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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A/B.S, Economics/Mathematics, Howard University, *Summa Cum Laude*, 2012

Graduate Studies:

University of Pennsylvania, 2012 to present
Thesis Title: “*Essays on Preference Programs in Government Procurement*”
Expected Completion Date: May 2018

Thesis Committee and References:

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Professor Jose Miguel Abito
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary field: Industrial Organization
Secondary field: Public Economics

Teaching Experience:

Spring, 2016	Introduction to Microeconomics, Instructor
Fall, 2016	Introduction to Microeconomics, Head Teaching Assistant for Professor Anne
Fall, 2015	Duchene
Spring, 2015	Introduction to Microeconomics, Recitation Instructor for Professor Rebecca Stein
Fall, 2014	
Spring, 2014	

Fall, 2013 Intermediate Microeconomics, Recitation Instructor for Professor Aislinn Bohren

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2016 – 2017 University of Pennsylvania, Research Assistant for Professor Joe Harrington
2009 – 2012 Howard University, Research Assistant for Professor Omari Swinton

Conference Presentations:

2017 International Industrial Organization Conference
2015, 2016 AEA Summer Mentoring Pipeline Conference

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2017 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Dissertation Fellowship
2017 University of Pennsylvania, GAPSA Travel Grant
2012 – 2017 University of Pennsylvania, Fontaine Fellowship

Research Papers:

“Subcontracting Requirements and the Cost of Government Procurement” (Job Market Paper)

Government procurement contracts are frequently subject to policies that specify, as a percentage of the total project, a subcontracting requirement for the utilization of historically disadvantaged firms. I study how such subcontracting policies affect procurement auction outcomes using administrative data from New Mexico's Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program. My analysis is based on a procurement auction model with endogenous subcontracting. Theoretically, I show that subcontracting requirements need not translate into substantially higher procurement costs – even when disadvantaged firms are relatively more costly. The intuition behind this result is that subcontracting programs require that prime contractors select their subcontractors from a common pool of disadvantaged firms, which reduces the private information prime contractors have on their own project-completion costs. As a result of losing private information, prime contractors strategically reduce their markups in their bids, and the reduction in markups can be sufficiently high to mitigate the cost increases from using more costly subcontractors. I estimate an empirical version of the model and find that New Mexico's past subcontracting requirements led to only small increases in procurement costs.

“Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico”
(conditionally accepted, Journal of Industrial Economics)

In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounts do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement setting. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation's Resident Preference Program, this paper uses an empirical model of firm bidding and entry behavior to investigate the effect of affiliation on auctions with bid discounting. I find evidence that firms have affiliated project-completion costs and show how this type of affiliation changes preference auction outcomes.

Research Papers in Progress:

“Affirmative Action Programs in a Dynamic Procurement Environment”

I use a stylized dynamic procurement auction model to study the long-term implications of affirmative action programs targeting disadvantaged subcontractors.

“Adverse Selection and Endogeneity in Government Procurement Programs”

I extend the methods for identifying and estimating nonlinear pricing models from Luo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2017) to a contract model with adverse selection, where the contracted quantity can potentially be endogenous. I apply my new method to contracts issued to disadvantaged firms under the U.S.' 8(a) Business Development Program.