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Personal Information:

Date of Birth: March 5th, 1988
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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Statistics and Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2013

Master Level Work:

M.A., Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2015
M.A., Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2017

Graduate Studies:

University of Pennsylvania, 2015 to present

Thesis Title: “*Essays on Firm, Worker and Consumer Decision-making in On-Demand and Health Care Markets*”

Expected Completion Date: May 2021

Thesis Committee and References:

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Research Papers:

“Gig Workers and Performance Pay: A Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis of an On-Demand Industry”
(Job Market Paper)

In many online product markets, firms manufacture and supply products almost immediately after receiving orders. Thus, firms need to ensure that their workers satisfy product demand, which can vary over time, in a cost-effective way. This paper develops and estimates a dynamic equilibrium model of firm and worker behavior in an ‘on-demand’ production context. The firm solves a dynamic discrete choice cost minimization model in which it faces uncertainty about future product demand and workers' productive capacity. The firm chooses to employ two types of workers – gig workers and permanent workers – and it sets parameters of a compensation scheme that is a mix of salary and performance-based incentives to elicit worker effort. Heterogeneous workers solve a daily effort choice problem given the compensation scheme offered by the firm. I estimate the model and perform an out-of-sample validation of the model using panel data from an online, global manufacturer that produces customized items. The data include detailed measures of workers' output and output quality under varying compensation schemes. I find that gig workers and permanent workers exhibit different production patterns and that gig workers are much more responsive to incentive pay. I embed the workers' optimal effort decisions into the firm's dynamic cost minimization problem and use simulation methods to derive optimal labor force composition and compensation schemes. I show that varying the compensation scheme over time and using a mix of gig and permanent workers provides the flexibility that the firm needs to effectively operate in an on-demand customized production environment.

“Family Information Spillovers: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment”
R&R at the *Journal of Health Economics*

I study how family information spillovers shape health care consumption through two main sources: a learning channel whereby family members share information about the health insurance plan, and a behavioral channel whereby risk perception and habits are shared and transmitted. I exploit two types of sudden health shocks to separately identify a causal effect operating through each channel. I incorporate these shocks into an event-study and a synthetic control event study frameworks to quantify the effect of spillovers on health care consumption of a non-injured adult family member. I find a significant behavioral spillover effect of an increase of more than 70% in medical spending of preventive care over a two-year horizon. Moreover, I find a strong and persistent spillover effect associated with learning that amounts to an average increase in medical spending of more than 100% relative to prior to the health shock. While the first result is in line with previous findings in the literature, the second is novel. I demonstrate that learning about health plan cost structure and coverage benefits are means in which the learning-spillover channel operates, and that acquired knowledge promotes consumption of preventive treatments.

“Sitting Habits and Productivity: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment”

Modern life has made us sedentary and our health suffers in consequence. Although the obvious direct costs of a sedentary lifestyle are health care expenses, there is an additional crucial path of indirect costs associated with the decline of workers' productivity, as worse health can lead to performance decrement and more work absences. I conduct a randomized control field experiment in a workplace with sedentary jobs to shed light on this indirect path. I supply workers with a “smart pillow”, a new technological device that provides real-time biofeedback on sitting posture and aims to improve workstation ergonomics. By combining workers' subjective and objective job performance measures with their detailed sitting records over time, I study the link between workers' health and productivity, as well as the sitting habit-forming process. More generally, the implications of this study concern workers' health in a modern work lifestyle both in the short run, as a result of an immediate improvement in sitting habits and adoption of a dynamic working environment, as well as the long run, after the treatment is removed.

Never Too Much? The Nonlinear Effect of Psychological Safety on Business Performance (with Peter Cappelli and Liat Eldor) Under Review

Psychological safety is widely seen as having a positive relationship with work performance. Could there be a downside, however? Drawing on the theoretical principle of a “too-much-of-a-good-thing” effect, we propose that high levels of psychological safety can actually harm business performance. We also propose that perceptions of accountability and shared ultimate goals can moderate this too-much-of-a-good-thing, based on cognitive representation theory. We test our hypotheses using data on employee attitudes as well as business performance outcomes over four years and across 257 branches of a retail chain store. We find that moderate levels of psychological safety have strong and positive effect on business outcomes whereas at the highest levels, the relationship reverses and becomes negative. Perceptions of accountability and shared ultimate goals moderate the negative effect. The results extend research on psychological safety to the organization level, specifically real business outcomes, and have important implications for research and practice.

Research Papers in Progress

“Anchoring Worker’s Pay Expectations: Evidence from the Gig Economy”

“Gifts Forming Social Exchange Relationship” [working title] (with Peter Cappelli and Liat Eldor)

“Internal or External Hiring?” [working title] (with Peter Cappelli and Liat Eldor)

Languages: Hebrew (Native), English (Fluent)

Computational Skills: Matlab, Stata, R