

## Instructor

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## Description

This is a topics course, designed for economics Ph.D. students in their second or third year who are interested in pursuing microeconomic theory. Topics covered will include hierarchies of beliefs, the common prior assumption, model uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and learning.

## Grading

Grades will be based equally on (1) class presentations, (2) a referee report on a paper not presented in class, and (3) a take-home exam. Optionally, (2) and (3) can be replaced by (4) a research paper that develops a model to address a novel question. If you wish to pursue this option, let me know by April 1, and your grade will then be based 60% on the paper, 40% on class presentations.

## Preliminary List of Readings

This is a preliminary list of readings that may evolve over the course of the lecture. The starred\* readings will be covered in class. Readings marked with a † can be chosen for the in-class presentations.

Part 1: Common Knowledge and Common  $p$ -Belief (2 lectures)

- [Aumann \(1976\)](#)\*
- [Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis \(1982\)](#)\*
- [Rubinstein \(1989\)](#)\*
- [Monderer and Samet \(1989\)](#)\*
- [Lipman \(2003\)](#)\*
- [Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini \(1998\)](#)

Part 2: Common Prior Assumption (1 lecture)

- [Samet \(1997\)](#)\*
- [Milgrom and Stokey \(1982\)](#)\*
- [Morris \(1995\)](#)
- [Gul \(1998\)](#)

- [Aumann \(1998\)](#)

Part 3: Universal Type Space (2 lectures)

- [Brandenburger and Dekel \(1993\)\\*](#)
- [Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris \(2006, 2007\)\\*](#)
- [Chen et al. \(2010, 2017\)\\*](#)
- [Cripps et al. \(2008\)\\*](#)
- [Ely and Peski \(2011\)†](#)
- [Dekel and Siniscalchi \(2015\)](#)

Part 4: Equilibrium Robustness (2 lectures)

- [Weinstein and Yildiz \(2007\)\\*](#)
- [Bergemann and Morris \(2016\)\\*](#)
- [Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine \(1988\)†](#)

Part 5: Equilibrium Selection (2 lectures)

- [Carlsson and van Damme \(1993\)\\*](#)
- [Kajii and Morris \(1997\)\\*](#)
- [Morris, Rob and Shin \(1995\)†](#)
- [Morris and Shin \(2003\)†](#)

Part 6: Coordination Games (2 lectures)

- [Morris, Shin and Yildiz \(2017\)\\*](#)
- [Hellwig and Veldkamp \(2009\)†](#)
- [Chamley \(1999\)†](#)
- [Myatt and Wallace \(2011\)](#)
- [Golub and Morris \(2017\)](#)

Part 8: Learning in Games (2 lectures)

- [Kalai and Lehrer \(1993\)\\*](#)

- [Steiner and Stewart \(2008\)](#)\*
- [Jehiel \(2005\)](#)†
- [Fudenberg and Levine \(1993\)](#)†
- [Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine \(2004\)](#)

Part 9: Pure Learning (2 lectures)

- [Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz \(2015\)](#)\*
- [Dasaratha, Golub and Hak \(2018\)](#)\*
- [Sethi and Yildiz \(2016\)](#)\*
- [Liang, Mu and Syrgkanis \(2017\)](#)\*

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