HANNA WANG

economics.sas.upenn.edu/people/hanna-wang
hannaw@sas.upenn.edu

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Placement Director: Guillermo Ordonez	ordonez@econ.upenn.edu	215-898-1875
Placement Director: Andrew Postlewaite	apostlew@econ.upenn.edu	215-898-7350
Graduate Student Coordinator: Gina Conway	gnc@sas.upenn.edu	215-898-5691

Interview Dates:
EEA: 12/6 - 7, Naples, Italy
ASSA: 1/4 - 6, Atlanta, USA

Office Contact Information

Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
133 South 36th Street, Suite 150
Philadelphia, PA 19104
267-474-1604

Personal Information

Citizenship: German
Languages: German (native), Chinese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (basic), French (basic)

Undergraduate Studies

B.Sc., Economics, University of Southampton, First-Class Honours, 2013

Graduate Studies

University of Pennsylvania, 2013 to present
Thesis Title: "Essays in Labor Economics"
Expected Completion Date: May 2019

Thesis Committee and References:

Profesor Petra Todd (Primary Advisor)	Professor Hanming Fang
Office 606, Department of Economics	Office 605, Department of Economics
The Ronald O. Perelman Center for	The Ronald O. Perelman Center for
Political Science and Economics	Political Science and Economics
133 South 36th Street	133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104	Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-898-4084	215-898-7767
ptodd@econ.upenn.edu	hanming.fang@econ.upenn.edu
Professor Andrew Postlewaite	Professor Andrew Shephard
Office 515, Department of Economics	Office 601, Department of Economics
The Ronald O. Perelman Center for	The Ronald O. Perelman Center for
Political Science and Economics	Political Science and Economics
133 South 36th Street	133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104	Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-898-7350	215-898-7408
apostlew@econ.upenn.edu	asheph@econ.upenn.edu

Teaching and Research Fields

Labor Economics, Family Economics, Search and Matching

Teaching Experience

Fall 2014   International Finance, Teaching Assistant for Professor Enrique Mendoza
Spring 2015   Law and Economics, Teaching Assistant for Professor Camilo Garcia-Jimeno
Fall 2015   Industrial Organization, Teaching Assistant for Professor Aislinn Bohren
Spring 2016   Industrial Organization, Teaching Assistant for Professor SangMok Lee
Summer, Fall 2016, Summer 2017 Introduction to Microeconomics, Course Instructor
Spring 2017, 2018 Microeconometrics, Teaching Assistant for Professor Petra Todd
Fall 2017   Game Theory, Teaching Assistant for Professor Annie Liang

Research Experience and Other Employment

2015-2017   Research Assistant for Professor Miguel Abito
                 The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Honors, Scholarships and Fellowships

August 2018   AEA CSWEP Summer Fellowship at the Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis
June-July 2018   Dissertation Fellowship of the American Institute for Contemporary German
                 Studies and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)
2018   President Gutmann Leadership Award
2014-2018   Dean's Subvention Fund (School of Arts and Sciences)
2014-2018   Travel Grant (School of Arts and Sciences)
2014-2018   Research Student Grant (Graduate and Professional Student Assembly)
2013-2018   Graduate Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania

Research Papers

***"Fertility and Family Leave Policies in Germany: Optimal Policy Design in a Dynamic Framework"* (Job Market Paper)**
I develop and estimate a life-cycle discrete-choice model of fertility and female labor supply to study optimal design of a range of child-related policies. I first evaluate two recent German reforms: A change in parental leave from fixed payments to wage-contingent payments for a shorter duration and an expansion of low-cost public childcare. I find that the parental leave reform increases fertility and lowers employment rates but only among highly-educated women, whereas the childcare reform increases fertility and employment evenly across all women. Second, I solve for an optimal policy portfolio that satisfies the post-reform budget. The objectives I consider are maximizing overall fertility with utility constraints and maximizing welfare with fertility constraints. The first solution increases fixed subsidies and decreases the wage replacement rate to encourage fertility among less educated women. The second increases childcare subsidies to achieve higher employment and consumption. Both solutions cut taxes for single mothers, thereby providing insurance against divorce to married mothers. Compared to post-reform levels of fertility and welfare, substantial improvements are achieved. The first solution increases fertility by 4% and the second results in a welfare gain equivalent to 0.5% of consumption.

***"Ranking and Search Effort in Matching"* with Joonbae Lee**
This paper studies the relationship between search effort and workers' ranking by employers. We propose a matching model in which employers' common preferences over a continuum of heterogeneous workers affect the incentives of workers to choose a number of applications to send out. We show that in equilibrium, the relationship is hump-shaped if there is a sufficiently large number of workers relative to vacancies: Highly-ranked and lowly-ranked workers send out fewer applications than workers of mid-range rank. This arises due to two opposing forces driving the incentive of applicants. Increasing the number of applications acts as insurance against unemployment, but is less effective when the probability of success for each application is low. This mechanism exacerbates the negative employment outcomes of low-rank workers. We discuss comparative statics with regards to the size of the vacancy pool and application cost, and show that, in contrast to the market equilibrium, planner's solution exhibits the number of applications monotonously decreasing in rank.

Computer Skills

Statistical Analysis: R, STATA
Programming: Fortran, Python, Matlab