantage of the GMLR approach to regression-based clustering is that asymptotic properties of the estimator (consistency and asymptotic normality) follow immediately under regularity conditions from standard maximum likelihood results. This means that analytical inference on \( \Psi^G \) (and other parameters) is straightforward. Desarbo and Cron (1988) provide a discussion of these inference results; the more detailed discussion for Gaussian mixture models found in McLachlan and Basford (1988) easily extends to GMLR as well. We use the observed information approach for inference on \( \Psi^G \), with analytical formulas adapted to accommodate the presence of common coefficients across groups in (2).

**Gaussian mixture instrumental variables regression** In our empirical setting, the value of the rebate an individual receives is potentially endogenous, so we turn to an instrumental variables extension of GMLR, “GMIVR”. In particular, we consider a two-stage least
squares (TSLS) estimator, $\hat{\theta}^{TSLS}$. Our instrument, denoted $z_j$, is an indicator for rebate receipt in a given quarter (which is based on the last two digits of an individual’s Social Security number), and is independent of individual characteristics as well as group structure by construction.

One possible concern is that heterogeneity is not just present in the second stage, but in the first stage as well. However, the group structure in the first stage may not be the same as that in the second, and forcing the group structure to align could bias estimates in both stages. As a solution, we estimate a homogeneous first stage omitting controls, $\omega_j$. We show in Supplement A.1 that doing so leads to unbiased estimates of $\lambda_g$ in the second stage, regardless of heterogeneity in the first stage, given standard assumptions for our setting.\(^{16}\) In particular, we estimate

$$R_j = a + \Pi z_j + u_j,$$

and generate $\tilde{R}_j = a + \Pi z_j$. We define $\tilde{x}_j = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \tilde{R}_j & \omega_j \end{pmatrix}'$, and estimate (3), replacing $x_j$ with $\tilde{x}_j$, as the second stage.

It is straightforward to adjust inference for $\hat{\theta}^{TSLS}$ to account for the fact that $\tilde{R}_j$ is a generated regressor by augmenting the log-likelihood with a second component corresponding to the first stage and computing the score and observed information based on this augmented object.

**Choosing the number of groups** In all clustering models, it is necessary to choose $G$, the number of groups; we use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In particular, the BIC for a candidate number of groups, $\hat{G}$, is given by

$$BIC (\hat{G}) = k_{\theta \hat{G}} \log N - 2l_{\phi} (\hat{\theta}^{\hat{G}}),$$

where $k_{\theta \hat{G}}$ is the number of unique parameters in $\theta^{\hat{G}}$, and $l_{\phi} (\hat{\theta}^{\hat{G}})$ is the maximized incomplete-data log-likelihood for $\hat{G}$ groups,

$$l_{\phi} (\hat{\theta}^{\hat{G}}) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \log \sum_{g=1}^{\hat{G}} \hat{\pi}_g \Phi \left( y_{ij}; \Psi_g^{\hat{G}} x_{ij}, \sigma_g^2 \right).$$

\(^{16}\)Including $\omega_j$ in the first stage, as is conventional, leads to bias in $\lambda_g$ in the second stage if heterogeneity is not fully modeled in the first stage and $\omega_j$ is correlated with such heterogeneity. Intuitively, unmodeled heterogeneity in the first stage behaves like a set of omitted variables, which bias the first-stage coefficients on $\omega_j$ and thus the predicted rebate values. As a robustness check, we consider alternative specifications with different first stage configurations in Supplement C.2 and show that the impact of the form of the first stage is small in practice.
Under regularity conditions, the BIC is consistent for the true value of $G$ (see, e.g., Celeux et al. (2018)). To complement the BIC, we compare the selected $G$ to that obtained from $K$-fold cross validation, and ensure that the chosen model is compatible with both criteria.

### 3.2 Power comparison of interacted and clustering regressions

After estimating the unconditional distribution of MPCs using the GMIVR estimator described above, we also examine the correlation between the MPC and observable household characteristics. We do so using regressions of the form

$$
\hat{\lambda}_j = c + \mu' F_j + v_j,
$$

where $\hat{\lambda}_j = \sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_{jg} \lambda_g$ is the posterior-weighted MPC for observation $j$ and $F_j$ is a vector of observables. In contrast to the existing literature, with this approach we first recover latent MPC heterogeneity, and then regress that heterogeneity on observable characteristics (henceforth “direct regression”). Previous papers have instead estimated heterogeneity by observables using interacted regressions with a given household characteristic (“interacted regression”). This method measures how the MPC changes with the chosen observable, as opposed to recovering a true distribution.

Our approach has at least three conceptual advantages: it allows us to recover the full distribution of “latent” MPC heterogeneity, including variation not associated with observables; it does not require us to pre-suppose *ex ante* the determinants of heterogeneity; and it allows us estimate regressions on all observables jointly to better assess which have truly significant relationships. However, our approach may also be desirable in a practical sense due to power concerns.

To illustrate this point, we consider two simple data-generating processes (DGPs) based on (6): one in which the MPC is a continuous function of some scalar observable variable, $f_j$, and one in which it is a discrete function of $f_j$. The former is consistent with the posterior-weighted MPCs we use in our regressions on observables, while the latter is consistent with our assumed model with discrete true MPCs. In Supplement A.2, we compute the non-centrality parameters of the asymptotic distributions of the $F-$statistics for the estimates of the association between heterogeneity and $f_j$ under each DGP. In particular, the two estimates are the coefficient on $f_j$ in our direct regression approach, where MPCs (which may or may not contain measurement error) are regressed on $f_j$, and the interaction coefficient in the interacted regression approach, where $\Delta C_j$ is regressed on both the rebate $R_j$ and the rebate $R_j$ interacted with an indicator for whether $f_j$ is above
its median value.

In the continuous MPC case, we find that our direct regression approach is always more powerful in the absence of measurement error. In the presence of measurement error, it is more powerful if the observable $f_j$ explains a small share of variation in MPCs, a condition which is consistent with our findings for the $R^2$ in Section 4.3.

In the discrete MPC case, we find the direct regression approach has a “maximin” power property in the absence of measurement error, with constant power independent of parameter values. In other words, it maximizes the worst case power, and will be more powerful when the correlation of MPCs and observables is small. In the presence of measurement error, it remains the case that direct regression will be more powerful when the effect size is small, or when the measurement error is small relative to the noise-to-signal ratio in the consumption equation. Overall, these two cases present an additional argument in favor of our direct regression approach, whether measurement error is present or not.

The precision of estimates in these regressions is important in our setting for two reasons. First, in the conventional approach that uses interactions observables to measure, imprecise estimates suggest a lack of significant variation in the MPC distribution, which, as we discuss in Section 4.1, our full unconditional distribution belies. Second, if heterogeneity is deemed to exist, it is hard to determine which observable characteristics are truly associated with it, since often none are found to be statistically significant. This means that no clear guidance can be provided either to inform policy, or to discipline and distinguish between consumption models based on their implied correlations.

4 Results

We apply our clustering approach to the 2008 tax rebate. As our baseline specification, we adopt the IV specification, as previously discussed. Similarly, we also drop households that never get the rebate, who may have different characteristics (such as higher income) and thus bias the results. In Supplement C, we show results for a battery of additional specifications, including OLS, alternative numbers of groups, alternative first stage specifications, alternative samples, and more flexible restrictions on coefficients for the controls $\omega_j$.

We find a considerable degree of MPC heterogeneity, the extent of which varies depending on the consumption category considered. We first show the distribution of the MPC for total expenditures and use bootstrapping to show its stability. We then investigate how the MPC distribution changes as we consider nondurable and durable goods
as the dependent variables. Importantly, our approach also allows us to directly test whether households display similar propensities for different consumption goods, or instead display differential responses across expenditure types when they receive a transitory income shock such as a tax rebate. Finally, we explore which observable household characteristics are correlated with the estimated marginal propensities to consume, both individually and jointly, and analyze the longer-run spending effects of the 2008 tax rebates.

4.1 The distribution of marginal propensities to consume

We start by considering total expenditures, defined as in Parker et al. (2013). Following Kaplan and Violante (2014), who show that properly accounting for outliers reduces the homogeneous rebate coefficient, while increasing precision, we drop the top and bottom 1.5% of consumption changes.\footnote{This is the only way in which our sample departs from the sample used in Panel B of Table 3 in Parker et al. (2013), and explains why the homogeneous MPC we estimate for total consumption differs from theirs.}

In order to choose the number of groups for GMIVR, $G$, we use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as discussed in Section 3.1. We find that it flattens between 2 and 5 groups and increases thereafter. Moreover, a 10-fold cross-validation follows a similar pattern. For these reasons, we choose $G = 5$ as our baseline, but show in Supplement C.3 that the unconditional distribution of MPCs, as well as the correlation of household MPCs with household observable characteristics, barely change when considering any alternative number of groups $G$ between 2 and 5. For each household that receives the rebate, we compute the posterior weighted MPC, using the household-specific weights $\gamma_{ig}$ and the group-specific MPCs $\lambda_g$ estimated by the GMIVR algorithm. Figure 1 shows the distribution of this object for the $j = (i, t)$ pairs receiving the rebate. The ability to plot this distribution is in itself novel, since previous approaches measure heterogeneity simply as a set of interaction coefficients, rather than a true distribution. Quantile regression also does not permit the recovery of the distribution of any single coefficient, rather recovering coefficients at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of $\Delta C_j$.

We find that the vast majority of households display a relatively low (but certainly non-negligible) MPC of about 27 cents on the dollar, and the share of households with a given MPC slowly decays as the MPC increases. 14% of households consume the rebate in its entirety or even have an MPC above one. Fagereng et al. (2016) and Olafsson and Pagel (2018) find sizable spending responses even for households with high liquid wealth, in Norwegian administrative data and Icelandic application user data, respectively. We
Figure 1: Estimated distribution of MPCs out of the tax rebate

Notes: The histogram (light blue bars) plots the GMIVR-estimated distribution of MPCs for total expenditures among households that received the rebate, defined as in Parker et al. (2013). The sample is defined as in the text. The BIC chooses $G = 5$. For each household we compute the weighted MPC across groups. The black vertical line shows the average weighted MPC in our sample. The homogeneous MPC (red vertical line) is estimated assuming a homogeneous response to the tax rebate as in Parker et al. (2013), following the IV implementation of Equation (1).

Likewise find evidence that even the smallest MPCs are substantially larger than zero, even when estimating the full unconditional MPC distribution, in standard U.S. survey data. In contrast, in this same data, Misra and Surico (2014) use quantile regression to estimate a substantial share of MPCs at or below zero. We discuss in Supplement B how our approach differs from theirs. A lower bound of the MPC distribution above zero can be explained by bounded rationality. Ilut and Valchev (2020), for instance, develop a model in which MPCs can be high for all households, even those with slack liquidity constraints. Due to limited cognitive perception, households can find themselves in the midst of a “learning trap”, “which makes the high MPC behavior the norm, rather than exception.”

Aggregating the individual-level responses, we find that the average marginal propensity to consume is similar to the homogeneous specification, as shown by the black and red vertical lines, respectively. Moreover, the former is within the 1-standard deviation confidence bands of the homogeneous MPC. However, this need not be the case, as we discuss in Supplement D. In general, estimates from a homogeneous specification like Equation (1) will equal the average of estimates from a heterogeneous specification only if all regressors $x_j$ are exogenous and have distributions that are invariant across groups, or if the regressor of interest ($R_j$) is exogenous with constant distribution across groups and is uncorrelated with any other regressor in $\omega_j$ whose distribution varies by group.
In our setting, while our instrument, a rebate timing indicator, is independent of group membership and household characteristics, it is correlated with the month dummies we include in $\omega_j$, since the rate of rebate disbursement varied over time. These time dummies may be related to group membership due to changes in the aggregate state of the economy. This means that, even in population, there may be some difference between our average heterogeneous MPC and the homogeneous MPC from an equivalent specification.

We now turn to discussing the statistical uncertainty around the estimated distribution. As previously discussed, we implement an observed information approach to compute analytical standard errors for the estimated group-specific MPCs from GMIVR that account for both uncertain group membership and estimation error in the first stage. We present our results in Supplement C.3 and discuss how statistical significance is affected by taking estimation error of the weights into account. We find that the lowest group-specific MPC point estimate, equal to 0.08, is not statistically significant from zero.\footnote{Formally, the lowest $\lambda_g = 0.08$, but $\min_i \sum_{g=1}^G \gamma_{i,g} \lambda_g = 0.27$, as shown in Figure 1.} This is important to bear in mind in light of the previously discussed lower bound. However, the main goal of our analysis is to evaluate the full distribution of individual MPCs. While we cannot formally conduct inference on individual weights – as they are a function of a single realization of a random error, not a parameter – we assess the stability of our findings by bootstrapping. In particular, we repeat the GMIVR estimation of the distribution of MPCs for total expenditures, with 5 groups, over 250 samples obtained by bootstrap with replacement. Figure 2 plots the cumulative density functions. Specifically, the dash-dotted blue line shows the median across bootstraps, which reassuringly tracks the CDF-equivalent of the distribution shown in Figure 1, here depicted in solid black. Moreover, there is reasonably little variation across bootstraps, as evidenced by the centered 68% confidence interval. In particular, more than half of the bootstraps predict that the lowest individual MPC will be above 0, but a good share of the remaining estimated distributions does not. This makes us conclude that, while quantitatively large, the lower bound of MPCs for total expenditures may be subject to uncertainty. We return to this point when discussing the MPC distribution for specific goods in the next section.

These results show that there is indeed considerable variation in the MPC. From a policy perspective, this implies that there is potentially significant benefit to targeting transfers to certain households. For a given dollar value of transfer, those households with a higher MPC will spend more and save less, leading to a greater increase in consumption and stimulatory effect on aggregate demand. We return to the question of whether such targeting is feasible in practice in Section (4.3).
Figure 2: Bootstrapped distribution of MPCs out of the tax rebate: GMIVR

Notes: The black solid line plots CDF of the estimated distribution of MPCs for total expenditures, shown in Figure 1. The blue dash-dotted line shows the median CDF of the estimated distribution of MPCs, across 250 bootstraps with replacement. The dashed red and black lines correspond to the centered 68% confidence interval.

4.2 The MPC distribution for different consumption goods

We have shown how households differ with respect to their propensity to consume the rebate. How does the distribution of these propensities change across consumption goods? The granularity of the CEX data allows us to tackle this question, while our approach allows us to explore how good-specific MPCs vary at the household level.

First, in the left panel of Figure 3, we report the weighted MPC distribution for nondurable goods. As expected, the distribution is shifted to the left with respect to the distribution corresponding to total expenditures in Figure 1, as nondurable goods account for, on average, only 57% of household total expenditures.

An important share of households consumes a small value of nondurables, although at least 16 cents for each dollar of rebate. Strictly speaking, therefore, no household behaves following the Permanent Income Hypothesis (Friedman (1957)). Looking at the other end of the distribution, households consume at most one third of the rebate. While more limited than for total expenditures, the heterogeneity in nondurable MPCs is economically meaningful and statistically significant, as we show in Supplement C.3. Importantly, the lowest group-specific MPC is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Moreover, the minimum individual weighted MPC is higher than 10 cents in nearly 90% of the bootstraps, and always above 4 cents. Hence, while quantitatively lower than for total expenditures, nondurable MPCs exhibit a lower bound on MPCs which we can confidently place above zero.
Figure 3: MPCs out of the tax rebate: nondurables and durables

(a) Nondurables
(b) Durables

Notes: The histograms (light blue bars) plot the GMIVR-estimated distribution of MPCs for nondurable and durable expenditures respectively among households that received the rebate, defined as in Parker et al. (2013). The sample is defined as in the text. The homogeneous MPCs estimated with the IV implementation of Equation (1) are 0.19 for nondurables and 0.26 for durables. For each household we compute the weighted MPC across groups. For nondurables the BIC selects \( G = 2 \) and for durables \( G = 4 \). Nondurable goods are defined, following Parker et al. (2013), as strictly nondurables (Lusardi (1996)) plus apparel goods and services, health care expenditures (excluding payments by employers or insurers), and reading material (excluding education). As in Parker et al. (2013), we define durable expenditures as the difference between total and nondurable expenditures.

The right panel of Figure 3 shows the estimated MPC distribution for durable goods. About 7% of households do not change their durable expenditures in response to the rebate; their weighted MPC is less than 5 cents to the dollar. Moreover, the lowest group-specific MPC is slightly below zero and bootstrapping confirms that an important share of households does not use the rebate to consume durables, as shown in Supplement C.3. This finding helps reconcile the uncertainty around the lower bound on the MPC for total expenditures, which we discussed previously. The vast majority of households consume around 15 cents to the dollar in durable goods. A non-negligible fraction of households, however, has a durable MPC close to one; 6% of households are approximately hand-to-mouth when it comes to durables. The dichotomy of this MPC distribution is in line with the discrete nature of durable goods purchases.

Finally, we assess whether households with high propensities to consume nondurable goods are also more likely to consume durable goods after receiving the rebate. While we can rule out substitution between goods, the estimated complementarity at the margin is, however, quantitatively small. The correlation between household-level weighted MPCs for nondurable goods with those for durables is 0.12 (significant at the 1% level). Albeit small, the complementarity might signal the presence of heterogeneous preferences or a small share of “spender” types, who are more prone to adjust any type of consumption.
in response to transitory income shocks. While the structure of our data does not allow us to draw conclusions regarding whether the heterogeneity we measure is permanent or transitory, we can investigate what observable characteristics explain the estimated MPC distributions that we recover. We tackle this issue in the next section.

4.3 What drives MPC heterogeneity?

Our approach uncovers the distribution of marginal propensities to consume without taking a stance, *ex ante*, on its observable determinants. Consequently, we can use the estimated distribution to understand how MPCs correlate, *ex post*, with observable characteristics. We start by examining how observables are individually correlated with MPCs. We then turn to investigate the joint relationship between the estimated MPCs and various household characteristics. As such, we contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we show that, with our approach, a large number of statistically significant individual correlations between MPCs and observable drivers emerge. This is true despite the fact that we use a dataset and an identification strategy that previously failed to find statistically significant relationships (e.g., Parker et al. (2013)). Second, we show how the distribution of MPCs is *jointly* correlated with observable characteristics, and can be confident that any lack of significant correlations is not due to loss of statistical power introduced by progressive interactions. In Supplement A.2 we formally assess the power properties of our approach to recovering observable determinants of MPC heterogeneity. Third, we can quantitatively assess the share of MPC heterogeneity that can be explained by observables. This metric is important for assessing the distributional effects of fiscal policy, gauging the potential the government has for targeting payments explicitly, and for disciplining heterogeneous agent models of consumption and savings.

Table 1 reports individual correlations. Our estimated weighted MPCs for total expenditures (column (1)) are positively correlated with salary and non-salary income, the mortgage interest-to-income ratio, the average propensity to consume (APC),\(^{19}\) and liquid wealth; however, they are negatively correlated with age.\(^{20}\) Similar relationships hold

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\(^{19}\)Empirically, we define the APC as average lagged consumption divided by average lagged total income. We lag expenditures to avoid the possibility of a mechanical positive correlation with the MPC. To ensure stability of APCs, we average expenditures over all the available lagged quarters at the household level, but the results are virtually unchanged if we only consider the first lag. We consider income as measured in the first interview for each household, which refers to the previous 12 months. We winsorize the APC upwards at 3, which is about 1.5% of the observations.

\(^{20}\)Additional relationships hold unconditionally. For instance, we find that households that put money into a tax-deferred or tax-free educational savings plan have a significantly higher MPC. Moreover, MPCs increase with education. All these relationships, however, are insignificant when tested jointly with other observables as in Table 2.

19
Table 1: Individual correlations with the MPC for total expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Nondurables</th>
<th>Durables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log salary income</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log non-salary income</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mortgage interest/income</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log liquid assets</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 1 shows the correlations between MPC estimates listed in columns and observables listed in rows. We report results for total expenditures, nondurables and durables. All logged variables take a value of log(0.001) when the raw value is 0 or negative. *, ** and *** denote significance of the correlation at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.

We also find that homeowners have larger MPCs for total expenditures, a result that echoes findings in Parker et al. (2013). Moreover, having a mortgage is associated with an even higher propensity to consume, as shown in Figure 4.

In Table 2 we regress our estimated weighted MPCs on an array of household observable characteristics. Aware of the low number of respondents for liquid wealth, and the potential non-response bias associated with it, we do not include it as an explanatory variable here, but report the associated findings in Supplement C.4. Our results are robust across specifications and even when considering the MPC distribution estimated with a different number of groups, as shown in Supplement C.4. Importantly, only two explanatory variables remain statistically significant after the inclusion of additional covariates: non-salary income and the average propensity to consume, both of which are positively correlated with the marginal propensity to consume. We expand on these two drivers in the remainder of the section.

While higher income households have higher MPCs, it is mainly the non-salary component of income that drives this relationship.\(^{21}\) This effect is partly the result of a particular category of households, such as entrepreneurs or investors (for example, those with a positive business or financial income), who have a significantly higher MPC. The intensive margin, however, seems to play the most prominent role. The other components of

\(^{21}\)Income in the CEX is measured in the first interview and relates to income over the prior 12 months. Non-salary income consists of farm and business income, financial income (e.g., income from interest, dividends, pensions and annuities) and all other income except foodstamps (e.g., retirement, supplemental security, unemployment compensation), following the categorization in Coibion et al. (2017).
nonsalary income, such as unemployment compensation, retirement, and transfers, are also positively associated with the MPC. We split non-salary income into its business-financial and transfer components and find that both sources of income are positively and significantly correlated with the MPC, even after controlling for all the observables in Table 2. Putting the estimates together, we find that a 100% increase in non-salary income is associated with an increase in the MPC of 19 cents for each dollar of the rebate for total expenditures. Put differently, a 170% increase in non-salary income predicts a 1 standard deviation increase in the MPC. Finally, the positive correlation between income and MPCs does not only hold for total expenditures, but also for nondurable and durable expenditures, as shown in the last two columns of Table 2. In general, the relationship between MPC and observable characteristics, and their statistical significance, are remarkably similar when considering different goods.

Some studies find that low-income households have a higher marginal propensity to spend: see, for instance, Johnson et al. (2006) for the 2001 tax rebate and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014), with respect to cash on hand, for Italian data on self-reported MPCs. Other studies, however, find mixed results or even the opposite relationship, as we do. While Broda and Parker (2014) find that low-income households had larger propensities to spend in the month of the 2008 rebate receipt than households in the top income tercile, this difference “becomes indistinguishable by the end of the quarter”. Misra and Surico (2014) also find that median income is higher at the top of the conditional distribution of consumption changes, which they find to be associated with higher propensities to consume, although the overall relationship is U-shaped. We instead find a monotonic
relationship with income, as in Kueng (2018), who studies consumption responses to regular and predetermined payments from the Alaska Permanent Fund. Boutros (2020) finds that households whose 2008 rebate was a smaller fraction of their income – typically higher-income households – had a higher MPC. He explains this finding with a model of bounded intertemporal rationality, in which the smaller the relative size of the payment, the more planning costs dominate the benefits of consumption smoothing. The theory of limited cognitive perception developed by Ilut and Valchev (2020) also delivers rich agents with high MPCs. Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) use data on self-reported propensities to spend the 2008 rebate and show that low-income individuals were more likely to pay off debt. They also find that 21% of households making more than $75,000 of total annual income reported to spend most of the rebate, compared to 18% for households with total income below $20,000. Miranda-Pinto, Murphy, Walsh, and Young (2020) develop a model that can rationalize these findings via time-varying consumption thresholds.

Our findings put non-salary income in the spotlight. The importance of business and financial income for the MPC might suggest the presence of wealthy hand-to-mouth households, as first posited by Kaplan and Violante (2014). However, the importance of the other components of non-salary income, such as retirement income and transfers, coupled with the significance of the APCs discussed below, suggests other mechanisms may also be at play.

Marginal propensities to consume also increase with the average propensity to consume (APC). Households that spent 1 percentage point more of their income before receiving the rebate spent 29 additional cents out of each rebate dollar. This effect is significant also for nondurable and durable MPCs: households that typically spend more relative to their income have a greater MPC.\textsuperscript{22}

In Figure 5 we show how the MPC varies jointly with the APC and total income. We separately compute quintiles of the APC and total income, and calculate the average weighted MPC for each quintile pair. The MPC increases with income, conditional on the APC, and vice versa. As the figure shows, our analysis uncovers three main groups. First, households with low total income and a low APC display the lowest marginal propensity to consume. We label these households “poor savers”. Second, households with a high APC and low total income, and vice versa, display intermediate MPCs. Third, the greatest marginal propensity to consume is found among households with a high APC and high total income. We label this group “rich spenders”.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22}A 1 percentage point increase in the APC for nondurables predicts 3 additional cents per rebate dollar spent on nondurables. This effect goes up to 7 when considering the APC for nondurable expenditures only.

\textsuperscript{23}We find similar relationships for MPC for nondurables and durables, especially the presence of “rich
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Total</th>
<th>(2) Nondurables</th>
<th>(3) Durables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dummy for no salary</td>
<td>-0.371</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
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<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log non-salary income</td>
<td>0.192***</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>mortgage interest/income</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.105</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>0.293***</td>
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<td>0.210***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
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<tr>
<td>homeowner dummy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
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<tr>
<td>dummy for mortgage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>1078</td>
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<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All logged variables take a value of log(0.001) when the raw value is 0 or negative. Non-salary income is positive for all observations. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. We control for marriage dummies, education dummies, number of children, age and age squared; those coefficients are not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.

We regard the results presented in this section as particularly relevant for disciplining macro models of household consumption. For example, the relationship between MPC, APC and income can be directly tested in even the simplest of consumption/savings models. Existing models predict very different relationships between MPCs and APCs. Hand-to-mouth, constrained agents, will typically have large MPCs and APCs. As they save towards their target level of wealth, both propensities fall. If agents are infinitely-lived, they eventually reach the target level of wealth, at which they stop saving (i.e. APC = 1) and have an MPC equal to the annuity value of the transitory income shock. A life-cycle model can, in contrast, generate the empirically observed positive relationship between MPC and APC, as older households dissave, but also have a high MPC spenders”, as we show in Supplement C.4.
due to a low effective discount factor. This standard model, however, generates a clear relationship between the MPC and age, which our results do not bear out.\footnote{Moreover, most incomplete markets models typically fail to generate savings rates (APCs) that increase (decrease) with wealth and permanent income, at odds with what is observed in the data and documented by Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) and Straub (2017).}

All these characterizations are conditional on homogeneous preferences. Preference heterogeneity, in contrast, can break these relationships and rationalize some of our findings. Aguiar et al. (2019), for instance, highlight the importance of heterogeneity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in order to generate heterogeneous target levels of wealth; high-IES households have high MPCs and high APCs. Consistent with this, Parker (2017) finds that the majority of consumption responsiveness to the tax rebate in the Nielsen data is driven by a measure of impatience, defined as households reporting to be “the sort of people who would rather spend their money and enjoy today rather than save more for the future.”

An additional finding underscores the importance of unobserved heterogeneity. All the observable drivers mentioned in this section – as well as other household characteristics that do not strongly correlate with the MPC – explain a relatively small portion of the variance of the weighted MPC distribution. Indeed, our linear regression framework of weighted MPCs on observable characteristics delivers an adjusted $R^2$ of 15%. Such ex-
planatory power is even lower for nondurables and especially durables. Unlike previous studies, we obtain a statistical measure of the portion of the variance in the MPC distribution explained by observable characteristics through the $R^2$. Technically, the reported $R^2$ is a lower bound on the true $R^2$ due to measurement error in the estimated MPCs. We discuss this issue in detail in Supplement C.6 and propose a back-of-the-envelope adjustment to the $R^2$ for to account for measurement error in recovering the MPCs in our clustering approach. Such a correction increases the $R^2$ for total expenditures to 26%, which still indicates that only a quarter of the MPC heterogeneity can be explained by observables.

A low $R^2$ could also be partly explained by non-linear relationships that are either difficult to parametrize or simply not captured by variables in our dataset. For example, the CEX contains only sparsely populated information on wealth. In Supplement C.4, we show the relationship between the MPC and liquid wealth, aware of the potential nonresponse bias highlighted by Parker et al. (2013), but we refrain from showing any relationship with total wealth, given the lack of reliable data. While such unmeasured characteristics could potentially explain some of the variation in MPCs, our results strongly suggest the presence of latent drivers, since some of those unobserved characteristics may give rise to the observables we analyze in the first place, such as the APC. This finding is not only useful for disciplining heterogeneous agent models, but is also informative about the degree to which fiscal policy can target high MPC households.

As a final exercise, we directly compare our approach to that typically taken in the literature. To do so, we take our estimated posterior weights as a form of (probabilistic) sample splitting and use them to estimate 5 group-specific MPCs. We then compare these results with regression estimates in which we instead split the sample using quintiles of commonly-studied observable characteristics. Table 3 shows the results. In the first column we report our GMIVR MPCs, ordered from low to high. We then report the estimated MPCs across quintiles of age, non-salary income and APC, ordered from the lowest to the highest quintile. The heterogeneity by age is unclear, in line with findings in Table 1. Moreover, if a researcher used only age to characterize the extent of MPC heterogeneity, she would obtain estimates between 28 and 79 cents, much narrower than the range we uncover. Splitting by either non-salary income or the APC, which we show above to be the most robust drivers of MPC heterogeneity, would allow a researcher to...
Table 3: MPC heterogeneity: full vs observable distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GMIVR</th>
<th>age</th>
<th>non-salary income</th>
<th>APC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>g = 1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g = 2</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g = 3</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g = 4</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g = 5</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table 3 reports estimated MPCs for different groups, using total expenditures. In parentheses, we report $p$-values from a test of equality to zero. In the first column, we report the results of a weighted least squares taking our estimated GMIVR weights as given, as in panel b of Table 7 in Supplement C.3. In the other columns, we report MPCs obtained by estimating Equation 2, using quintiles of age, non-salary income and APC as $1[j \in g]$ respectively. Groups are ordered from the lowest to the highest MPCs in the first column and by quintile in the other columns. Standard errors in these columns are not adjusted for estimation error in the first stage, since we found that such error had negligible impact on the standard errors in the first column.

uncover some MPCs above 1 but still delivers a lower degree of heterogeneity than using our approach. Therefore, the existing literature, by splitting on observables that are likely noisy in practice, and correlated with only a portion of MPC heterogeneity, would under-estimate the true extent of MPC heterogeneity. Moreover, nearly all the MPCs estimated with our approach are statistically different from zero, while only few are when interacting by observables. In our approach many pairs of MPCs are also statistically different from each other, as we show in Supplement C.3, while virtually no pairs are when interacting by household characteristics. Therefore, these results corroborate earlier statements that our approach may deliver improvements in statistical power.

From a policy perspective, the results in this section have two implications. First, we find that only two observable household observable traits are robustly correlated with the MPC in a statistically significant manner. Among these, our results suggest that fiscal authorities might consider targeting relatively higher-income households as recipients of lump-sum transfers, in the attempt to maximize the effect on aggregate consumption. While we cannot speak to the MPCs of the highest earners absent from our natural experiment, we find that, among the subset of middle-income rebate recipients, higher MPCs are more likely to be found towards the upper end of the (non-salary) income distribution. This implication poses a potential trade-off between the stimulus and relief/insurance ef-

26
fects of lump-sum transfers. This tension is consistent with the empirical finding that low-income households are more likely to use stimulus checks to pay down debt, both in 2008 (Shapiro and Slemrod (2009)) and in 2020 (Armantier et al. (2020)). Second, however, the finding of a small $R^2$ in the regression of the MPC on observable characteristics suggests that attempts to target transfers based on factors observable by policymakers will ultimately exploit only a small fraction at best of the variation in households’ MPCs. This means that feasible targeted transfers can harness only a small share of the gains in terms of consumption response available if policymakers could observe the identity of high MPC households directly or if such MPCs were more strongly associated with observable characteristics.

4.4 Robustness to spurious heterogeneity

In this section we show that the results shown in the previous section are unlikely to be driven by spurious heterogeneity. For this exercise, we generate data using estimates from the homogeneous regression, with errors drawn from a Gaussian distribution with the empirical variance. We then obtain GMIVR estimates under the faulty assumption that more than 1 group is present, and repeat the same analysis for 250 Monte Carlo samples. First, our BIC approach correctly selects $G = 1$ in all but one samples, so that it is very unlikely one would choose a description of the data that allows for heterogeneity. The BIC steadily increases as more groups are added; stronger departures from true homogeneity are penalized more harshly.

Nevertheless, we show in Table 4 what happens if we impose the incorrect degree of heterogeneity on a homogeneous distribution. For small departures ($G = 2$), very limited spurious heterogeneity arises. When fitting a homogeneous distribution with many more groups ($G = 5$), spurious heterogeneity is unsurprisingly more pronounced. However, the average MPC remains still close to the truth.

These spuriously estimated MPCs do not invalidate our headline results regarding observable correlations. To see this, we regress the estimated weighted MPCs for each Monte Carlo sample above on the array of observable predictors used in Table 2. We adopt a conservative approach and show here the results for $G = 5$, in line with our baseline specification, but the results are confirmed when considering $G = 2$, as shown in Supplement C.7.

On average across samples, all the estimated correlations are small and, most importantly, statistically insignificant. Moreover, the adjusted $R^2$ is 0.1% on average across samples, and never higher than 2%. For illustrative purposes, Figure 6 displays the dis-
Table 4: Over-fitting $G$: median quantiles of the MPC distribution across simulated samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>p25</th>
<th>p50</th>
<th>p75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>truth:</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G = 1$</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G = 2$</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G = 5$</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each row reports the median of various summary statistics of the distribution of (weighted) MPCs across Monte Carlo samples for models estimated imposing different numbers of groups on data generated from a homogeneous DGP with Gaussian errors. The first row reports the truth, which is 0.52 for all statistics, since the distribution is homogeneous. The second row corresponds to a correctly-specified homogeneous regression in repeated samples (with the standard deviation across samples below in parentheses) and the third and fourth to GMIVR incorrectly assuming the presence of two and five distinct groups, respectively. p$^{xx}$ denotes the $xx^{{th}}$ percentile. The values in parentheses report the standard deviation of each moment for the $G = 2$ and $G = 5$ specifications across simulated samples.

Distribution of the $t$–statistic for the coefficient on the APC, across samples. In only 5.6% of the samples is there significant evidence of a relationship between MPC heterogeneity and APC at the 5% level, a size distortion within the scope of Monte Carlo error. The same is also true for coefficients on all other observables, with even lower shares of significant coefficients. This finding that tests for the significance of correlations with observables achieve close to nominal size when no heterogeneity is present increases our confidence that the rejections we obtain in the data are not due to spurious heterogeneity. Further, a common concern when using the CEX data is the role of measurement error. These exercises also serve to show that grouping on noise alone – like measurement error – does not dictate a distribution like that we recover or the correlations with observable characteristics that we estimate.

4.5 The longer-run effects of the 2008 ESA

In this section, we estimate household-level longer-run spending effects of the 2008 tax rebates, considering a lagged specification that takes the possible persistent effects of rebate receipt into account, as in Parker et al. (2013). In particular, we estimate the following model:
Figure 6: Minimal correlation of spurious heterogeneity with observables

Notes: For each of 250 simulated samples, we regress the weighted MPCs from our baseline specification for total expenditure estimated imposing spurious heterogeneity ($G = 5$) on the set of observables used in Table 2. The histogram (light blue bars) plots the $t$–statistics for the coefficient on the APC across samples. The red and black lines represent the critical values for a 5% test of equality with zero.

$$\Delta C_j = \beta' \omega_j + \sum_{g \in G} \left( \lambda_g^1 [j \in g] R_j + \lambda_g^{lag} [j \in g] R_j^{lag} + \alpha_g [j \in g] \right) + \epsilon_j, j = 1, \ldots, N,$$

where the coefficient $\lambda_g^{lag}$ represents the lagged effect of the rebate for group $g$.\(^{27}\) In line with our baseline specification, we instrument both $R_j$ and $R_j^{lag}$ by an indicator for whether the rebate was received by household $j = (i, t)$, and another indicator for the receipt of the rebate in the previous period. We do not force group membership for household $i$ to be fixed across $t$, since we want to preserve flexibility; even if individuals’ preferences are constant, the MPC may be time-varying, due, for instance, to changes in state variables such as income and wealth.\(^{28}\) To correctly estimate the cumulative consumption response to the rebate, we therefore track individual weights over the two quarters following the rebate. We use these to construct the individual 2-quarter total effect of the rebate, by adding twice the weighted contemporaneous rebate coefficient to the weighted

\(^{27}\)Kaplan and Violante (2014) suggest that the rebate coefficient might differ from the marginal propensity to consume because some households in the control group have already received the rebate, and some households might anticipate receiving the rebate in the future. Adding lagged rebate partially address this concern. See Supplement C.5 for further discussion of this specification.

\(^{28}\)Even in the homogenous case, $\lambda$ can be different from $\lambda^{lag}$ because they measure two different objects; the coefficient on the lagged rebate value is an inter-temporal MPC which can be different from the contemporaneous MPC. See Auclert et al. (2018) for a theoretical discussion of intertemporal MPCs.
Figure 7: Estimated distribution of total 2-quarter effect of the tax rebate

Notes: The histogram (light blue bars) plots the estimated distribution of the total effect of the 2008 ESA for total expenditures, defined as in Parker et al. (2013), using the lagged specification in Equation (7). For each household we compute the weighted contemporaneous and lagged MPCs across groups and plot the total response as discussed in the text. The BIC selects 3 groups.

Figure 7 plots a histogram of this object among those who received the rebate. Relative to the baseline results depicted in Figure 1, the distribution spreads out, with some households having a total effect near zero but with most cumulated effects being larger than responses within the quarter. Similarly to the findings for a homogeneous specification in Parker et al. (2013), our $\lambda_g$, and especially the corresponding contemporaneous weighted MPCs, are barely affected by controlling for lagged rebate receipt. Moreover, all individual lagged responses ($\sum_{g=1}^{G} \gamma_{i,g}\lambda_{g}^{lag}$) are negative, suggesting that in the second period households consume a smaller fraction of the rebate than in the first (since a value of zero indicates a constant consumption response). 95% of the households, however, still displays a positive net effect in the second period. Therefore, as documented by Parker et al. (2013), we show that spending does not only increase upon receipt of the rebate, but also remains high but lower in the subsequent 3 months. We complement this finding by showing that such behavior is qualitatively widespread across households, but is quantitatively quite heterogenous.

Finally, we show in Table 5 that our previous analysis regarding the drivers of MPC

\footnote{For example, a household may be categorized to be in some group $a$ in the period in which they receive the rebate, and then in some group $b$ the period after they receive the rebate. For such an individual, we construct the individual 2-quarter total effect of the rebate by adding twice the contemporaneous rebate coefficient for group $a$ to the lagged rebate coefficient of group $b$, since $\lambda_{g}^{lag}$ captures the change in consumption relative to consumption in the period of rebate receipt.}
Table 5: Explanatory variables of 2-quarter MPCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-qtr MPC</td>
<td>2-qtr MPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log non-salary income</td>
<td>0.192***</td>
<td>0.503***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>0.293***</td>
<td>0.857***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See notes for Table 2. MPCs for total expenditures. Column 1 repeats the same analysis of Table 2, whereas column 2 uses as dependent variable the 2-quarter MPC computed as described in the text. Regression results for column 1 are unaffected if restricting to the subsample of column 2, in which we consider households observed for at least one full quarter after rebate receipt. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.

heterogeneity is confirmed when looking at longer-run spending responses. Non-salary income and the APC remain the only two variables that are significantly correlated with the longer-run marginal propensities to consume. These results are in line with the fact that the spending effects of the rebate are persistent for most households. Moreover, it confirms that the relationship between MPC and its drivers is not the result of short-lived effects that could be erased by inter-temporal substitution. In addition, the $R^2$ remains low, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is important even at this longer horizon.

5 Conclusion

We exploit a flexible clustering method to uncover the unconditional distribution of the marginal propensity to consume. Our strategy improves on existing approaches by recovering the full distribution of MPCs and not simply estimating how the MPC varies with observable characteristics. Applying this methodology to consumption data following the 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments, households display a considerable degree of heterogeneity in their MPCs. A non-negligible share of households spent the checks in their entirety, and all households spent at least one fourth of the rebate within one quarter, although this lower bound appears subject to statistical uncertainty. Nondurable consumption is also characterized by a lower bound that is significantly larger than zero, while durable consumption features two distinct groups with MPCs close to zero and one.

We then examine which observables – individually and jointly – best predict different
portions of the MPC distribution. We obtain various statistically significant relationships with the MPC, but only those associated with non-salary income and the APC survive the inclusion of additional drivers. These results hinge on the fact that our approach proves statistically more powerful than existing methodologies. Moreover, we estimate a formal metric for the share of the unconditional MPC heterogeneity that can be explained by observables. Since observable characteristics explain a minor portion of the estimated MPC heterogeneity, we posit that other latent factors, such as preference heterogeneity, might be important in determining marginal propensities to consume. Taken together our results provide a range of facts useful to discipline an emerging literature of macroeconomic models as well as significant policy implications, particularly for the targeting of transfers.

Finally, two caveats help to highlight possible avenues for future work. Importantly, we measure the distribution of MPCs out of the 2008 tax rebate. This means our estimated distribution uses a single cross-section of data during a recession; if an individual’s MPC is a function of the aggregate state, extrapolating our estimates requires caution. Second, because our empirical setting is one in which individuals only experience positive transitory shocks, we cannot speak to income windfalls, to which households may respond differently (Fuster et al. (2018)). However, clustering approaches like the one we use can easily be applied to other datasets with suitably identified transitory income shocks, making comparisons straightforward. We leave such exercises for future work.
References


