Games on Endogenous Networks^{*}

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Abstract

We study network games in which players choose both an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for others and the partners with whom they associate. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts that extend standard solutions for each choice made separately: Nash equilibrium in actions and pairwise stability in links. Our main results show that, under suitable monotonicity conditions on incentives, stable networks take simple forms. The first condition concerns whether links create positive or negative payoff spillovers. The second condition concerns whether actions and links are strategic complements or substitutes. Together, these conditions allow a taxonomy of how network structure depends on economic primitives. We apply our model to understand the consequences of competition for status, to microfound matching models that assume clique formation, and to interpret empirical findings that highlight unintended consequences of group design.

1 Introduction

Social contacts influence people's behavior, and that behavior in turn affects the connections they form. For instance, a good study partner might lead a student to exert more effort in school, and the student's increased effort may incentivize the partner to maintain the collaboration. Understanding how networks and actions mutually influence one another is crucial for policy design.

While many papers analyze peer effects taking social networks as fixed, an important study by Carrell et al. [2013] suggests that if policymakers neglect that the relevant networks are endogenous, then predictions can be seriously mistaken, and well-intended interventions can backfire. Studying academic peer effects among cadets at the U.S. Air Force

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Academy, their basic model posited that spillovers were the same between all members of administratively assigned groups. They first estimated these peer effects using data from random assignment to groups and found that high-skilled peers improved the grades of freshmen with less preparation. Extrapolating from these estimates, the authors subsequently designed peer groups, placing low-skilled freshmen with a higher proportion of high-skilled freshmen. While the initial estimates predicted that this would have a positive effect on the low-skilled students' performance, the intervention ultimately produced a comparably sized *negative* effect on its intended beneficiaries. The authors interpret this unintended effect as a consequence of endogenous friendship and collaboration networks *within* administratively assigned groups. Moreover, they present evidence that friendships between low- and highskilled freshmen did not form in the designed groups, preventing the beneficial spillovers observed under random assignment. In order to account for such effects, researchers need a model that permits a simultaneous analysis of network formation and peer effects.

We introduce a framework to study games with network spillovers together with strategic link formation. Our theoretical contribution is twofold. First, we propose a model that nests standard models of each type of interaction on its own. We adapt the definitions of Nash equilibrium (for actions) and pairwise stability (for network formation) to define our solution concepts. Intuitively, in a solution to a network game with network formation, players should have an incentive to change neither their actions¹ nor their links. More precisely, our notion of a stable outcome requires that no player benefits from changing her action, holding the network fixed, nor from unilaterally removing links, and no pair of players can jointly benefit from creating a link between them.² We subsequently establish existence results through standard methods.

Second, we identify payoff properties under which stable networks have simple structures. When a game is *separable*, meaning that the value of a link depends only on the identities and actions of the two players involved, we obtain sharp characterizations that depend on two kinds of strategic monotonicity. The first concerns the nature of spillovers. We say a game has *positive spillovers* if players taking higher actions are more attractive neighbors; correspondingly, a game has *negative spillovers* if players taking higher actions are less attractive neighbors. The second kind of monotonicity concerns the relationship between actions and links. The game exhibits *action-link complements* if the returns from taking higher actions increase with one's degree³ in the network. The game exhibits *actionlink substitutes* if these returns decrease with one's degree. Our main result characterizes the structure of both actions and links in equilibrium for any combination of monotonicity assumptions (one of each type). Table 1 summarizes our findings. The result demonstrates that these monotonicity conditions provide a useful way to organize our understanding of games on endogenous networks.

We present three applications in which our framework and results offer new insights.

¹We use this term from now on to mean the strategic action *other* than the link choice.

²Mirroring definitions standard in network formation, we consider both pairwise stability, in which players may drop only one link at a time, and pairwise Nash stability, in which players may drop many links simultaneously.

³Number of neighbors.

		Positive Spillovers	Negative Spillovers
Interaction between links and actions	Complements	Nested split graph, higher degree implies higher action	Ordered overlapping cliques, neighbors take similar actions
	Substitutes	Ordered overlapping cliques, neighbors take similar actions	Nested split graph, higher degree implies lower action

Interaction between neighbors' action incentives

Table 1: Summary of main result.

First, we explain the counterintuitive findings of Carrell et al. [2013] as a consequence of positive spillovers combined with action-link substitutes—we assume that students who study together create benefits for their peers, but more time studying makes link formation and maintenance more costly. We look at an example in which students have one of three innate ability levels—low, medium, or high. Although replacing just one medium-ability student with a high-ability students benefits the low-ability students in the group, additional replacements can reverse this effect. The reason is that small changes in group composition do not affect the set of stable networks—in our example, the complete network is uniquely stable at first, so all students benefit from each others' efforts—but larger changes cause the group to fragment. When the group divides into two cliques, one with high-ability students and one with low-ability students, low-ability students no longer experience peer effects from high-ability students, so the benefits of group design disappear.

Second, we study a model of "status games" based on Immorlica et al. [2017]. Competitions for status entail a combination of action-link complements and negative spillovers. For example, imagine people who compete for social status through investments in conspicuous consumption while simultaneously forming relationships. Those with more friends have a greater incentive to flaunt their wealth (action-link complements). On the other hand, those who do so are less attractive friends, since linking with them creates negative comparisons (negative spillovers). In this setting, our model predicts that individuals will sort into cliques with members that invest similar amounts in status signaling—a finding consistent with stylized facts from sociological studies. We report some further implications: those in larger groups—popular individuals—engage in more conspicuous consumption due to heightened competition, and an increase in status concerns causes the social graph to fragment into smaller cliques.

A third application provides a microfoundation, under suitable circumstances, for "club" or "group matching" models. Theories of endogenous matching for public goods or team production often *assume* that spillovers occur in disjoint cliques, which is critical for tractability. The question is then: which cliques form? We show that even when agents can arrange their interactions into more complex structures if they wish,⁴ there are natural conditions under which cliques are still the predicted outcome.

Our analysis generates new insights on strategic network formation while simultaneously unifying and organizing existing work. In our applications, we emphasize cells in our table that do not appear in earlier work—to the best of our knowledge, the ordered overlapping cliques in two cells of our table are a novel prediction in the literature on strategic network formation. Though nested split graphs arise in earlier work, we go beyond earlier work by identifying ordinal payoff properties that produce these structures.

Many of the predicted structures are more rigid than what we observe in real networks. Following our applications, we discuss two ways to accommodate more complex networks before concluding with brief remarks.

1.1 Related Work

Our analysis sits at the intersection of two strands of work in network theory: games on fixed networks and strategic network formation. Within the network games literature, some of the most widely-used and tractable models feature real-valued actions and best replies that are linear in opponents' strategies [Ballester et al., 2006, Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007, Bramoullé et al., 2014]; many of our examples are based on these models. Sadler [2020] explores the robustness of equilibrium characterizations based on centrality measures when payoffs are more general. In the same spirit, our analysis derives predictions from order properties of the payoff functions rather than particular functional forms.

The literature thus far on strategic interactions in endogenous networks is small. In the best-known examples, the decision to form a link is made unilaterally. Galeotti and Goyal [2009] study a game in which players invest in information gathering and simultaneously choose links to unilaterally form. Linked players share the information that they gather. Though link formation is unilateral, and the proposer of a link incurs the cost, information flows in both directions. Equilibrium networks involve a core-periphery structure. In Herskovic and Ramos [2020], agents receive exogenous signals and form links to observe others' signals, and they subsequently play a beauty contest game. In this game, a player whose signal is observed by many others exerts greater influence on the average action, which in turn makes this signal more valuable to observe. The equilibrium networks again have a hierarchical structure closely related to nested split graphs. Unilateral link formation in these papers contrasts with our model, in which stability is based on mutual consent.

? and ? are closer to our approach. ? studies a binary action coordination game with endogenous link formation, proposing a solution concept that interpolates between pairwise stability and pairwise Nash stability. This is a parametric model for estimation and simulation procedures in a high-dimensional environment; the goal is to study empirical counterfactuals rather than deriving theoretical results. ? studies a game in which each player chooses a real-valued effort level and simultaneously proposes a set of links—a link

⁴For instance, in a public goods model in which the public good is information, a pair could share information bilaterally.

forms if and only if both players propose it. The author then refines the set of Nash equilibria by ruling out pairwise deviations in which two players create a link between them and simultaneously adjust their actions. In the underlying game, players have symmetric payoff functions that exhibit strategic complements and positive spillovers. The setting therefore falls into the first cell in our table, and even though the solution concept differs slightly from ours, the resulting outcomes are indeed nested split graphs. Relative to this work, we significantly relax parametric and symmetry assumptions on players' payoffs, highlighting more fundamental properties that lead to this structure.

In a related but distinct effort, König et al. [2014] study a dynamic network formation model in which agents choose strategic actions and myopically add and delete links. Motivated by observed patterns in interbank lending and trade networks, the authors seek to explain the prevalence of hierarchical, nested structures. The underlying incentives satisfy positive spillovers and action-link complements, and accordingly the stochastically stable outcomes are nested split graphs.

Several other literatures connect to our applications. Most obviously, we highlight how our results can explain counterintuitive findings from studies on peer effects [Carrell et al., 2013] and derive new insights on the effects of status competitions [Immorlica et al., 2017]. For two of the cells in Table 1, our results state that stable structures consist of ordered cliques, and the members of a clique share similar attributes. In some cases, these cliques are disjoint. One can view this result as providing a microfoundation for group matching models. In these models, players choose what group to join rather than what links to form, so it is assumed ex ante that the graph is a collection of disjoint cliques. For instance, Baccara and Yariv [2013] study a model in which players choose to join in groups before investing in public projects, finding that stable groups exhibit homophily.⁵ Our analysis extends this finding, and one can use our results to find conditions under which the group matching assumption is without loss of generality.

Within the network formation literature, Jackson and Watts [2001], Hellmann [2013], and Hellmann [2020] each provide antecedents to a corresponding result in our paper. Jackson and Watts [2001] present an existence result for pairwise stable networks based on a potential function—our first existence result extends this to a setting in which players take strategic actions in addition to forming links. Likewise, our second existence result extends the main finding in Hellmann [2013].⁶ Hellmann [2020] studies a network formation game in which all players are ex-ante identical and uses order properties of the payoff functions to characterize the architecture of stable networks. A key result shows that if more central players are more attractive linking partners, then stable networks are nested split graphs. By specifying an appropriate network game, one can view this finding as a special case of the action-link complements and positive spillovers cell in our table.

⁵In other related work, Bandyopadhyay and Cabrales [2020] study pricing for group membership in a similar setting, and Chade and Eeckhout [2018] study the allocation of experts to disjoint teams.

⁶Hellmann [2013] shows that pairwise stable graphs exist if payoffs are convex in own links, and others' links are complements to own links. These conditions are jointly equivalent to our definition of quasi-convexity in links (see Definition 4).

2 Framework

A network game with network formation is a tuple $\langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ consisting of the following data:

- There is a finite set N of players; we write \mathcal{G} for the set of all simple, undirected graphs on N.⁷
- For each player $i \in N$, there is a set S_i of actions; we write $S = \prod_{i \in N} S_i$ for the set of all action profiles.
- For each player $i \in N$, there is a payoff function $u_i : \mathcal{G} \times S \to \mathbb{R}$. This gives player *i*'s payoff as a function of a graph $G \in \mathcal{G}$ and a profile of players' actions.

A pair $(G, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{G} \times S$ is an **outcome** of the game. Given a graph G, we write G_i for the neighbors of player i, we write G + E for the graph G with the links E added, and we write G - E for the graph G with the links E removed.

2.1 Solution concepts

Intuitively, in a solution to a network game with network formation, players should have an incentive to change neither their actions nor their links. We propose two nested solution concepts. These mirror, and extend to our setting with action choices, existing concepts in the network formation literature.

Definition 1. An outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) is **pairwise stable** if the following conditions hold.

- The action profile **s** is a Nash equilibrium of the game $\langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i(G, \cdot))_{i \in N} \rangle$ in which G is fixed and players only choose actions s_i .
- There is no link $ij \in G$ such that $u_i(G ij, \mathbf{s}) > u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$.
- There is no link $ij \notin G$ such that both $u_i(G + ij, \mathbf{s}) \ge u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$ and $u_j(G + ij, \mathbf{s}) \ge u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$ with at least one strict inequality.

An outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) is **pairwise Nash stable** if the following conditions hold.

- There is no pair (s'_i, H) , consisting of an action $s'_i \in S_i$ and a subset of neighbors $H \subseteq G_i$, such that $u_i (G \{ik : k \in H\}, (s'_i, s_{-i})) > u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$.
- There is no link $ij \notin G$ such that both $u_i(G + ij, \mathbf{s}) \geq u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$ and $u_j(G + ij, \mathbf{s}) \geq u_j(G, \mathbf{s})$ with at least one strict inequality.

⁷We identify a graph with its set *E* of *edges* or *links*—an edge is an unordered pair of players. We write ij for the edge $\{i, j\}$.

Both of these solution concepts reflect that link formation requires mutual consent. An outcome is pairwise stable if \mathbf{s} is a Nash equilibrium given the graph, no player wants to unilaterally delete a link, and no pair of players jointly wish to form a link. Pairwise Nash stability adds the stronger requirement that no player benefits from simultaneously changing her action and deleting some subset of her links. Whenever a player considers adding a link, she takes the action profile \mathbf{s} as given—implicit in our definition is that players assess new links and actions separately. We discuss our interpretation of this assumption, and provide foundations for it, in Section 6.2.

Note that standard models of network games and strategic network formation are nested in our framework. To represent a network game on a fixed graph G, one can take the utility function from the network game and add terms so it is strictly optimal for all players to include exactly the links in G. Pairwise stable outcomes in the corresponding network game with network formation correspond to Nash equilibria in the original network game. To represent a model of network formation, simply impose that each S_i is a singleton.

2.2 Two examples

Inspired by common applications of network models, we highlight two examples that we use throughout the paper to illustrate key findings.

A complementary-effort game: The first is a game of strategic complements that generalizes standard peer effects models. In this example, we take the action space $S_i = \mathbb{R}_+$ to be the set of nonnegative real numbers for each $i \in N$. We refer to s_i as an effort level. Letting $d_i = |G_i|$ denote the degree of player i, the payoffs are

$$u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = b_i s_i + \alpha s_i \sum_{j \in G_i} s_j - c(d_i, s_i).$$

$$\tag{1}$$

We interpret the action s_i as a level of effort in some activity—studying, crime, attendance at religious services—and links represent relationships that convey spillovers. Each player derives some standalone benefit b_i per unit of effort, and assuming $\alpha > 0$, each player also benefits from the efforts of her neighbors.

The last term captures the costs of effort and link maintenance; we assume c is increasing in both arguments. Further assumptions on the cost function should reflect the setting we have in mind. A key dimension is whether d_i and s_i are strategic complements or substitutes. Suppose we are studying peer effects in education, and s_i describes time spent studying. If maintaining a collaborative friendship requires some activities that are distinct from studying, then it would be natural that the marginal cost of a link c(d + 1, s) - c(d, s)is increasing in *s*—the more time a student spends studying, the less time is left over to sustain friendships. Alternatively, if the effort s_i describes direct social investment, such as regular attendance at events, then this effort would facilitate new relationships, and we should expect the marginal cost of a link to decrease with s. A public goods game: Our second example is a game of strategic substitutes. Players invest in creating local public goods—for instance, gathering information or learning through experience how to use a new technology—and can form links to enjoy the benefit of others' efforts. Again assume $S_i = \mathbb{R}_+$ for each $i \in N$, and the payoffs are

$$u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = b_i s_i + \sum_{j \in G_i} f(s_i, s_j) - \frac{1}{2} s_i^2 - c d_i$$
(2)

with b_i and c strictly positive.⁸ The parameter b_i captures the private benefit from investing for player i, while the constant c captures the cost of linking. The function $f(s_i, s_j)$ describes the benefit from linking to j. For this example, we assume $f(s_i, s_j) = f(s_j, s_i) > 0$ is symmetric, increasing, and concave in each argument, and the cross partial $\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial s_i \partial s_j} < 0$ is negative—this implies that neighbors' actions are strategic substitutes.⁹

The form of (2) implies that the net gains from forming a link are shared equally between the two players involved. We note, however, that since monotonic transformations of u_i do not affect best responses, this is less restrictive than it seems: differences in relative benefits can be reflected in the ratio of f to b_i , which can vary across the players due to differences in b_i . The substantive assumption here is that any link either benefits both players or harms both players. In the context of a game in which players gather information and share it with their neighbors, we might imagine that a player who has invested much more effort than a neighbor still benefits from explaining her findings.

3 Existence

As in the literature on strategic network formation, pairwise stable or pairwise Nash stable outcomes need not exist. We provide conditions that cover some important applications under which existence is guaranteed. Each builds on canonical techniques for showing existence. The first derives from potential games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996], while the second is based on monotonicity and strategic complements.

3.1 Potentials

We begin with a definition.

Definition 2. Fixing a strategy profile **s** and two networks G and G' that differ in exactly one edge, with G' = G + ij. We say G' **dominates** G given **s** if both $u_i(G', \mathbf{s}) \ge u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$ and $u_j(G', \mathbf{s}) \ge u_j(G, \mathbf{s})$, with at least one strict inequality. Conversely, we say G dominates G' given **s** if either $u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) > u_i(G', \mathbf{s}) > u_i(G', \mathbf{s}) > u_i(G', \mathbf{s})$.

⁸This example is very similar to the model of Galeotti and Goyal [2010]. The main differences are i) the impact of neighbors' actions on a player's payoff is additively separable, and ii) link formation requires mutual consent.

⁹One example of such a function is $f(s_i, s_j) = g(s_i + s_j)$, in which g is an increasing and concave function.

A function $\phi : \mathcal{G} \times S \to \mathbb{R}$ is a **potential** for $\langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ if it satisfies the following conditions for all values of the arguments.

- The inequality $\phi(G, s'_i, s_{-i}) > \phi(G, s_i, s_{-i})$ holds if and only if $u_i(G, s'_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(G, s_i, s_{-i})$.
- Whenever G and G' differ in exactly one edge, the inequality $\phi(G', \mathbf{s}) > \phi(G, \mathbf{s})$ holds if and only if G' dominates G given \mathbf{s} .

The first condition says that for any fixed G, the game $\langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i(G, \cdot))_{i \in N} \rangle$ is an ordinal potential game with potential $\phi(G, \cdot)$. The second condition says that $\phi(\cdot, \mathbf{s})$ ordinally represents the benefit of any single link change to the players involved, holding fixed the action profile \mathbf{s} —if a link is removed, the potential increases as long as at least one player is made strictly better off, and if a link is added, the potential increases as long as both players are weakly better off and one is strictly better off. If a network game with network formation has a potential, and that potential attains a maximum, then a pairwise stable outcome must exist.

Proposition 1. If a network game with network formation $\langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ has a potential ϕ , and ϕ attains a maximum at (G, \mathbf{s}) , then (G, \mathbf{s}) is a pairwise stable outcome—in particular, a pairwise stable outcome exists.

Proof. If ϕ attains a maximum at (G, \mathbf{s}) , then \mathbf{s} is clearly a Nash equilibrium holding G fixed as $\phi(G, \cdot)$ is an ordinal potential for the corresponding game. Moreover, since ϕ attains a maximum at (G, \mathbf{s}) , there is no G' differing from G in exactly one edge such that $\phi(G', \mathbf{s}) > \phi(G, \mathbf{s})$, which, by definition of the potential, means there is no link $ij \in G$ such that one of i or j strictly benefits from its removal, and there is no link $ij \notin G$ such that i and j both benefit from its addition, with one strictly benefiting. We conclude that (G, \mathbf{s}) is pairwise stable. \Box

To illustrate the application of this result, consider the second example from Section 2.2, with $s_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and payoffs given by (2). We can write a potential for this game as

$$\phi(G, \mathbf{s}) = \sum_{i \in N} \left(b_i s_i - \frac{1}{2} s_i^2 \right) + \sum_{ij \in G} \left(f(s_i, s_j) - c \right).$$

If f is bounded, then there is a bound on each player's best response correspondence, so we can treat the action sets as compact, and ϕ must attain a maximum. Hence, Proposition 1 tells us that a pairwise stable outcome exists.

3.2 Strategic complements

Our second existence result requires that the game exhibits strategic complements. Here we assume that each action set S_i is a complete lattice with order \geq . Recall that a function $f : X \times T \to \mathbb{R}$, in which X is a lattice and T is partially ordered, has the *single crossing* property in x and t if, whenever $x' \geq x$ and $t' \geq t$, it satisfies

$$f(x',t) \ge (>) f(x,t) \quad \Longrightarrow \quad f(x',t') \ge (>) f(x,t').$$

The function is quasisupermodular in x if for any $x, x' \in X$,

$$f(x,t) - f(x \wedge x',t) \ge (>) 0 \quad \Longrightarrow \quad f(x \vee x',) - f(x',t) \ge (>) 0.$$

Definition 3. A network game with network formation exhibits **strategic complements** if:

- Each action set S_i is a complete lattice.
- For each $i \in N$ and $G \in \mathcal{G}$, the payoff $u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$ is quasisupermodular in s_i and has the single crossing property in s_i and s_{-i} .
- For each $i \in N$ and $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$, the payoff $u_i(G, \mathbf{s})$ has the single crossing property in s_i . and G

The first two parts of Definition 3 ensure that $\langle N, (S_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i(G, \cdot))_{i \in N} \rangle$ is a game of strategic complements for each graph G. Holding G fixed, each player's best response correspondence is increasing (in the strong set order) in opponents' actions, and standard results imply that minimal and maximal Nash equilibria exist. The single crossing property in s_i and G implies that, holding opponent actions fixed, player *i* wants to choose a higher action if we add links to the graph—adding a link intensifies complementarities.

Our next definitions introduce monotonicity conditions on the marginal benefit from adding a link.

Definition 4. A network game with network formation has **positive spillovers** if for each edge $ij \notin G$, any $s'_j \geq s_j$, and any s_{-j} , we have

$$u_i(G+ij, s_j, s_{-j}) - u_i(G, s_j, s_{-j}) \le u_i(G+ij, s'_j, s_{-j}) - u_i(G, s'_j, s_{-j}),$$

with strict inequality if $s'_j > s_j$. The game has weakly positive spillovers if

$$u_i(G+ij, s_j, s_{-j}) \ge u_i(G, s_j, s_{-j}) \implies u_i(G+ij, s'_j, s_{-j}) \ge u_i(G, s'_j, s_{-j}) \le u_i(G, s'_j, s'_j) \le u_i(G, s'_j) \le u_i$$

with strict inequality if $s'_j > s_j$. A network game with network formation has (weakly) negative spillovers if the game with all u_i replaced by $-u_i$ has (resp., weakly) positive spillovers.

A network game with network formation is **convex** in links if for each edge $ij \notin G' \supset G$ and any **s**, we have

$$u_i(G+ij,\mathbf{s}) - u_i(G,\mathbf{s}) \le u_i(G'+ij,\mathbf{s}) - u_i(G',\mathbf{s}).$$

The game is **quasi-convex** in links if

$$u_i(G+ij,\mathbf{s}) \ge u_i(G,\mathbf{s}) \implies u_i(G'+ij,\mathbf{s}) - u_i(G',\mathbf{s}).$$

A network game with network formation is (quasi-)concave in links if the game with all u_i replaced by $-u_i$ is (resp., quasi-)convex in links.

Positive spillovers means that, all else equal, if player j takes a higher action, she becomes a more attractive neighbor. Convexity in links means that adding other links to the graph can only increase the benefit from forming a link with j. Negative spillovers reverses the first statement—higher actions make someone a *less* attractive neighbor—and concavity in links reverses the second—additional links in the graph weakly *decrease* the benefit of linking. Analogous to the distinction between increasing differences and the single crossing property, weak positive/negative spillovers, and quasi-convexity/concavity in links, are corresponding ordinal conditions.

Proposition 2. If a network game with network formation exhibits strategic complements, has weakly positive spillovers, and is quasi-convex in links, then there exist minimal and maximal pairwise stable outcomes. Moreover, the minimal pairwise stable outcome is pairwise Nash stable.¹⁰

Proof. We carry out the existence argument for the minimal outcome; the argument for the maximal outcome is analogous. We can find the minimal pairwise stable outcome via the following algorithm:

- (a) Let $G^{(0)}$ be the empty graph, and let $\mathbf{s}^{(0)}$ be the minimal Nash equilibrium of the game holding the graph $G^{(0)}$ fixed.
- (b) For each $k \ge 1$, we take $ij \in G^{(k)}$ if and only if we have both $u_i(G^{(k-1)} + ij, \mathbf{s}^{(k-1)}) \ge u_i(G^{(k-1)} ij, \mathbf{s}^{(k-1)})$ and $u_j(G^{(k-1)} + ij, \mathbf{s}^{(k-1)}) \ge u_j(G^{(k-1)} ij, \mathbf{s}^{(k-1)})$, with at least one strict inequality.
- (c) For each $k \ge 1$, the action profile $\mathbf{s}^{(k)}$ is the minimal Nash equilibrium of the game holding the graph $G^{(k)}$ fixed.

The action profile $\mathbf{s}^{(k)}$ is always well-defined because the game on a fixed graph is one of strategic complements, which implies it has a minimal and maximal equilibrium in pure strategies. Additionally, since u_i has the single crossing property in s_i and G for each $i \in N$, we know that if \mathbf{s} and \mathbf{s}' are the minimal Nash equilibria associated with G and G' respectively, then $\mathbf{s} \leq \mathbf{s}'$ whenever $G \subseteq G'$. Since $G^{(0)} \subseteq G^{(1)}$, we know that $\mathbf{s}^{(0)} \leq \mathbf{s}^{(1)}$, and weakly positive spillovers now imply that $G^{(1)} \subseteq G^{(2)}$ —by induction, we conclude that $G^{(k-1)} \subseteq G^{(k)}$ for each $k \geq 1$. Since there are finitely many possible graphs, the algorithm must terminate, and the resulting graph is pairwise stable. To see that the minimal graph is in fact pairwise Nash stable, note that for any player i, if we remove any subset of links $S \subseteq G_i$ one by one, reversing order in which they were added above, quasi-convexity in links implies that each removal decreases i's utility, so removing the links in S decreases i's utility.

For the maximal pairwise stable outcome, start from the complete graph instead of the empty graph, choose the maximal equilibrium instead of the minimal one, and in step (b) of the algorithm, always include link ij if it weakly benefits both players.

¹⁰If in the definition of strategic complements one replaces single crossing in s_i and G with single crossing in s_i and -G, so best responses *decrease* as links are added, then one can obtain an analogous existence result assuming weakly negative spillovers and quasi-convexity in links.

Our first example from Section 2.2 is a case to which Theorem 2 applies. Looking at the payoff function (1), since α is positive, the game exhibits strategic complements. The benefit to *i* of adding link *ij* is

$$\alpha s_i s_j - c(d_i + 1, s_i) + c(d_i, s_i)$$

This tells us that if c(d + 1, s) - c(d, s) is non-increasing in d for each s, then the game has positive spillovers. As long as action sets are effectively bounded—either due to constraints on effort or because the cost c(d, s) is sufficiently convex in s—Theorem 2 ensures that minimal and maximal pairwise stable outcomes exist.

4 The structure of stable graphs

How do properties of the payoff functions $(u_i)_{i \in N}$ affect stable network structures? This section derives our main results on the taxonomy of stable graphs under certain monotonicity assumptions on payoffs.

4.1 Separability

Our analysis in this section focuses on separable games, meaning that the incremental payoff to a player from forming a link depends only on statistics of the two players on either end of the link. Throughout this section, we assume that each action set S_i is partially ordered with order \geq .

Definition 5. Let \mathcal{G}_{-i} denote the set of all graphs with vertex set $N \setminus \{i\}$, and given a graph G, write G_{-i} for the subgraph of G with vertex i removed. A **statistic** for player i is a function $h_i : \mathcal{G}_{-i} \times S_i \to \mathbb{R}$ that is strictly increasing in s_i . A network game with network formation is **separable** if there exist statistics $\{h_i\}_{i\in N}$ for each player and a function $g : \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$u_i(G+ij, \mathbf{s}) - u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = g(h_i(s_i, G_{-i}), h_j(s_j, G_{-j}))$$

for all players i and j and all graphs G with $ij \notin G$. The game is **strongly separable** if the corresponding statistics do not depend on the graph G.

We say that actions and links are complements if, whenever $h'_i > h_i$, we have

$$g(h_i, h_j) \ge 0 \implies g(h'_i, h_j) > 0.$$

We say that actions and links are substitutes if, whenever $h'_i > h_i$, we have

$$g(h_i, h_j) \le 0 \implies g(h'_i, h_j) < 0.$$

We note additionally that, applying Definition 4, a separable game has positive (negative) spillovers if g is increasing (decreasing) in its second argument.

Since the statistics $\{h_i\}_{i\in N}$ are player specific, Definition 5 allows linking incentives to depend on essentially any idiosyncratic attributes of the players as long as we can reduce them to a one-dimensional summary statistic. Moreover, separability is compatible with any underlying network game holding the graph fixed—the game can exhibit strategic complements or substitutes (or neither), and players can have arbitrary private incentives to take high or low actions. The main substantive restrictions are that i) the incentive for *i* and *j* to form a link cannot depend directly on a third player *k*'s action or attributes,¹¹ and ii) factors that influence linking incentives can be reduced to a one-dimensional scale.

A pair of examples helps illustrate the kinds of incentives that separable games can capture. In the simplest case, the incentive to form a link depends only on the two players' actions. Suppose payoffs take the form

$$u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = v_i(s_i) + \sum_{j \in G_i} w(s_i, s_j) - cd_i,$$

in which $d_i = |G_i|$ is player *i*'s degree. Here, the function *w* describes a link benefit that depends on the two players' actions, and linking incurs some fixed cost *c*. This game is separable for statistics $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) = s_i$, with $g(h_i, h_j) = w(h_i, h_j) - c$. The public goods game from Section 2.2 takes this form, and the complementary-effort game is similarly separable if the cost function $c(d_i, s_i)$ in equation (1) is linear in d_i , holding s_i fixed.

As a second example, suppose actions are real-valued, each player *i* has a type $t_i \in [0, 1]$, and payoffs take the form

$$u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = v_i(s_i) + \sum_{j \in G_i} w(s_i + t_i, s_j + t_i)$$

Here, the value of a link between i and j depends on a combination of the two players' actions and idiosyncratic types—the game is separable for statistics $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) = s_i + t_i$, with $g(h_i, h_j) = w(h_i, h_j)$. Using this functional form, we can capture situations in which higher types are more attractive partners—take w increasing in the second argument—situations in which higher types seek out more partners—take w increasing in the first argument—or even situations in which players seek out partners with similar types—take w decreasing in the distance between its arguments.

Both of these examples are in fact strongly separable as player statistics do not depend on the graph. While statistics in general can vary with the network, note that the dependence of player *i*'s statistic on *G* is limited to the subgraph G_{-i} induced by *i*'s removal. In assessing the value of a link *ij*, the value of player *i*'s statistic cannot depend on the presence or absence of link *ij*. Nevertheless, a link between *i* and *k* can still indirectly affect the value of link *ij* through its effect on *i*'s equilibrium action.

In a strongly separable game, we can strengthen our two existence results because the value of a link depends only on players' actions, not on other links present in the graph: under the conditions of Propositions 1 or 2, a pairwise Nash stable outcome exists.

¹¹To the extent that player k's action or attributes affect player i's action in equilibrium, it can still have an indirect effect on i's incentives to link to j.

Proposition 3. If a network game with network formation is strongly separable, then any pairwise stable outcome is pairwise Nash stable.

Proof. We need only check that if there are no profitable single link deletions, then there is no way to profit from multiple link deletions. This is immediate from strong separability because the marginal gain from deleting a link does not depend on the presence or absence of other links. \Box

4.2 Main result

Turning now to our main question, we obtain a sharp characterization of the network structures that can arise as stable outcomes in separable games.

Theorem 1. Suppose a network game with network formation is separable with statistics $\{h_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$, and (G, \mathbf{s}) is a pairwise stable outcome. Then:

- (a) If the game has weakly positive spillovers, and links and actions are complements, then $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) > h_j(G_{-j}, s_j)$ implies $G_j \subseteq G_i \cup \{i\}$.
- (b) If the game has weakly positive spillovers, and links and actions are substitutes, then if $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) > h_j(G_{-j}, s_j) > h_k(G_{-k}, s_k)$ and $ik \in G$, then $ij, jk \in G$.
- (c) If the game has weakly negative spillovers, and links and actions are complements, then if $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) > h_j(G_{-j}, s_j) > h_k(G_{-k}, s_k)$ and $ik \in G$, then $ij, jk \in G$.
- (d) If the game has weakly negative spillovers and links and actions are substitutes, then $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) > h_j(G_{-j}, s_j)$ implies $G_i \subseteq G_j \cup \{j\}$.

Proof. To simplify notation, throughout this proof we suppress the dependence of the statistic h_i on G_{-i} and s_i . We begin with part (a). Suppose $jk \in G$ and $h_i > h_j$. Since $g(h_k, h_j) \ge 0$, weakly positive spillovers imply that $g(h_k, h_i) > 0$, and since $g(h_j, h_k) \ge 0$, action and link complements imply $g(h_i, h_k) > 0$. Players *i* and *k* strictly benefit from linking, so a link must exist.

For part (b), if $ik \in G$, then stability of G implies $g(h_i, h_k) \ge 0$. We make two observations from this. First, since $h_i > h_j$, action-link substitutes imply $g(h_j, h_k) > 0$. Since $h_i > h_k$, weakly positive spillovers now imply that $g(h_j, h_i) > 0$. Second, since $h_j > h_k$, weakly positive spillovers imply $g(h_i, h_j) > 0$. Since $h_i > h_k$, action-link substitutes now imply that $g(h_k, h_j) > 0$. We conclude that ij and jk are both in G.

For part (c), suppose actions and links are complements, but the game has weakly negative spillovers. If $ik \in G$, then $g(h_k, h_i) \geq 0$. Since $h_j > h_k$, action-link complements imply $g(h_j, h_i) > 0$, and since $h_i > h_k$, we can now infer $g(h_j, h_k) > 0$ from weakly negative spillovers. Moreover, since $h_i > h_j$ and $g(h_k, h_i) \geq 0$, weakly negative spillovers imply that $g(h_k, h_j) > 0$. Action-link complements now imply $g(h_i, h_j) > 0$. We conclude that ij and jk are both in G.

Finally, for part (d), suppose actions and links are substitutes, and the game has weakly negative spillovers. If $ik \in G$ and $h_i > h_j$, then since $g(h_k, h_i) \ge 0$, weakly negative spillovers

imply $g(h_k, h_j) > 0$, and since $g(h_i, h_k) \ge 0$, action-link substitutes imply $g(h_j, h_k) > 0$. We conclude that $jk \in G$.

The characterization in Theorem 1 is stark. In cases (a) and (d), if one player has a higher statistic than another, then the two neighborhoods are ordered by set inclusion. In cases (b) and (c), a link between two players, one with a higher statistic than the other, implies that the set of players with intermediate statistics forms a clique. Strict comparisons play an important role as any link ij need not be in G if both i and j are indifferent about adding it.

By strengthening the stability concept slightly, we can obtain a stronger characterization.

Definition 6. The outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) is strictly pairwise stable if no player is indifferent about keeping any link in G, and no two players are both indifferent about adding a link between them.

If we assume that (G, \mathbf{s}) is strictly pairwise stable in the hypothesis of Theorem 1, then all statements remain true if we replace strict inequalities with weak inequalities (i.e., assume throughout only that $h_i \ge h_j \ge h_k$).¹² This in turn implies that stable graphs have particular neighborhood structures. To state our result, we first define two classes of graphs.

Definition 7. Given a graph G, let $\mathcal{D} = (D_0, D_1, ..., D_k)$ denote its degree partition players are grouped according to their degrees, and those in the (possibly empty) element D_0 have degree 0. The graph G with degree partition \mathcal{D} is a **nested split graph** if for each $\ell = 1, 2, ..., k$ and each $i \in D_\ell$ we have

$$G_{i} = \begin{cases} \bigcup_{j=1}^{\ell} D_{k+1-j} & \text{if } \ell \leq \lfloor \frac{k}{2} \rfloor \\ \bigcup_{j=1}^{\ell} D_{k+1-j} \setminus \{i\} & \text{if } \ell > \lfloor \frac{k}{2} \rfloor. \end{cases}$$

In particular, if $d_i \leq d_j$, then $G_i \subset G_j \cup \{j\}$.

A graph G consists of **ordered overlapping cliques** if we can order the players $\{1, 2, ..., n\}$ such that $G_i \cup \{i\}$ is an interval for each i, and the endpoints of this interval are weakly increasing in i.

In a nested split graph, players' neighborhoods are totally ordered through set inclusion, resulting in a strong hierarchical structure. In a graph with ordered overlapping cliques, the order on the players induces an order on the set of maximal cliques. Each maximal clique consists of an interval of players, and both end points of these cliques are strictly increasing. Any graph in which every component is a clique is special case of this structure. As a corollary of Theorem 1, we note that stable graphs have one of these two structures.

Corollary 1. Suppose a network game with network formation is separable with statistics $\{h_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$, and (G, \mathbf{s}) is a strictly pairwise stable outcome. Then:

 $^{^{12}}$ Analogous to the distinction between single crossing differences and strict single crossing differences, in this case we can also weaken the definitions of positive/negative spillovers and action and link complements/substitutes.

- (a) If the game has weakly positive spillovers and actions and links are complements, then G is a nested split graph, and $|G_i| > |G_j|$ implies $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) > h_j(G_{-j}, s_j)$.
- (b) If the game has weakly negative spillovers and actions and links are substitutes, then G is a nested split graph, and $|G_i| < |G_j|$ implies $h_i(G_{-i}, s_i) > h_i(G_{-j}, s_j)$.
- (c) If the game has weakly positive spillovers and actions and links are substitutes, or if the game has weakly negative spillovers and actions and links are complements, then G consists of ordered overlapping cliques with players ordered according to their statistics.

Proof. Consider claim (a) first. Part (a) of Theorem 1 immediately implies that if $|G_i| \ge |G_j|$, it must be that $h_i \ge h_j$, and $G_j \subset G_i \cup \{i\}$. Hence, players with the same degree share the same neighbors, and for players with different degrees, neighborhoods are ordered by set inclusion. Part (a) of the corollary follows, and claim (b) holds by a similar argument.

Moving to claim (c), parts (b) and (c) of Theorem 1 imply that if we order players according to their statistics, neighborhoods are intervals—if *i* is linked to any *j* with $h_j < h_i$, then *i* is linked to all *k* with $h_j \leq h_k \leq h_i$, and similarly if *i* is linked to *j* with $h_j > h_i$, then *i* is linked to all *k* with $h_j \geq h_k \geq h_i$. The endpoints are necessarily increasing in the order because the Theorem also implies that player *k* is linked to player *j* in each case. The result follows.

Barring indifference, there are essentially two network structures that can arise in stable outcomes. Either neighborhoods are nested, with the order depending on whether we are in case (a) or (b), or the network is organized into overlapping cliques of players. In many natural examples, the statistics are simply players' actions, and in this case players in a clique necessarily take similar actions.

Implicit in this result is a novel characterization of structures that arise in more standard network formation games. If action sets are singletons, then the assumptions of positive or negative spillovers, and action-link complements or substitutes, translate into assumptions about idiosyncratic attributes of the players. Imagine that each player has a one-dimensional type. Positive spillovers means that, all else equal, higher types are more attractive neighbors, while negative spillovers means that higher types are less attractive neighbors. Similarly, action-link complements means that higher types desire more links, while action-link substitutes means that higher types desire fewer links. Work on strategic network formation has thus far struggled to obtain general results on the structure of pairwise stable graphs, and Corollary 1 highlights non-trivial conditions that yield sharp predictions.

5 Applications

This section discusses applications to issues in related literatures. The first subsection uses our theory to interpret the unintended consequences of group design observed by ?. The second subsection applies our taxonomy of predicted network structures to make predictions about *status games*, in which social comparisons play an important role in payoffs, and interprets stylized facts about clique formation. Finally, we discuss how our analysis can be used to provide a foundation for models that assume a much coarser notion of network formation than we do: people opting into groups rather than bilateral relationships.

5.1 Perverse consequences of group design: An example based on Carrell et al. [2013]

Carrell et al. [2013] estimated academic peer effects among first year cadets at the US Air Force Academy and then used these estimates to inform the assignment of new cadets to squadrons. Based on the first wave of randomly assigned squadrons, the authors concluded that being in a squadron with higher performing peers¹³ led to better academic performance among less prepared cadets. In the second wave, incoming cadets with less preparation were systematically placed in squadrons with more high ability peers. While the researchers' goal was to improve the performance of the less prepared cadets, the intervention ultimately backfired: these students performed significantly worse. In this section, we present a simple example showing that our theory can simultaneously explain two peculiar features of the Air Force study:

- (a) When peer group composition changes slightly, low ability cadets are better off when they have more high ability peers, and
- (b) Larger changes in peer group composition eliminate or even reverse this effect.

Consider a network game with network formation in which $S_i = \mathbb{R}_+$ for each player *i*, and payoffs take the form

$$u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = b_i s_i + \alpha s_i \sum_{j \in G_i} s_j - \frac{1}{2} (1 + d_i) s_i^2,$$

in which $d_i = |G_i|$ is player *i*'s degree and $\alpha > 0$. Holding the graph fixed, this is a standard linear-quadratic network game of strategic complements. There are positive spillovers, as an increase in s_j makes a link to player *j* more valuable. Moreover, links and actions are substitutes. Player *i*'s net benefit from adding a link to player *j* is

$$\alpha s_i s_j - \frac{1}{2} s_i^2 = s_i \left(\alpha s_j - \frac{1}{2} s_i \right),$$

which satisfies the single crossing property in Definition 5. As s_i increases, this eventually turns negative—those who invest a lot of effort find linking too costly. From this expression, one can check that in a pairwise stable outcome, players i and j are neighbors only if $\frac{s_j}{2\alpha} \leq s_i \leq 2\alpha s_j$.

¹³Specifically, those entering with relatively high SAT verbal scores.




Figure 1: An illustration of the stable outcomes for the three squadrons. Ability levels b_i appear inside each node, while equilibrium actions s_i are next to the node.

A pairwise stable outcome satisfies the first order condition

$$s_i = \frac{1}{d_i + 1} \left(b_i + \alpha \sum_{j \in G_i} s_j \right)$$

for each $i \in N$. Writing \tilde{G} for a matrix with entries $\tilde{g}_{ij} = \frac{1}{d_i+1}$ if $ij \in G$ and 0 otherwise, and $\tilde{\mathbf{b}}$ for a column vector with entries $\frac{b_i}{d_i+1}$, we can write this in matrix notation as

$$\mathbf{s} = \tilde{\mathbf{b}} + \alpha \tilde{G} \mathbf{s} \implies \mathbf{s} = (I - \alpha \tilde{G})^{-1} \tilde{\mathbf{b}}.$$

As long as α is small enough (e.g., $\alpha \leq 1$), the solution for **s** is well-defined for any graph G, and it is an equilibrium of the game holding G fixed.

Now assume that $\alpha = 1$ and the game consists of five players, with b_i taking the values 4, 6, or 9. We understand players with $b_i = 4$ as cadets with low ability¹⁴ and those with $b_i = 9$ as cadets with high ability. Given an outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) , we interpret the action s_i as the academic performance of cadet i, and we interpret links as friendships through which peer effects can operate.

We now assess stable outcomes for three different squadron compositions:

- Squadron 1: $\mathbf{b} = (4, 4, 6, 6, 9)$
- Squadron 2: $\mathbf{b} = (4, 4, 6, 9, 9)$
- Squadron 3: $\mathbf{b} = (4, 4, 9, 9, 9)$

In each successive model, we replace a cadet of intermediate ability with a high ability cadet, and we are interested in how the actions of the low ability cadets change.

¹⁴We use "ability" as a shorthand for aptitude and preparation.

In squadron 1, the unique pairwise stable outcome is a complete graph with action vector $\mathbf{s} = (5\frac{1}{2}, 5\frac{1}{2}, 5\frac{5}{6}, 5\frac{5}{6}, 6\frac{1}{3})$. In squadron 2, the unique pairwise stable outcome again involves a complete graph, and the action vector is $\mathbf{s} = (6, 6, 6\frac{1}{3}, 6\frac{5}{6}, 6\frac{5}{6})$. From this we see that adding a second high ability cadet to the squadron increases the performance of low ability cadets from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 6—low ability cadets benefit from this small change in group composition.

What happens when we add another high ability cadet? In squadron 3, there are multiple pairwise stable outcomes, but only one that survives a natural refinement. We call a pairwise stable outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) **uncoordinated** if there exists a sequence of graphs and action profiles $(G^{(0)}, \mathbf{s}^{(0)}, G^{(1)}, \mathbf{s}^{(1)}, ...)$, ending at (G, \mathbf{s}) , in which

- $G^{(0)}$ is empty,
- $\mathbf{s}^{(k)}$ is a Nash equilibrium holding $G^{(k)}$ fixed, and
- $G^{(k+1)}$ dominates $G^{(k)}$ given $\mathbf{s}^{(k)}$.

In words, a pairwise stable outcome is uncoordinated if it is reachable through myopically optimal adjustments, starting from an empty graph.¹⁵ For squadron 3, the unique uncoordinated outcome involves two separate cliques: the two low ability cadets form one clique, the three high ability cadets form the other, and the action vector is $\mathbf{s} = (4, 4, 9, 9, 9)$. A larger change in the group composition results in a marked decline in performance for the low ability cadets.

Although the uncoordinated refinement is particularly compelling in this setting—cadets generally do not know one another beforehand—note that the complete graph is still part of a pairwise stable outcome—the corresponding action vector is $\mathbf{s} = (6\frac{1}{2}, 6\frac{1}{2}, 7\frac{1}{3}, 7\frac{1}{3}, 7\frac{1}{3})$. This suggests that a more coordinated effort to facilitate collaboration may restore the beneficial relationship we saw in the shift from squadron 1 to squadron 2.

5.2 Status games and ordered cliques

Competitions for status feature action-link complements and negative spillovers. For instance, conspicuous consumption among friends tends to increase one's own conspicuous consumption in response, but those who flaunt expensive possessions are less attractive as friends. Jackson [2019] argues that many social behaviors (e.g., binge drinking) have the same properties: those with more friends find these behaviors more rewarding, but they exert negative health externalities across neighbors. More generally, this pattern applies to any domain in which friends' achievement drives one to excel, but there is disutility from negative comparisons among friends. Our theory suggests that these interactions drive the formation of social cliques ordered according to their relative status.

This prediction agrees with anthropological and sociological studies documenting the pervasiveness of ranked cliques. For instance, Davis and Leinhardt [1967] formalize the theory of Homans [1950], asserting that small or medium-sized groups (e.g., departments in

¹⁵This selection criterion implicitly assumes that players have no prior relationships at the start of the adjustment process. Given information on prior relationships, one could adapt this criterion to select an outcome reachable from the initial state.

workplaces, grades in a school) are often organized into cliques with a clear ranking among them.¹⁶ Adler and Adler [1995] conduct an ethnographic study of older elementary-school children that highlights the prevalence of cliques. The authors argue that status differentiation is clear across cliques, and there are unambiguous orderings, with one clique occupying the "upper status rung of a grade" and "identified by members and nonmembers alike as the 'popular clique." This study also emphasizes negative externalities arising from dominance contests within cliques, consistent with our negative spillovers assumption. Building on this ethnographic work, Gest et al. [2007] carry out a detailed quantitative examination of the social structures in a middle school, with a particular focus on gender differences. The authors' summary confirms the ethnographic narrative: "girls and boys were similar in their tendency to form same-sex peer groups that were distinct, tightly knit, and characterized by status hierarchies."

Within the economics literature, Immorlica et al. [2017] introduce a framework in which players exert inefficient effort in a status-seeking activity and earn disutility from network neighbors who exert higher effort—we can view this as a model of conspicuous consumption with upward-looking comparisons. The authors assume an exogenous network and explore how the network structure influences individual behavior. Formally, the authors take $S_i = \mathbb{R}_+$ for each player *i*, and payoffs are

$$u_i(\mathbf{s}) = b_i s_i - \frac{s_i^2}{2} - \sum_{j \in G_i} g_{ij} \max\{s_j - s_i, 0\},\$$

in which $g_{ij} \ge 0$ for each $ij \in G$. The paper shows that an equilibrium partitions the players into classes making the same level of effort, and the highest class consists of the subset of players that maximizes a measure of group cohesion. Our framework makes it possible to endogenize the network in this model—under a natural extension of the payoff function, the classes that emerge in equilibrium form distinct cliques in the social graph.

Consider a network game with network formation in which $S_i = \mathbb{R}_+$ for each *i*, and payoffs take the form

$$u_i(G, \mathbf{s}) = bs_i - \frac{s_i^2}{2} + \sum_{j \in G_i} \left(1 - \delta \max\{s_j - s_i, 0\}\right).$$

In this game, player *i* earns a unit of utility for each neighbor, but suffers a loss $s_j - s_i$ if neighbor *j* invests more effort. To highlight the role of network formation, rather than individual incentives, we also specialize the model so that all players have the same private benefit *b* for effort. The game is clearly separable with negative spillovers, and links and actions are (weak) complements. Hence, stable outcomes consist of ordered overlapping cliques, and we can only have $ij \in G$ if $|s_i - s_j| \leq \frac{1}{\delta}$. For the purposes of this example, we restrict attention to outcomes in which the cliques partition the players. Moreover, following Immorlica et al. [2017], we focus on maximal equilibria of the status game, with players

¹⁶Davis and Leinhardt [1967] discuss purely graph-theoretic principles that guarantee some features of a ranked-cliques graph, but do not have a model of choices.

taking the highest actions they can sustain given the graph. Since all players have the same private benefit b, all players in a clique play the same action, and the maximal action in a clique of size k is $b + (k - 1)\delta$.

Two features of stable outcomes stand out. First, those in large groups take higher actions—popular individuals invest more in status signaling. Second, as status concerns increase, the graph can fragment. Let c^* denote the smallest integer such that $c^*\delta \geq \frac{1}{\delta}$ —this is the unique integer satisfying $\delta \in [1/\sqrt{c^*}, 1/\sqrt{c^*-1})$. If *i* and *j* are in different cliques, we must have $|s_i - s_j| \geq \frac{1}{\delta}$, which implies the cliques differ in size by at least c^* . The larger c^* is, the more cohesive stable networks are. If there are *n* players in total, and $\delta < \frac{1}{\sqrt{n-2}}$, then the complete graph is the only stable outcome. As δ increases, meaning there are greater status concerns, then stable outcomes can involve more fragmented graphs. If $\delta \geq 1$, then separate cliques need only differ in size by one player, and the maximal number of cliques is the largest integer *k* such that $\frac{k(k+1)}{2} \leq n$. This simple example highlights how our framework enables meaningful study of comparative statics for stable networks.

5.3 Foundations for group-matching models

Models of endogenous matching that go beyond pairwise interactions often posit that individuals belong to a *group* of others. Externalities and strategic interactions then occur within or across groups—crucially, payoffs are invariant to permutations of agents within groups. In essence, these models constrain the network that can form, assuming disjoint cliques. For example, Baccara and Yariv [2013] study a setting in which individuals join groups (e.g., social clubs) and then choose how much to contribute to an activity within the group. These contributions affect the payoffs of other group members symmetrically. Similarly, Chade and Eeckhout [2018] model the allocation of experts to teams. These experts share information within their teams, benefiting all team members equally, but not across teams.

The interactions motivating these models are not so constrained in reality—there is no reason why pairs cannot meet outside the groups, and in many cases a person could choose to join multiple groups. However, assuming that interactions happen in groups allows simplifications that are essential to the tractability of these models. To what extent are these restrictions without loss of generality? Our results allow us to provide simple sufficient conditions.

For this section, we assume all players have the same action set S, which is a closed interval in \mathbb{R} , and each player has one of finitely many types—write $t_i \in T$ for player *i*'s type. The types capture all heterogeneity in payoffs across players, and utility is continuous in the action profile. Moreover, we assume that payoffs are strongly separable and exhibit a weak preference for conformity—this means that optimal actions result in player statistics that lie between some type-specific benchmark and neighbors' statistics.

More formally, a graph G = (N, E) is type-isomorphic to another graph G' = (N, E')if there exists a bijection $\pi : N \to N$ such that $t_i = t_{\pi(i)}$ and $ij \in E$ if and only if $\pi(i)\pi(j) \in E'$. We have

$$u_i(G, \pi(\mathbf{s})) = u_{\pi(i)}(G', \mathbf{s})$$

for all such bijections π , all such graphs G and G', and all players i. We further suppose that players have unique best responses, holding the graph and other players' actions fixed, so there exists a unique action s_t^* that a type t player would take if isolated with no neighbors. This is the *privately optimal action*. Since the game is strongly separable we can write the statistic for each player i as $h(s_i, t_i)$ for some function $h : S \times T \to \mathbb{R}$. We write $h_t^* = h(s_t^*, t)$ for the statistic corresponding to a type t player's privately optimal action. Payoffs exhibit a *weak preference for conformity* if player i's statistic when playing a best response always lies somewhere in between her privately optimal benchmark and the statistics of her neighbors. That is, for $\hat{s} = \arg \max_{s_i \in S} u_i(G, s_i, s_{-i})$, we have

$$h(\hat{s}, t_i) \in \left[\min\{h_{t_i}^*, \min_{j \in G_i}\{h(s_j, t_j)\}\}, \max\{h_{t_i}^*, \max_{j \in G_i}\{h(s_j, t_j)\}\}\right]$$

for all i and G.

We say that types form *natural cliques* if there exists a partition $\{T_1, T_2, ..., T_K\}$ of T such that

- $g(h_t^*, h_{t'}^*) \ge 0$ for any $t, t' \in T_k$ and any k.
- $g(h_t^*, h_{t'}^*) \leq 0$ for any $t \in T_k$ and $t' \in T_\ell$ with $k \neq \ell$.

In words, this means that if all players were to choose their privately optimal actions, and form the network taking those actions as given, then disjoint cliques based on the partition of types would be pairwise stable. If payoffs exhibit a weak preference for conformity, these same cliques remain pairwise stable when players can change their actions.

Proposition 4. Under the above assumptions, suppose the game exhibits either positive spillovers and action-link substitutes or negative spillovers and action-link complements. If types form natural cliques, then there exists a pairwise stable outcome in which the players are partitioned into disjoint cliques.

Proof. We carry out the proof assuming positive spillovers and action-link substitutes—the other case is analogous. Since types form natural cliques, there is a partition $\{T_1, T_2, ..., T_K\}$ of types such that, when playing the privately optimal actions, players have an incentive to link if and only if their types are in the same element of the partition. Suppose this graph forms. We show it is part of a pairwise stable outcome.

For each T_k let \underline{h}_k and h_k denote the lowest and highest values respectively of h_t^* for some type $t \in T_k$. Weak preference for conformity implies that there exists an equilibrium in actions in which $h_i \in [\underline{h}_k, \overline{h}_k]$ for every player i with type $t_i \in T_k$. Given two such players i and j, we have

$$g(h_i, h_j) \ge g(h_i, \underline{h}_k) \ge g(h_k, \underline{h}_k) \ge 0,$$

in which the first inequality follows from positive spillovers, and the second follows from action-link substitutes. Hence, these two players have an incentive to link.

For two partition elements T_k and T_ℓ , with $k \neq \ell$, assume without loss of generality that $\underline{h}_\ell \geq \overline{h}_k$. For player *i* with type $t_i \in T_k$ and *j* with type $t_j \in T_\ell$ we have

$$g(h_i, h_j) \le g(\underline{h}_k, h_j) \le g(\underline{h}_k, \overline{h}_\ell) \le 0, \text{ and}$$
$$g(h_j, h_i) \le g(\underline{h}_\ell, h_i) \le g(\underline{h}_\ell, \overline{h}_k) \le 0,$$

so the players have no incentive to link.

Under natural assumptions, stable networks preserve natural cleavages between identifiable types of individuals, and players endogenously organize themselves into disjoint cliques as assumed in group matching models. Even if the natural cleavages are not so stark, our results show that much of the simplifying structure remains: individuals can be part of multiple groups, but each group is a clique, and there is a clear ordering among the cliques. Imposing this slightly weaker assumption in models of group matching may allow for richer analysis while preserving the tractability in existing models.

6 Discussion

6.1 Complex network structure

Our predictions about the structure of stable networks are stark. Real networks are typically not organized precisely into ordered cliques, nor are neighborhoods perfectly ordered via set inclusion. Nevertheless, our results provide a starting point to better understand how incentives affect the complex structures we observe in real networks. There are at least two natural directions to extend our analysis. One is to layer different relationships on top of one another in a "multiplex" network—rigid patterns across different layers can combine to form more realistic arrangements. A second is to introduce noise.

Consider a simple example with two activities: work on the weekdays—in which the activity is production—and religious services on the weekends—in which the activity is attendance and engagement. Both entail positive spillovers, but work exhibits action-link substitutes—forming friendships takes time that could be devoted to production—while church exhibits action-link complements—attendance makes it easier to form ties. Assuming suitable heterogeneity in ability or preferences, a non-trivial network will form through each activity. In the work network, we get ordered cliques. In the church network, we get a nested split graph, with the more committed members more broadly connected. Layering these networks on top of each other can produce a complex network with aspects of both "centralization," mediated by the religious ties, and homophily, driven by the work ties. This description ties into Simmel's account, subsequently developed by many scholars, of cross-cutting cleavages.

König et al. [2014] demonstrate the second approach, describing a dynamic process in which agents either add or delete one link at a time, and the underlying incentives exhibit positive spillovers and action-link complements. If agents always make the myopically optimal link change, the graph is a nested split graph at every step of the process. However, if

agents sometimes make sub-optimal changes, then all graphs appear with positive probability, but the distribution is still heavily skewed towards those with a nested structure. This allows the authors to fit the model to real-world data. Based on our analysis, one could adapt this model to study peer effects or status games, obtaining a noisy version of our ordered cliques prediction.

6.2 Foundations for pairwise (Nash) stability

As presented, pairwise (Nash) stability is a static solution concept that entails the absence of particular individual and pairwise deviations. A key feature is that deviations in links and actions are treated separately: Players consider link deviations holding actions fixed and action deviations holding links fixed. Why not require robustness to simultaneous deviations in both actions and links?

There are two reasons. One is a pragmatic view of how link formation and action choice actually work: In practice, decisions over these dimensions *are* considered separately. Occasionally, people must invest to form and maintain relationships (e.g., doing a costly favor, attending a social event)—these are the times at which linking costs are actually paid and people are prone to reconsider relationships. Opportunities to revise productive actions (e.g., investing in a certain kind of expertise at work) occur at other times. We therefore consider it plausible that individuals consider these revisions separately, taking the current state of play as otherwise fixed.

The second reason is methodological. Simultaneous deviations along multiple dimensions make it delicate to define how a counterparty should respond to a link offer. Should the recipient of an offer condition on other deviations by the sender? Should she contemplate subsequent changes in her own behavior? These considerations open the important but very complicated Pandora's box of farsighted stability. Following this logic to its natural conclusion requires not only great sophistication from the players, but omniscience regarding how others respond to deviations. Allowing just one deviation at a time avoids this issue.

As this last argument only applies to deviations that require another player's consent, one might still ask: Why not allow a broader set of unilateral deviations? This is precisely what pairwise Nash stability does. While we still consider pairwise stability a more appropriate solution concept for the first reason above, refining this to pairwise Nash stability has no impact on our structural results—since a pairwise Nash stable outcome is pairwise stable, any statement true of all pairwise stable outcomes is also true of all pairwise Nash stable outcomes. Requiring robustness to other unilateral deviations can only further refine the outcome set, and our main results continue to apply.

In the rest of this subsection, we present two dynamic models that provide foundations for our solution concepts, one for pairwise stability and one for pairwise Nash stability. These make explicit the adjustment processes that lead to our predicted outcomes. Throughout the section, we restrict attention to finite action spaces and generic payoffs, so player i has a unique myopically optimal action s_i given s_{-i} and G.

A revision game

We first study a dynamic game that makes explicit the "occasional revisions" rationale for pairwise stability. Players have revision opportunities arriving at random times, and myopic best response is optimal as long as discount rates are sufficiently high, or the time between revisions is sufficiently long.

Time t is continuous, all players observe the current state $(G^{(i)}, \mathbf{s}^{(i)})$, and players can change their actions and links only at random arrival times. Each player i has an independent Poisson clock with rate λ , which rings at times $\{\tau_k^i\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$. At each time τ_k^i , player i has an opportunity to revise her strategic action s_i . Additionally, each ordered pair of players ijhas an independent Poisson clock with rate λ , which rings at time $\{\tau_k^{ij}\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$. At each time τ_k^{ij} , if $j \in G_i$, player i has the option to delete link ij, and if $j \notin G_i$, player i has the option to propose a link to player j. If i proposes a link to j, player j can either accept or reject at that instant. If player j accepts, we add ij to the graph, and otherwise the graph is unchanged. Players receive a constant flow payoff according to the current state (actions and links), and there is a common discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1)$. To complete the model, we specify an arbitrary initial condition $(G^{(0)}, \mathbf{s}^{(0)})$.

Proposition 5. Fix any $\delta < 1$. If $\lambda > 0$ is sufficiently small, the following statements hold:

- (a) If there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the revision game, and a corresponding stopping time τ that is finite with probability one, such that (G, \mathbf{s}) is played on path at all $t \geq \tau$, then (G, \mathbf{s}) is pairwise stable.
- (b) Conversely, if (G, \mathbf{s}) is pairwise stable, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the revision game, with initial condition $(G^{(0)}, \mathbf{s}^{(0)}) = (\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{s})$, in which (G, \mathbf{s}) is played at all times $t \ge 0$.

Proof. First, suppose there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and an almost surely finite stopping time τ such that (G, \mathbf{s}) is played after τ , but this outcome is not pairwise stable. Since the outcome is not pairwise stable, there exists some player i with a profitable action or link deviation. Choose some $\tau_k^i > \tau$, so (G, \mathbf{s}) is the outcome at τ_k^i . If i has a profitable action deviation, she gets strictly more utility from some outcome $(G, (s'_i, s_{-i}))$. If λ is small enough, then i's expected gain from this deviation is positive even if the outcome changes to the worst possible one for i at the next revision opportunity—since the action sets are finite, payoffs are bounded. Similarly, if i has a profitable deviation along link ij, choose some $\tau_k^{ij} > \tau$. If $ij \in G$, then by analogous reasoning, for small enough λ , player i finds it profitable to delete link ij. If $ij \notin G$, player i similarly finds it profitable to propose a link to player j, who then finds it profitable to accept. The upper bound on λ necessarily depends on the deviation in question, but since there are finitely many possible configurations, and finitely many possible deviations, one can simply take a minimum over all such bounds.

Suppose conversely that the initial condition $(G^{(0)}, \mathbf{s}^{(0)}) = (G, \mathbf{s})$ is pairwise stable. Any deviation leads to an outcome delivering a strictly lower flow payoff. If λ is small enough, the cost of such a deviation outweigh any potential benefit in a later subgame.

A two-stage game

We next present an explicit non-cooperative protocol for making joint deviations—this game provides a foundation for pairwise Nash stability. Beginning from some outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) , the deviation game proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, a player *i* is selected uniformly at random, and *i* is allowed to make any unilateral deviations she wishes—she can change her strategic action s_i and delete any subset of her links $S \subseteq G_i$. With probability $1 - \epsilon$, the game ends here. With probability ϵ , we move to the second stage in which *i* is allowed to propose a link to a single other player *j*. If *i* makes a proposal to *j*, player *j* chooses whether to accept or reject, and the game ends with payoffs determined by the final outcome (G', \mathbf{s}') . An outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) is an *equilibrium of the* ϵ -*PNS-game* if, starting at this outcome, we remain at the outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the deviation game.

Proposition 6. The outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) an equilibrium of the the ϵ -PNS-game for all sufficiently small ϵ if and only if it is pairwise Nash stable.

Proof. If the outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) is an equilibrium of the ϵ -PNS-game for any $\epsilon > 0$, then it is pairwise Nash stable by definition. If (G, \mathbf{s}) is pairwise Nash stable, then conditional on making it to the second stage with the outcome (G, \mathbf{s}) intact, no further changes can occur in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the first stage, any deviation leads to a strictly worse outcome for player i, so any such deviation can only be profitable following another deviation in the second stage. Taking ϵ small enough ensures that ex ante player i has no incentive to deviate in the first stage.

The deviation game captures an intuition that players can always change their own actions, or delete links, but an opportunity must arise in order to form a new link. If these are sufficiently infrequent, then it does not make sense to plan one's behavior in anticipation of such an opportunity.¹⁷ Formally, when ϵ is small, options available in the second stage have no bearing on decisions in the first.

7 Final Remarks

From academic peer effects to social status to trading networks, the connections people and firms choose to form affect the strategic actions they take and vice versa. Predictions of behavior as well as policy recommendations depend on taking both interacting phenomena into account rather than studying them separately. We offer a flexible formal framework that unites two types of models and equilibrium concepts. The interaction of the two enriches what we can capture, but also allows us to make new and sharper predictions in important cases. We identify simple conditions that allow a sharp characterization of equilibrium

¹⁷The same result holds if we reverse the order of the stages—player *i* makes a link offer in the first stage, and with probability ϵ she can change her action or delete links in the second. While the order is unimportant from a technical perspective, we believe this order has a more natural interpretation.

network structures and the behavior they support. Several widely studied applications fit within this framework, and we highlight new insights that emerge from applying our results. A theme is that the structural predictions offered by the theory greatly reduce the space of possible networks, as well as the actions they can support, and this makes both calculations and theoretical characterizations more tractable.

The highly structured nature of the networks our theory predicts means that, in many cases, the framework must be further elaborated to fit realistic network structures. There are two directions that we consider promising. One is to consider noise in linking decisions or incentives. We expect the qualitative insights about linking patterns to be robust, but noise raises theoretical questions about how much predictions change relative to our benchmark, and econometric questions about what can be identified from an observed network. A second direction is to examine models that combine different types of relationships. Such models can allow "overlaying" the simple structures yielded by characterizations, and exploring economic implications of interactions between different kinds of relationships is an important question.

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