

University of Pennsylvania  
Fall Term 2013

### **ECON 13/PPE 201 - Strategic Reasoning**

Lectures: Tuesday and Thursday 12.00-1.30, in College Hall 200.

Professor: David Dillenberger, 423 McNeil, 898-1503, [ddill@sas.upenn.edu](mailto:ddill@sas.upenn.edu)  
Office hours: Tuesday 2:00-3.15  
(Important: To leave messages please use e-mail, **not** voice mail.)

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Office hours: Monday, 3:30-5:30

Grader: Li Tan, 419 McNeil, [litan0403@gmail.com](mailto:litan0403@gmail.com)

Course home page: usual Blackboard: <https://courseweb.library.upenn.edu/>

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY the Departmental Policies at:  
<https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/undergraduate-program/course-information/guidelines/policies>

### **COURSE DESCRIPTION**

This course is about strategically interdependent decisions. In such situations, the outcome of your actions depends also on the actions of others. When making your choice, you have to think what the others will choose, who in turn are thinking what you will be choosing, and so on. Game Theory offers several concepts and insights for understanding such situations, and for making better strategic choices. This course will introduce and develop some basic ideas from game theory, using illustrations, applications, and cases drawn from business, economics, politics, and sports. Some interactive games will be played in class. There will be little formal theory, and the only pre-requisite is some high-school algebra and having taken Econ 1. However, general numeracy (facility interpreting and doing numerical graphs, tables, and arithmetic calculations) is very important. This course will also be accepted by the Economics department as an Econ course, to be counted toward the Minor in Economics (or as an Econ elective).

### **BOOKS**

Required: The textbook for the course, available at University of Pennsylvania Bookstore, is Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr. (henceforth DSR), *Games of Strategy*, 3rd edition, 2009

### **GRADING**

**Problem sets:** n=5 or 6 homework assignments during the term. **The best (n-1)** will comprise **10%** of the course grade.

**Exams:** There will be two (non-cumulative) in class midterm examinations. **Each midterm exam counts for 25% of the course grade.** There will be a (comprehensive) final examination. **The final exam counts for 40% of the course grade.** If you are unable to take one of the midterm exams for *an excused reason* (illness or other emergency), the final exam will count for 60% of your course grade and the other midterm for 30%. (There will be no make-up exams or other accommodations). All exams are closed book, notes, calculators, and mobile phones.

**Exam dates: October 3 (Thursday), November 7 (Thursday), and Wednesday, December 18, 12:00-2:00 p.m**

## **THE FINE PRINT**

- (1) Students have **one week** from the day in which examinations and problem sets are returned to report errors in grading and/or to request that problems be re-graded. If a student submits his/her exam for re-grading, then the student's entire exam will be re-graded (with no guarantee of a higher total score).
- (2) Students should attend and participate in class; their mobile phones and other devices should not. The professor will employ the necessary means to discourage classroom distractions.

## **COURSE OUTLINE (ORDER OF TOPICS MIGHT CHANGE)**

### **1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION**

Topics: Decisions (impersonal environment) and games (environment has other strategic actors whose choices interact with ours). Some dimensions of classification of strategic interaction

Required reading: DSR, Chapters 1 and 2

### **2. GAMES WITH SEQUENTIAL MOVES**

Topics: Game trees, Rollback equilibrium, Bargaining

Required reading: DSR, Chapter 3. DSR, Chapter 18 (sections 3-6)

### **3. SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES**

Topics: Dominant strategies, Dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium.

Required reading: DSR, Chapters 4-6

### **4. RANDOMIZATION**

Topics: Mixed strategies. Their distinct roles in zero-sum and non-zero sum games.

Required reading: DSR, Chapters 7 and 8

## **5. UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION**

Topics: Incentives to reveal and conceal private information, and strategies for doing so: signaling and screening. Design of contracts and incentives.

Required reading: DSR, Chapters 9 and 14

## **6. THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA AND REPEATED GAMES**

Topics: Dominant strategy equilibrium in single play. Tacit cooperation in repeated play. Tit-for-tat and other strategies. Examples from business competition, international negotiations.

Required reading: DSR, Chapter 11

## **7. SOCIAL COORDINATION AND CONFLICT**

Topics: Multi-person dilemmas. Harmful external effects: congestion and pollution. Beneficial externalities, strategic complementarity: human capital and economic growth. Role of policy, social conventions etc.

Required reading: DSR, Chapter 12

## **8. VOTING IN ELECTIONS AND LEGISLATURES**

Topics: The median voter theorem and its limitations. Agenda manipulation. Other topics as time permits.

Required reading: DSR, Chapter 16

## **9. AUCTIONS**

Topics: Different types of auctions. Strategies for bidders and sellers. Truthful revelation of preferences

Required reading: DSR, Chapter 17

## **10. CONTRACTS, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT IN STATIC SETTINGS**

Topics: Complete contracting in discretionary environments. Contracting with court-imposed breach remedies. Expectation damages, Reliance damages.

Required reading: Lecture notes