**Instructions**: Please double space your answers and write clearly. Your answer will be graded on **both** the economic intuition and technical proficiency you demonstrate.

Consider a married household whose utility function is given by

$$\alpha \ln(c) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(1 - l_m) + (1 - \alpha)\lambda \ln(1 - l_f) + b,$$

where c is the household's consumption,  $1 - l_m$  and  $1 - l_f$  denote the leisure enjoyed by the husband and the wife, respectively, and b is the bliss from the marriage. The variable  $\lambda \geq 1$  governs the value that a couple places on the female's time spend at home. It differs across households. Some households value the female's time at home more (a higher  $\lambda$ ) than others. In particular, assume that  $\lambda$  is distributed across households in the society according to some distribution function  $\Lambda(\lambda)$ . The husband earns the wage w and is taxed at the rate  $\tau$ . The male always work the fixed amount l < 1in the market. If the woman works, she will earn  $w_f < w_m$  and is taxed at the rate  $\tau_f > \tau$ . The family must decide whether or not the wife should work. If she works, then she also works l. Taxes are used to finance useless government spending, g.

- 1. Set up the household's decision problem. What determines whether or not the woman will work?
- 2. How many married women will work in equilibrium?
- 3. Suppose that the tax rate on the first earner,  $\tau$ , is raised. What impact does this have on married female labor supply?
- 4. Suppose the tax rate on the second earner,  $\tau_f$ , is raised. What impact does this have on married female labor supply?
- 5. Suppose that a single person's tastes are given by

$$\alpha \ln(c) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(1 - l_s),$$

for s = f, m. Assume that a single person, male or female, is always taxed at the rate  $\tau$ . Imagine that two single people meet and draw a value for marital bliss, b, which may be negative, from B(b). They also draw a value for  $\lambda$  from  $\Lambda(\lambda)$ . The couple is deciding whether to get married. How is this decision affected by  $\tau_f$ ?