

Penn Institute for Economic Research Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 pier@econ.upenn.edu

# PIER Working Paper 12-038 

"Do Single-Sex Schools Enhance Students’<br>STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) Outcomes?"<br>by

Hyunjoon Park, Jere R. Behrman, and Jaesung Choi
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153812

# Do Single-Sex Schools Enhance Students' STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) Outcomes? 

Hyunjoon Park<br>Department of Sociology and Education<br>University of Pennsylvania<br>hypark@sas.upenn.edu<br>Jere R. Behrman<br>Department of Economics and Sociology<br>University of Pennsylvania<br>jbehrman@econ.upenn.edu<br>Jaesung Choi<br>Department of Economics<br>University of Pennsylvania<br>jaesungc@sas.upenn.edu

18 September 2012

Work in progress: Please do not cite without permission of the authors

We acknowledge support by the Spencer Foundation Grant (\#201100030), the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health \& Human Development (R03HD066018), and National Science Foundation (\#SES-1023911). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the Spencer Foundation, the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health \& Human Development (the National Institutes of Health), and the National Science Foundation.


#### Abstract

Despite women's significant improvement in educational attainment, underrepresentation of women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) college majors persists in most countries. We address whether one particular institution - single-sex schools - may enhance female - or male - students' STEM careers. Exploiting the unique setting in Korea where assignment to all-girls, all-boys or coeducational high schools is random, we move beyond associations to assess causal effects of single-sex schools. We use administrative data on national college entrance mathematics examination scores and a longitudinal survey of high school seniors that provide various STEM outcomes (mathematics and science interest and selfefficacy, expectations of a four-year college attendance and a STEM college major during the high school senior year, and actual attendance at a four-year college and choice of a STEM major two years after high school). We find significantly positive effects of all-boys schools consistently across different STEM outcomes, whereas the positive effect of all-girls schools is only found for mathematics scores.


In recent decades, American women have significantly improved their educational attainment and since the mid-1980s females have surpassed males in acquiring college degrees (Buchmann and DiPrete 2006). The significant progress of women is, however, accompanied by persistent underrepresentation of women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) college majors. In 2005-6, females accounted for 18 percent of engineering B.A.s in the United States, not much different from a decade earlier. In that year, females accounted for 21 percent of bachelor degrees in computer and information sciences, lower than the 30 percent in 1979-80 (Freeman 2004; NCES 2007). Underrepresentation of women in STEM majors, especially engineering, is not peculiar to the United States but general in most contemporary societies. In a comparative study of gender and field of college degrees in 44 countries, for instance, Charles and Bradley (2009) show that women are significantly underrepresented in engineering in all 44 countries. More strikingly, male overrepresentation in engineering is quite considerable in several affluent societies like Switzerland, Germany, Finland, and the United Kingdom, highlighting the pervasive sex segregation in STEM college majors regardless of countries' development levels.

Considering that a STEM degree is an important prerequisite for STEM occupations, the lower likelihood for women than for men to choose STEM majors in college naturally leads to lower representation of women than of men in STEM occupations (Xie and Shauman 2003; Frehill 1997). Given the growing importance of the science and engineering workforce in globalized economies as well as concerns about gender equity, a variety of educational programs and research activities to attract women to STEM fields have been enacted (NSF 2006a, 2006b). To broaden women's participation in STEM fields most efficiently, systematic evidence is required regarding what factors constrain or enhance women's pursuit of STEM majors and occupations.

The major purpose of the current study is to assess the impact of one particular institution that is claimed or shown by many to enhance female students' STEM outcomes - single-sex schools (Sax, Shapiro, and Eagan 2011; Sullivan 2009; Mael 1998). In this study we examine causal effects of single-sex schools on STEM career outcomes of high school seniors and their transitions to college utilizing two different datasets of high school students and college students from South Korea (hereafter, Korea). We investigate this question for Korea because of the random assignment of students in metropolitan areas of Korea to single-sex and coeducational
high schools that will be described blow in more detail. Korea is also interesting in regard to STEM outcomes. Korea presents a comparably high level of sex segregation in the field of study among higher education graduates particularly with a strong underrepresentation of women relative to men in engineering (see Charles and Bradley 2009). However, this does not necessarily mean that only a small number of women obtain higher education degrees in science and engineering. In fact, according to the statistics compiled by the National Science Board (2012), 22 percent of Korean women who obtained a university degree did so in science and engineering fields in 2008, which was the $5{ }^{\text {th }}$ highest among 81 countries providing data. ${ }^{1}$ The corresponding percentage among US women was only 10 percent. Therefore, underrepresentation of women in science and engineering in Korea is mainly due to the high percentage of Korean men who earn university degrees in those fields. Almost half of university degrees earned by Korean men were awarded in science and engineering fields, $6{ }^{\text {th }}$ highest among 81 countries (National Science Board 2012). Indeed, $72 \%$ of the degrees awarded in science and engineering were for men.

We first investigate the effect of single-sex schools on national college entrance mathematics exam scores among high school seniors who took the college entrance exam at the end of their senior year. Then, using survey data on high school seniors, we compare the levels of interest and self-efficacy in mathematics and science subjects between high school seniors in single-sex schools and their counterparts in coeducational schools. We also assess the extent to which students in single-sex schools and in coeducational schools differ in their expectations of four-year college attendance and STEM college majors (if they enter college) during their final year of high school. Finally, as the survey of high school seniors followed up respondents two years after they graduated from high school, we, furthermore, utilize the longitudinal information to examine whether students who attended single-sex high schools are actually more likely to attend a four-year college and choose a STEM college major as of two years after high school than their counterparts who attended coeducational high schools.

There are many claims that all-girls schools (or classrooms) enhance female education, particularly in STEM, because of the absence of social interactions with boys that divert attention from academic activities and because of the absence of competition from boys for teachers' attention (Mael et al. 2004; Riordan 1990). However, some studies question any benefits of single-sex education, highlighting the likelihood that better educational outcomes
among students in single-sex than their peers in coeducational schools do not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of single-sex schools but may simply reflect prior differences in ability, motivation and other background factors between students in single-sex and coeducational schools before entering the schools (Jackson 2012; Lavy and Schlosser 2011; LePore and Warren 1997; Marsh 1989). If students, or their families, choose between single-sex schools and coeducational schools, students attending the two types of schools probably differ in their characteristics, including those difficult to measure such as ability, motivation, effort, or parental involvement on children's education that could potentially affect student's educational outcomes. In short, self-selection may lead to biased estimates of the single-sex school effects (Mael et al. 2005; Sax 2009).

Although a limited number of studies have recently attempted to address this problem of selection bias using instrument variable approach (Jackson 2012; Booth and Nolen 2012a), the fundamental difficulty of estimating causal effects of single-sex schools on the basis of observational data remains. A small number of studies have conducted small-scale controlled experiments in which researchers randomly separate boys and girls into all-boys, all-girls, and gender-mixed groups in a lab-like setting and observe their behaviors to attempt to draw inferences about causal impacts of single-sex environments on children's behaviors (Booth and Nolen 2012a; 2012b). Obviously, it is questionable to what extent these kinds of controlled laboratory experiments can inform knowledge of causal effects of single-sex schools in real-life settings.

In a recent study, Park, Behrman and Choi (forthcoming) have utilized the unique setting in Korea to address causal effects of single-sex high schools on students' educational outcomes. Interestingly, according to the national policy for high school equalization in Korea, especially Seoul (capital), middle school graduates, who advance into academic high schools (the major form of high schools in Korea), are randomly assigned into high schools within residential school districts regardless of whether schools are single-sex or coeducational, and also whether schools are private or public. In the Korean context, students cannot choose their schools, and schools have to receive students who are assigned by lottery. Although non-compliance to the random assignment is not impossible, Park et al. (forthcoming) argue that the potential bias in estimating causal effects of single-sex schools due to non-compliance is inconsequential.

It is notable that this policy of random assignment has been implemented for a long time, since 1974, and so single-sex schooling in Korea is not a novelty but instead a long-established institution. Therefore, a potential bias in estimating the effect of a novel and innovative program, caused by participants' 'novelty-based enthusiasm' or interest in innovation, is not of serious concern for evaluating the impacts of single-sex school effects in Korea (cf. Halpern et al. 2011). Moreover, as will become clear in analysis below, the number of students attending single-sex high schools is considerable, suggesting the broad relevance of single-sex schooling. Following the strategy of Park et al. (forthcoming), in this study we exploit the unique random assignment in Korea to assess causal effects of single-sex schools on students' STEM outcomes. Note that Park et al. (forthcoming) limited their focus to overall college attendance rates and students’ scores on Korean and English subjects and did not address outcomes more directly related to STEM.

## Do Single-Sex Schools Help?

In contrast to the common assumption that coeducational schools should promote gender equity in learning experiences, numerous studies of primary and secondary schools in the United States have suggested through associational descriptions that coeducational schools may work as social institutions to reinforce, rather than to reduce, traditional gender role socialization, provide gender-differential experiences of learning in classrooms, and thus potentially constrain female students’ opportunities to pursue mathematics and science (Thompson 2003; AAUW 1992; Oakes 1990). Gender-biased teaching and counseling practices, due to pervasive sex stereotypes among school teachers and counselors in coeducational schools, are often thought to discourage female students’ interest and participation in mathematics and science. Several studies report 'warm' classroom climates that teachers make for boys but 'chilly’ climates for girls in studying mathematics and science subjects with gender-differential expectations for and interactions with boys and girls (Valentine 1998; Lee, Marks, and Byrd 1994; Sadker and Sadker 1994; Oakes 1990; Hall and Sandler 1982). Moreover, the influence of adolescent culture in coeducational settings, which often places emphasis on physical attractiveness and interpersonal relationships over academic activities, may discourage female students' interest in traditionally male-dominant subjects such as mathematics and science (Riordan 1990; Coleman 1961).

Instead, single-sex schools may provide better environments for female students with regard to both teacher-student and peer-group interactions, which may encourage them to pursue their educational careers in STEM. In single-sex environments, students do not need to compete with the opposite sex for teachers' attention and time. In all-girls schools, leaders and top performers in all classes, including mathematics and science, are female students, which may provide good female role models for other girls (Thompson 2003). The absence of the opposite sex in the classroom may reduce the influence of adolescent culture, and thus increase female students' participation in mathematics and science classrooms and ultimately their confidence in their abilities in mathematics and science. Although limited in the scope and generalizability of findings, an ethnographic study of teacher-student and peer-group interactions in an all-girls mathematics classroom within a coeducational public high school in the United States illustrates the potential of single-sex education for improving girls’ confidence and self-efficacy in mathematics (Streitmatter 2002). A small-scale study of single-sex classes within a coeducational school in England also found a similarly positive change in mathematics selfconcept among girls attending all-girls mathematics classes (Jackson 2002).

Using nationally representative data, some studies in economics, sociology, and education also provide evidence for potential benefits of single-sex schools to enhance girls’ STEM outcomes. Comparing single-sex and coeducational Catholic schools in the United States, for instance, Lee and Bryk (1986) showed that girls attending single-sex schools expressed more interest in mathematics than girls attending coeducational schools. Girls (and boys) in single-sex schools also took more mathematics courses than did their peers in coeducational schools. Studying private high schools in the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), Billger (2008) found much less segregated college major choices among those who went to single-sex high schools than their peers who went to coeducational high schools. Using data from the High School and Beyond Study, Thompson (2003) also showed that the likelihood for girls to choose a sex-integrated college major over a female-dominant major was significantly higher among girls who attended all-girls high schools than girls who attended coeducational high schools.

The arguments so far, which focus on interactions between teachers and students, and between students and students, emphasize pervasive school environments that shortchange girls in coeducational schools especially in regard to mathematics and science education, and therefore lead us to expect potentially positive effects of all-girls schools for girls. However, it
does not seem likely that parallel arguments hold for the comparison between boys in all-boys schools and boys in coeducational schools. Because environments of coeducational schools are not considered to discourage boys' interest and pursuit of STEM careers, separating boys from girls should not necessarily enhance boys' STEM careers. On the other hand, however, boys in all-boys schools also may enjoy some advantages compared to boys in coeducational schools. For instance, separating boys from girls may reduce influences of adolescent culture, help boys focus on academic work, and thus contribute to their better academic achievement in mathematics and science as well as in other subjects compared to their counterparts attending coeducational schools. As a systematic review of literature on single-sex schools has pointed out, studies have so far focused on effects of all-girls schools (Mael et al. 2005), leaving virtually unexplored hypotheses on the effects of all-boys schools for boys.

In addition to much less attention to effects on boys, the single-sex school literature has heavily focused on academic achievement and concurrent student socio-psychological development such as self-concept and locus of control as major educational outcomes. Despite well-developed theories on how all-girls schools may enhance girls' interest and pursuit of STEM careers, only a small number of studies have explicitly assessed the effects of single-sex schools on students' expectations and actual choices of STEM college majors and occupations. Although several studies have looked at differences in educational aspirations between students in single-sex and coeducational schools, the educational aspirations examined in those studies were overall college expectations without distinguishing the field of study (e.g., Lee and Bryk 1986, Lee and Marks 1990). Even rarer is research on the effects of single-sex schools on transitions to post-secondary education and choices of college majors. A literature review by Mael et al. (2005) of more than 100 studies on single-sex schooling, for example, identified only one study that found a greater likelihood for women who attended girls' high schools to choose sex-integrated fields of study as their college majors than women who attended coeducational high schools (Thompson 2003). Using data on first-year college students in the United States, Sax (2009) found that women graduates of single-sex high schools were more likely to plan engineering as their major than women graduates of coeducational high schools.

## The Random Assignment in Korea

On the basis of a lottery, the 'High School Equalization Policy' (P'yŏongjunhwa Chŏngch'aek) in Korea, which has been in effect since 1974, randomly sorts entering high school students into either single-sex or coeducation schools within school districts (Kim 2003). Before the policy, students had to apply to a high school and take the entrance examination administered by each high school, which resulted in considerable between-school differences in socioeconomic and academic compositions of student body. Importantly, this equalization policy is applied to both private and public schools. In other words, all schools within a school district, regardless of whether they are single-sex or coeducational and regardless of whether they are public or private, must accept high-school entrants assigned by a lottery. After middle schools, students can go to either academic high schools or vocational high schools and the random assignment is applied to only academic high schools. In 2009, almost 73 percent of high school students in Korea attended academic high schools (KEDI 2009). Although there are some school districts that do not implement the random assignment policy, currently the policy is applied to the majority of high school entrants including Seoul (the capital) and the six major metropolitan areas. ${ }^{2}$

Students have to accept the random assignment unless they move to a different school district. If they move to another school district, they are subject to another lottery in the new district. Students (and families) may also move to another school district in the middle of the school year if they are not satisfied with the randomly-assigned school. However, the movement does not necessarily increase the likelihood for a student to attend a single-sex school (or a coeducational school) because the assignment of a moving-in student into a school within a school district is close to be random on the basis of availability of open seats in a specific school district. Discussing possibilities of non-compliance, moreover, Park et al. (forthcoming) showed that the actual percentage of households moving into a different school district during the timing for transition to high schools is very small and consequently concluded that non-compliance is not likely to cause serious distortions in the estimates of the causal effect of single-sex schools in Korea.

Recently, however, some school districts have modified the original random assignment procedure in response to the growing criticism on the lack of school choices. Specifically, schools outside Seoul now allow students to list their preferred 2-3 schools before assignment. ${ }^{3}$ Then, about $30-40 \%$ of enrollments in each school are randomly selected among those students
who preferred the school and the remaining enrollments are determined by lottery without consideration of students' preferences. It is an open question to what extent this modification affects selection into single-sex schools by observed and unobserved characteristics of students and families. Given that students are still randomly assigned to one of their preferred schools and the proportion of students assigned in this way is only $30-40 \%$, the modified random assignment still restricts considerably school choices of students. The examination of observed socioeconomic backgrounds of students from the data used in this study reveals no significant difference between students attending single-sex and those attending coeducational high schools in areas of the modified random assignment as well as in Seoul where the random assignment remained intact through the period that we analyze. However, we acknowledge that some other observed and unobserved characteristics of students and their families could still affect students’ selection into single-sex schools in areas of the modified random assignment, even though selection may not be as substantial as in the context where students "freely" choose single-sex schools over coeducational schools. Therefore, in this study we examine the effects of single-sex schools separately for Seoul with the intact version of random assignment and other non-Seoul areas with the modified version. ${ }^{4}$

Although the assignment of students into schools is random (or close to be random), it is important to note that single-sex and coeducational schools can differ in other aspects of school characteristics. The Korean school system is highly standardized and centralized by the government (Park 2010) and therefore variation across schools (even between public and private schools) in formal curricula and most other basic school resources generally is minimal. However, public and private schools differ in hiring and retention of teachers. To become a teacher in public school, candidates have to pass the National Teacher Employment Test and those who pass the exam are eventually assigned to a school in the city or province they applied to (Kang and Hong 2008). The hiring process in private schools is, however, dependent upon each school's own procedures and decisions. Once hired, moreover, public school teachers are rotated to a different school within the city or province every 4-5 years, while such rotation does not exist for private school teachers for whom tenure is decided at the level of each school. These differences in teacher recruitment and tenure systems may yield some differences in teacher-related characteristics between public and private schools. Importantly, the majority of single-sex schools in Korea are private, while the majority of coeducational schools are public. ${ }^{5}$

In other words, associated with being a private school or not, single-sex and coeducational high schools can differ in some school characteristics especially in regard to the tenure of teachers. In this study we attempt to control for these potential differences in school characteristics in estimating the effect of single-sex schools, by including several important school-level variables besides private-school status in our analysis of national college entrance mathematics test scores (information is not available to link the other data set that we use - the Korean Education and Employment Panel -- to such school characteristics).

## Data and Variables

## Data

For this study, we use two different data sources: 1) administrative data on mathematics test scores of all high school seniors who took the national college entrance exam in 2009; and 2) a longitudinal survey of high school seniors, the 2004-06 Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP). We limit our analysis to those who attended schools that were subject to the high school equalization policy. To examine how the results will be different or similar between Seoul, where the restricted version of the ransom assignment is applied, and non-Seoul areas, where the modified version is applied, we separate our analysis for the two different regions. We do not include students attending schools that are not subject to the high school equalization policy. Those schools that are not subject to the high school equalization policy include many rural and remote-area schools that vastly differ in their school conditions from those schools in metropolitan areas that are subject to the high school equalization policy. Moreover, in several regions where the high equalization policy is not applied, some types of schools in regard to single-sex (vs. coed) and/or private (vs. public) school status do not exist, preventing comparisons.

To apply to college, high school seniors take the national college entrance exam, College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT), at the end of high school senior year, which is a standardized test administered only once a year by the government. CSAT consists of several subjects including mathematics. As a nationally standardized test that most students seriously take for college admission, CSAT is probably the most reliable measure of academic achievement of high school seniors. For this study, we include high school seniors in the high school equalization policy areas who do not have missing scores on the mathematics test: 39,446 female (132 high
schools) and 44,823 male students (140 schools) in 11 school districts in Seoul; 92,593 female ( 347 schools) and 101,985 male students ( 370 schools) in 27 school districts in non-Seoul areas. Note that the administrative dataset of CSAT does not include any individual or family background variables except for gender of students.

Our second dataset, the Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP), is a nationally representative, longitudinal survey that began in 2004 by interviewing 2,000 academic high school seniors (i.e., $3^{\text {rd }}$-year high school students) across 100 schools (Chae et al. 2006). In the 2004 baseline survey, KEEP collected a variety of information on high school seniors’ attitudes toward study generally and for specific subjects, their educational and occupational plans, their demographic and family background characteristics, as well as other information. In each year since the baseline, KEEP reinterviewed respondents to collect information on educational transitions. In this study, we utilize the data from the baseline to the second follow-up conducted in 2006. Using these data over three years, we can determine who expected to major in STEM in college during their final year of high school, and who actually chose a STEM college major by two years after high school. In Korea, in their college application students apply to a specific major (department) (or a group of majors) within a college and are accepted or rejected by the department. Therefore, with only two years of data after high school graduation, we can still identify students' college majors. School administrators provided information on whether the schools are single-sex or coeducational school. A parent of each student respondent filled in the questionnaire to provide information on the student's family environment.

Among the total of 2,000 academic high school seniors, we exclude 180 seniors who attended "specialized" high schools such as foreign language high schools that are not subject to the equalization policy. We further excluded 560 students who attended high schools outside of the equalization policy areas, resulting in a total of 1,260 students: 232 female students in 15 schools and 208 male students in 14 schools in Seoul; 323 female students in 25 schools and 497 male students in 31 schools in non-Seoul areas. The fairly small size of the sample makes it necessary to be cautious on drawing strong conclusions from the analysis. In particular, the already-small sample should be further divided into students in Seoul and those in non-Seoul areas, which makes it challenging to compare the effects of single-sex schools in the two areas. Moreover, there is no school identifier in the KEEP data with which we could link with administrative records on school-level variables. Therefore, compared to the analysis for
mathematics test scores that includes several school-level variables, we only control for private school status in our analysis of KEEP data. ${ }^{6}$

## Variables

The CSAT data provide each student's score on a mathematics subject. In CSAT, students take one of four different mathematics tests: general mathematics, calculus, probability, and discrete mathematics. In our final data for the analysis, $76 \%$ of high school seniors took general mathematics, $23 \%$ calculus, and less than 1\% probability and discrete mathematics (Appendix A). We first assess whether students in single-sex schools are more likely to take calculus, probability, or discrete mathematics (as compared to general mathematics) than students in coeducational schools by creating a dichotomous variable that combines calculus, probability and discrete mathematics into one category that is separate from general mathematics. Because scores on the general mathematics test and the calculus test are not comparable, we have to examine the effect of single-sex schools for each test score, separately. We assess differences in average scores on the general mathematics test between students in single-sex and students in coeducational schools separately for female and male students. We do the same comparison by school type for average scores on the calculus test as well. Because only a small number of students took either probability or discrete mathematics, we do not conduct analysis for these tests. All the analyses are conducted separately for Seoul and non-Seoul areas. Means and standard deviations of general math and calculus test scores are presented in Appendix A.

To assess the effects of single-sex schools, we control for some school characteristics that may be associated with single-sex school status and/or mathematics test scores. Given that the majority of single-sex schools are private, we include a dichotomous variable for private schools (vs. public) as a control variable. Moreover, following the strategy by Park et al. (forthcoming), we additionally control for the proportion of students receiving public support for lunch that is given to students from low-income households, seniors-teacher ratio, average years of teachers' schooling attainment, and average years of teaching experience of teachers in a school. As mentioned above, because of the random assignment students attending single-sex and coeducational schools should be similar in their characteristics. However, because teacher assignment is not random in private schools, single-sex and coeducational schools can differ in
school characteristics so controlling for these is helpful for estimating the causal effects of single-sex schools. Appendix A presents descriptive statistics of these school-level variables. We turn to KEEP data for the analysis of students’ interest and self-efficacy in mathematics and science subjects. The baseline survey of KEEP asked high school seniors to indicate the extent to which they agree upon the following two statements: 1) I am interested in this subject; and 2) I am good at this subject. ${ }^{7}$ The first item is related to the student's interest in mathematics and science, while the second measures the level of self-efficacy with regard to mathematics and science. Students indicated the degree of agreement on a five-point scale from "strongly disagree (1)" to "strongly agree (5)."

The second set of outcomes we examine with KEEP data is whether students in each type of school are different in their expectations of attending a four-year college and of selecting a STEM college major if they expect to attend a four-year college. In the 2004 baseline survey, KEEP asked high school seniors to indicate whether they expect to go to college, and which majors they expect to choose if they enter college. We classify expected college majors into two groups: STEM majors and non-STEM majors. The STEM majors include engineering, computer science, natural science, biological science, mathematics, physics, and other related majors. ${ }^{8}$ For the analysis, we use a dependent variable that has three categories: 1) expecting university and a STEM major; 2) expecting university and a non-STEM major; and 3) expecting no university.

Because the KEEP survey followed high school seniors over two years after high school graduation, using longitudinal information we can identify who actually enrolled in a four-year college by two years after high school graduation. Because Korean students apply to specific majors (departments) for college admission as noted above, we can also identify their majors (departments) even with the data on sophomore college students. So, the third set of outcomes to be examined is actual attendance at a four year college and actual choice of a STEM major given attendance at a four year college. Similar to the variable for expectations, for the analysis we construct a categorical dependent variable that has three different statuses: 1) attending university with a STEM major; 2) attending university with a non-STEM major; and 3) not attending a four-year university. Means and standard deviations of mathematics and science interest and self-efficacy measures as well as the distributions (\%) of STEM expectation and actual attendance measures are shown in Appendix B.

## Methods

## Analysis of National Entrance Exam Scores on Mathematics

Because the CSAT dataset provides students' high school names, we can identify schools and school districts. This allows us to estimate three-level hierarchical linear models (HLM) to take into account the nested structure of the data (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002): (1) student, (2) school, and (3) district. The CSAT dataset does not contain any information on an individual student except for gender so the level-1 model (i.e., the student-level model), separately by gender, is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i j k}=\pi_{0 j k}+e_{i j k} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where
$Y_{i j k}$ is the (either general mathematics or calculus) test score of student $i$ in school $j$ and district $k$;
$\pi_{0 j k}$ is the intercept (mean) for school $j$ in district $k$; and
$e_{i j k}$ is a level-l (student) random effect.

In the level-2 (school-level) model, we postulate school mean scores ( $\pi_{0 j k}$ ), specified in the level-1 model, to be predicted by a dichotomous school-level variable of single-sex schools (vs. coeducational schools) and five other school-level variables (the proportion of students receiving public support for lunch, seniors-teacher ratio, average years of teaching experiences of teachers, and average years of teachers’ schooling attainment, private schools (vs. public schools)):

$$
\begin{gather*}
\pi_{0 j k}=\beta_{00 k}+\beta_{01 k}(\text { Single }- \text { SexSchool })+\beta_{02 k}(\text { Lunch })+\beta_{03 k}(\text { Seniors } / \text { teacher })+  \tag{2}\\
\beta_{04 k}(\text { TeacherExp })+\beta_{05 k}(\text { TeacherEdu })+\beta_{06}(\text { Private })+r_{0 j k}
\end{gather*}
$$

Finally, in the level-3 (district-level) model, we model district mean scores ( $\beta_{00 k}$ ) to vary randomly around the grand mean ( $\gamma_{000}$ ), but the effects of single-sex schools ( $\beta_{01 k}$ ) to be
constant across districts. We also hold the effects of the five other school-level variables to be constant across districts.

$$
\begin{align*}
& \beta_{00 k}=\gamma_{000}+u_{00 k}  \tag{3}\\
& \beta_{01 k}=\gamma_{010}  \tag{4}\\
& \beta_{0 j k}=\gamma_{0 j 0} \text { for } \mathrm{j}=2,3,4,5,6 \tag{5}
\end{align*}
$$

For the binary outcome of whether taking a calculus, probability, or a discrete mathematics test (vs. general math), we apply hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs) that have a logit link at level 1 but the same specifications for school- and district-level models as the model for the mathematics test score. A hierarchical linear model (HLM) that is estimated for the analysis of mathematics test scores can be considered as one kind of hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) that has a normal sampling model and level-1 identity link function (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

## Analysis of Mathematics and Science Interest and Self-Efficacy

We use data from the baseline KEEP survey to examine the effect of single-sex schools on mathematics and science interest and self-efficacy among high school seniors. KEEP does not provide identification numbers for school districts (but only an indicator of whether a school is in a high school equalization policy area). Moreover, because school identifiers are not available, we are limited in using school-level variables and therefore rely on a simple model that controls only for private school status in estimating the effect of single-sex schools. We use ordinary least square regressions to predict students’ levels of mathematics and science interest and self-efficacy, which are scaled from 1 to 5 , by a dichotomous variable of single-sex schools (vs. coeducational) and an additional school-level variable for private schools (vs. public) schools. To take into account the nested structure of students into schools, we report robust standard errors.

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1}(\text { Single }- \text { Sex })+\beta_{2}(\operatorname{Pr} \text { ivate })+u_{i} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Analysis of Expectations and Actual Choices of a STEM College Major

Given that the expectation outcome variable during the high school senior year has three categories ( 1 - expecting university and a STEM major; 2 - expecting university and a nonSTEM major; 3 - expecting no university), we use multinomial logit models to predict the likelihood of expecting university and a STEM major or expecting university and a non-STEM major compared to expecting no university, by whether the respondent is attending a single-sex high school (vs. coed) and whether attending a private school (vs. public). Similarly, we analyze actual attendance at university after two years from high school graduation using multinomial logit models that compare the likelihood of actual attendance at university with a STEM major or the likelihood of actual attendance at university with a non-STEM major relative to the likelihood of attending no university, by single-sex school status and private school status.

## Checking Randomness of Student Assignment: Differences in Students' Socioeconomic

 Backgrounds between Single-Sex and Coeducational SchoolsGiven the importance of random assignment into single-sex or coeducational schools for our analysis, it is critical to confirm the randomness from the survey data by checking for balance on observed characteristics of parents between students in single-sex and coeducational schools. Therefore, before discussing the effects of school type on STEM outcomes, we examine the extent to which students attending single-sex and coeducational schools are similar in their socioeconomic backgrounds. An earlier study, Park et al. (forthcoming), already showed the balance on observed family characteristics and prior achievement between students attending single-sex and coeducational high schools using a different dataset. Assessing the balance with our current data, which are different from those used in Park et al.'s study, will increase confidence about the nature of random assignment. To represent family background, we use father's schooling attainment, mother's schooling attainment, household income, and number of books at home. Each of these four variables has been widely used to measure a specific aspect of family environment in the literature on educational stratification (Buchmann 2002). Note that our KEEP data do not have a prior achievement measure that represents levels of ability before entering high schools and that would be very useful to examine were it available. We run a logistic regression for predicting single-sex school attendance by these four background measures for boys and girls, separately. Our expectation is that if students are randomly sorted
into single-sex and coeducational schools, family background measures will not have significant associations with students' enrollment in single-sex schools (as compared to enrollment in coeducational schools).

## TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 1 shows the logistic regression results separately for boys and girls in the equalization policy areas. None of the four background measures is significantly associated with attendance at single-sex schools for either girls or boys. These results showing no significant relationships between family background and students’ enrollment at single-sex schools in equalization policy areas increase our confidence regarding the random assignment in Korean high schools in these areas. Although not shown in this table, we also conducted separate analysis for Seoul and non-Seoul areas and found the balance by school type not only in Seoul but also in non-Seoul areas. However, with the fairly small size of the sample we are cautious in concluding that that even in areas of the modified version of random assignment student assignment is random.

## Causal Effects of Single-Sex Schools on Mathematics Test Scores

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 presents the results of three-level hierarchical generalized model for the binary outcome of taking a calculus, probability, or discrete mathematics test (vs. a general mathematics test) and three-level hierarchical linear models for scores on the general mathematics and calculus tests for girls in Seoul (Panel A) and non-Seoul areas (Panel B). Again, note that because the number of students taking probability or discrete mathematics test is so small, t we do not examine these tests separately here.

Among female seniors in Seoul, single-sex school is not significantly associated with the likelihood of taking a calculus, probability, or discrete mathematics test (vs. general mathematics). However, for each of general mathematics and calculus tests, female students attending single-sex schools show significantly higher levels of performance than their counterparts attending coeducational schools, even after taking into account other school characteristics. The effect size is equivalent to about 7 percent of one standard deviation for general mathematics scores and 10 percent for calculus scores.

The same pattern is found in non-Seoul areas. Single-sex school does not significantly affect the likelihood of taking a calculus, probability, or discrete mathematics test (vs. general mathematics). However, the average scores on both general mathematics and calculus tests are significantly higher among girls from single-sex than from coeducational schools. The effect size is about 15 percent of one standard deviation in both tests. Indeed, the effect size in non-Seoul seems larger than in Seoul. At this point, we are not aware of any study that evaluates how selective is the modified version of random assignment in non-Seoul areas in regard to single-sex vs. coeducational schools. Therefore, although plausible, we are not able to assess to what extent this larger effect size in non-Seoul areas reflects modification of random assignment in which $30-40 \%$ of enrollments in a school are determined randomly among those who listed the school as their preference but the remaining enrollments are determined randomly without consideration of students' preferences. More important is that the effect of all-girls schools remains significant even in Seoul with the intact version of random assignment. In other words, the positive effect of all-girls schools on mathematics test scores cannot be explained by the selection of students.

## TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Turning to Table 3 for male seniors, we find that attending all-boys schools is not significantly associated with the likelihood of taking a calculus, probability, or discrete mathematics test (vs. general mathematics) in Seoul. However, male seniors who attend all-boys schools show a higher level of performance on the general mathematics test than their counterparts who attend coeducational schools. The effect size is about 10 percent of one standard deviation. We see stronger effects of all-boys schools in non-Seoul areas. Male seniors attending all-boys schools in non-Seoul areas are more likely to take a calculus, probability, or discrete mathematics test (vs. general mathematics) than those attending coeducational schools. Single-sex schools show higher average scores on both general mathematics and calculus tests. The effect size is 25 percent of one standard deviation for the general mathematics test and 18 percent for the calculus test. Again, it is a difficult question to answer to what extent the larger effect of single-sex schools in non-Seoul areas than in Seoul can be attributable to the different student assignment mechanisms. However, it is important to note that even in Seoul single-sex schools are associated with the increased scores on the general mathematics test.

## Causal Effects of Single-Sex Schools on Mathematics and Science Interest and Self-Efficacy

We now turn to the results for mathematics and science interest and self-efficacy among high school seniors using the baseline survey of KEEP. Table 4 presents results of OLS regression and multinomial logit models predicting each STEM outcome by a dichotomous variable for single-sex schools (vs. coed) and a dichotomous variable for private schools (vs. public) for girls. We do not include additional school-level variables beyond for the indicator for private schools because, as noted, we cannot link the KEEP data to the administrative data due to the absence of school ids in the KEEP data.

## TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The results in Table 4 show that none of the single-sex school coefficient estimates is significant in either Seoul or non-Seoul areas, although a couple of single-sex school coefficients are large in value (such as 1.04 for the analysis of actual attendance with a STEM major in nonSeoul areas). In other words, evidence suggests that although all-girls schools enhance girls’ scores on mathematics tests as seen in Table 2, they do not necessarily affect girls' math and science interest and self-efficacy and girls' expectations and actual choices of STEM college majors. Along with the earlier finding by Park et al. (forthcoming) that all-girls schools have higher average scores on Korean and English, our finding of the positive effect of all-girls schools on mathematics test scores but no significant effect on other STEM outcomes seems to suggest that all-girls schools probably help boost girls' academic performance but have a limited role in enhancing girls' interest, confidence, and plans for STEM careers.

## TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Moving to the results for male seniors in Table 5, however, we see a somewhat different pattern in regard to the effect of all-boys schools. Even in Seoul, students attending all-boys schools show higher levels of interest and self-efficacy in science subjects than do their counterparts attending coeducational schools. The positive effect of all-boys schools is also found for expectations and actual choices of STEM majors. Compared to male seniors who attend coeducational schools, those who attend all-boys schools show higher odds of expecting attendance at university with STEM majors (relative to expecting no university), and also higher odds of actually attending university with a STEM major two years after high school. Again, the positive effects of all-boys schools on some STEM outcomes in Seoul should not reflect the selection of students into single-sex schools given the nature of the intact random assignment in Seoul.

A similar pattern is found among schools in non-Seoul areas. Although the effect of allboys schools is not significant for science interest and self-efficacy, it is significant for math interest. Male seniors in all-boys schools, in comparison with their counterparts in coeducational schools, show higher odds of expecting university with STEM majors compared to expecting no university. Male students who attend all-boys high schools, in comparison with their peers who attend coeducational schools, show higher odds of actually attending university with STEM majors relative to no university attendance two years after high school. The major difference from the estimates for Seoul is that the odds of expecting university with a non-STEM major and the odds of actual attendance at university with a non-STEM major are also significantly higher among all-boys schools than coeducational schools in non-Seoul areas.

## Conclusion

There has been long-standing interest in the possible positive effects of all-girls schools for improving girls’ education in general and STEM specializations in particular. But the positive associations presented in the previous literature do not permit identifying the effects of selection into all-girls schools versus the effects of those schools. Using the unique Korean experience of random assignment of students into schools in equalization policy areas, we have assessed the causal effects of single-sex schools without confounding due to selection of schools by students or their families. We use both cross-sectional and longitudinal data to examine various STEM outcomes including mathematics test scores and interest and self-efficacy in mathematics and science, and expectations of a STEM college major during the high school senior year and also longitudinal outcomes of actual choices of STEM college majors. Although previous literature has mostly focused on the potential of all-girls schools for girls' STEM outcomes, in this study we also investigate the effects of all-boys schools for boys as systematically as the effects of all-girls schools.

We find that all-girls schools have significantly positive effects on national college entrance exam scores on both general mathematics and calculus tests. The finding that the effect of all-girls schools on mathematics test scores is found in Seoul with the intact version of random assignment, albeit somewhat weaker, as well as in non-Seoul areas with the modified version supports the causal inference of all-girls schools on mathematics test scores. However, we do not find substantial impacts of all-girls schools on other STEM outcomes including mathematics
and science interest and self-efficacy, expectations and actual choices of a STEM college major. It is an open question why all-girls schools do not make significant differences in STEM outcomes other than mathematics test scores. This finding, along with the earlier result of positive effects on Korean and English test scores by Park et al. (forthcoming), seems to suggest that all-girls schools are perhaps effective in enhancing girls’ academic performance but do little in affecting girls’ attitudes and plans for STEM. In other words, among the various reasons put forth in the literature on why single-sex schools may have advantages, the one that would seem most applicable to girls in the Korean setting pertains to the possibility that adolescent boy-girl culture diverts attention from interest in and success in academic pursuits. However, it is also important to note that compared to the analysis for mathematics test scores, which used administrative data for the entire senior cohort in the nation who took the test, our analysis of other STEM outcomes relies on a fairly small sample.

In contrast to the limited effects of all-girls schools, our results suggest strong and consistent effects of all-boys schools across the several STEM outcomes examined in this study. In Seoul with the intact version of random assignment, boys attending all-boys schools show higher levels of science interest and self-efficacy than boys attending coeducational schools. Compared to boys attending coeducational schools, boys attending all-boys schools also have higher odds of expecting university with a STEM college major during the high school senior year and higher odds of actually attending university with a STEM college major two years after high school. All-boys schools in Seoul are also associated with better scores on the general mathematics test, although their effect size is somewhat smaller than the effect in non-Seoul areas. In short, our results support causal inferences on the positive effect of all-boys schools on several STEM outcomes, not attributable to the selection of students into single-sex schools.

Though our study has some important results on the impacts of single-sex schools in Korea on STEM outcomes, the data that we use do not permit us to go further to examine specific mechanisms through which the positive effects of single-sex schools, found in our analysis, are generated (cf. Lavy and Schlosser, 2011). In particular, without systematic investigation of how students consider single-sex schools in listing their preferred schools in non-Seoul areas with modified random assignments, we know little about the extent to which student assignment into single-sex vs. coeducational schools in those areas is selective. We are not in a position yet to adjudicate to what extent the larger effect size of single-sex schools in
non-Seoul areas than in Seoul is due to the selection of students. However, even in Seoul with the intact version of random assignment all-boys schools show significant effects on several STEM outcomes and all-girls schools on mathematics test scores. This suggests that the positive effect of single-sex schools is not attributable to the selection of students, and specific mechanisms through which the positive effect is generated should be examined. The need for further research is particularly strong to explain the effect of all-boys schools. The current scholarship of single-sex schools provides only limited insights into how all-boys schools can improve STEM outcomes of boys, although it offers relatively elaborated explanations of the effects of all-girls schools for girls. Among potential mechanisms, for example, we would be particularly interested in learning how all-boys schools and coeducational schools differ in the way in which boys form their interest and confidence in mathematics and science and maintain them through peer group interactions, or in the way in which teachers and students interact to affect students' STEM outcomes.

## ENDNOTES

${ }^{1}$ Science and engineering fields include physical/biological sciences, mathematics/computer sciences, agricultural sciences, and engineering.
${ }^{2}$ Our calculation using data from the Statistical Yearbook of Education indicates that in 2009 seven out of ten academic high school students attended schools in equalization policy areas (KEDI 2009).
${ }^{3}$ Seoul also introduced a kind of modified version of the random assignment in 2010. However, our analysis below deals with high school entrants before 2010 to which the modified version was not applied yet.
${ }^{4}$ Strictly speaking, the random assignment in Seoul is not entirely 'intact' in that among 11 school districts, one school district in downtown Seoul considers student preferences to some extent in school assignments to deal with the small number of residents.
${ }^{5}$ In our CSAT data, 69 percent of single-sex schools and 23 percent of coeducational schools are private, respectively.
${ }^{6}$ We could include seniors-teacher ratio because KEEP data provided the number of students by grade and the number of teachers in school. However, because no other school-level variable is available, we decided not to include seniors-teacher ratio. Our analysis with seniors-teach ration controlled (not presented) showed very similar results for the effect of single-sex schools.
${ }^{7}$ Although the questions were asked for other subjects such as Korean language and English, in this study we focus on students' answers for mathematics and science subjects.
${ }^{8}$ In Korean higher educational system, medicine, nursing, and pharmacy are undergraduate colleges, not professional schools as in the United States. However, following the common definition of STEM in the United States (NCES 2009), we excluded medicine, nursing, pharmacy from STEM majors. We also estimated the same models by including medicine, nursing, and pharmacy in STEM majors and there were no significant differences from the results reported in the current paper.

## REFERENCES

American Association of University Women (AAUW). 1992. How Schools Shortchange Girls. Washington, DC: American Association of University Women Educational Foundation.

Booth, Alison L., and Patrick Nolen. 2012a. "Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour: Does Nurture Matter?" The Economic Journal 122: 56-78.
___ 2012b. "Choosing to Compete: How Different Are Girls and Boys?" Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization 81 (2): 542-555.

Buchmann, Claudia. 2002. "Measuring Family Background in International Studies of Education: Conceptual Issues and Methodological Challenges." In Methodological Advances in Cross-national Surveys of Educational Achievement, ed. Andrew C. Porter and Adam Gamoran, 150-197. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Buchmann, Claudia, and Thomas A. Diprete. 2006. "The Growing Female Advantage in College Completion: The Role of Family Background and Academic Achievement." American Sociological Review. 71 (4): 515-541.

Chae, Changkyun., Jihee. Choi, Jisun. Jung, Juhong. Min, Jiyoung. Ryu, Dongjoon. Shin, and Gisan. Choi. 2006. The Report of Descriptive Analysis of KEEP (Korean Education \& Employment Panel) Baseline Data. Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET) (in Korean).

Charles, Maria, and Karen Bradley. 2009. "Indulging Our Gendered Selves? Sex Segregation by Field of Study in 44 Countries." American Journal of Sociology 114 (4): 924-976.

Coleman, James S. 1961. The Adolescent Society. New York: Free Press.
Coleman, James S., Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore. 1982. High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared. New York: Basic Books.

Freeman, Catherine E. 2004. "Trends in Educational Equity of Girls \& Women: 2004". Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Frehill, Lisa M. 1997. "Education and Occupational Sex Segregation: The Decision to Major in Engineering" 38 (2): 225-249.

Hall, Roberta M., and Bernice R. Sandler. 1982. The Classroom Climate: A Chilly One for Women? Washington, DC: Association of American Colleges.

Halpern, Diane F., Lise Eliot, Rebecca S. Bigler, Richard A. Fabes, Laura D. Hanish, Janet Hyde, Lynn S. Liben, and Carol Lynn Martin. 2011. "The Pseudoscience of Single-sex Schooling." Science, September 23.

Jackson, C. Kirabo. 2012. "Single-sex Schools, Student Achievement, and Course Selection: Evidence from Rule-based Student Assignments in Trinidad and Tobago." Journal of Public Economics 96 (1-2): 173-187.

Jackson, Carolyn. 2002. "Can Single-sex Classes in Co-educational Schools Enhance the Learning Experiences of Girls and/or Boys? An Exploration of Pupils’ Perceptions." British Educational Research Journal 28: 37-48.
K., Kim. 2003. "Modifications of the Equalization Policy and Suggested Policy Measures." Korea Journal 43: 200-214.

Korean, Educational Development Institute (KEDI). Statistical Yearbook of Education. http://cesi.kedi.re.kr/index.jsp.

Lavy, Victor, and Analía Schlosser. 2011. "Mechanisms and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3: 1-33.

LePore, Paul C., and John Robert Warren. 1997. "A Comparison of Single-Sex and Coeducational Catholic Secondary Schooling: Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988." American Educational Research Journal 34 (3): 485-511.

Lee, Valerie E, and Anthony S Bryk. 1986. "Effects of Single-sex Secondary Schools on Student Achievement and Attitudes." Journal of Educational Psychology 78 (5): 381-395.

Lee, Valerie E., and Anthony S. Bryk. 1989. "A Multilevel Model of the Social Distribution of High School Achievement." Sociology of Education 62 (3): 172-192.

Lee, Valerie E., Helen M.Marks, and Tina Byrd. 1994. "Sexism in Single-sex and Coeducational Independent Secondary School Classrooms." Sociology of Education 67 (2): 92-120.

Lee, Valerie E., and Helen M. Marks. 1990. "Sustained Effects of the Single-sex Secondary School Experience on Attitudes, Behaviors, and Values in College." Journal of Educational Psychology 82 (3): 578-592.

Mael, Fred A. 1998. "Single-sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to Socioemotional and Academic Development." Review of Educational Research 68: 101-129.

Mael, Fred, Alex Alonso, Doug Gibson, Kelly Rogers, and Mark Smith. 2005. Single-sex Versus Coeducational Schooling: A Systematic Review. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Department, Policy and Program Studies Service.

Mael, Fred, Mark Smith, Alex Alonso, Kelly Rogers, and Doug Gibson. 2004. Theoretical Arguments for and Against Single-sex Schools: A Critical Analysis of the Explanations. Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research.

Marsh, Herbert W. 1989. "Effects of Attending Single-sex and Coeducational High Schools on Achievement, Attitudes, Behaviors, and Sex Differences." Journal of Educational Psychology 81 (1): 70-85.

National Association for Single Sex Public Education. Retrieved on September 2009 from http://www.singlesexschools.org.

National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES). 2007. 2005-06 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).

National Science Board. 2012. Science and Engineering Indicators 2012. Arlington VA:National Science Foundation (NSB 12-01). Appendix Table 2-23 available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/indicators/appendix/.

National Science Foundation. 2003. Women, Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: 2002. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation.
__ 2006a. New Tools for America's Workforce: Girls in Science and Engineering. NSF 0659. http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2006/nsf0659/nsf0659.pdf.
__. 2006b. New Formulas for America's Workforce 2: Girls in Science and Engineering. NSF 06-60. http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2006/nsf0660/nsf0660.pdf.

Oakes, Jeannie. 1990. "Opportunities, Achievement, and Choice: Women and Minority Students in Science and Mathematics." Review of Research in Education 16: 153-222.

Park, Hyunjoon. 2010. "Japanese and Korean High Schools and Students in Comparative Perspective." In Quality and Inequality of Education: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Jaap Dronkers, 255-273. Springer Press.

Park, Hyunjoon, Jere R Behrman, and Jaesung Choi. Forthcoming. "Causal Effects of Single-sex Schools on College Entrance Exams and College Attendance: Random Assignment in Seoul High Schools." Demography.

Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Riordan, Cornelius. 1990. Girls and Boys in School: Together or Separate? NY: Teachers College Press.

Royal Society. 2008. Exploring the Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Participation and Attainment in Science Education. London: The Royal Society.

Sadker, Myra, and David Sadker. 1994. Failing at Fairness: How Our Schools Cheat Girls. New York: Simon \& Schuster.

Sax, Linda J. 2009. Women Graduates of Single-sex and Coeducational High Schools:
Differences in Their Characteristics and the Transition to College. The Sudikoff Family Institute for Education \& New Media.

Sax, Linda J., Casey A. Shapiro, and Kevin M. Eagan. 2011. "Promoting Mathematical and Computer Self-Concept Among Female College Students: Is There a Role of Single-Sex Secondary Education?" Journal of Women and Minorities in Science and Engineering 17 (4): 325-355.

Schemo, Diana Jean. 2006. "Federal Rules Back Single-sex Public Education." New York Times, October 25.

Streitmatter, Janice. 2002. "Perceptions of a Single-sex Class Experience: Females and Males See It Differently." In Gender in Policy and Practice: Perspectives on Single-sex and Coeducational Schooling, ed. Amanda Datnow and Lea Hubbard, 212-226. New York: Routledge.

Sullivan, Alice. 2009. "Academic Self-concept, Gender and Single-sex Schooling." British Educational Research Journal 35 (2): 259-288.

Thompson, Jennifer S. 2003. "The Effect of Single-sex Secondary Schooling on Women’s Choice of College Major." Sociological Perspectives 46 (2): 257-278.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2007. Single-sex Schools for Girls and Gender Equality in Education. Bangkok, Thailand: UNESCO.

Valentine, Elizabeth F. "Gender Differences in Learning and Achievement in Mathematics, Science, and Technology and Strategies for Equity: A Literature Review". ERIC Document Reproduction Service ED446915.

Xie, Yu, and Kimberlee A. Shauman. 2003. Women in Science: Career Processes and Outcomes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Table 1. Predicting Single-Sex School Attendance by Students' Socioeconomic Backgrounds

|  | Girls <br> All-Girls Schools <br> (vs. Coed Schools) | Boys <br> All-Boys Schools <br> (vs. Coed Schools) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| sather's college education | se | se |
| Mother's college education | $0.035(0.301)$ | $0.140(0.214)$ |
| Montly household income | $0.241(0.404)$ | $0.158(0.332)$ |
| Number of books at home | $-0.032(0.178)$ | $-0.008(0.148)$ |
| Constant | $0.048(0.067)$ | $0.005(0.065)$ |
| N | $0.653(1.106)$ | $0.497(0.918)$ |

Table 2. Three-Level Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models for College Entrance Exam Math Tests and Scores by Region (Girls)

|  | Binary Logit | Linear Models |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Taking a calculus, Probability or discrete math test (vs. general-math test) ${ }^{a}$ | Score on the general-math test (among those who took the general math test) | Score on the calculus test (among those who took the calculus test) |
| Panel A. Seoul (Intact Random Assignment) ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |
| All-girls schools (ref: coedu) | -0.005 (0.063) | $\begin{aligned} & 1.429 \text { (0.598)* } \\ & (0.07 \mathrm{SD}) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.729(\mathbf{0 . 9 9 4})^{\wedge} \\ & (0.10 \mathrm{SD}) \end{aligned}$ |
| Proportion of students receiving lunch support (0.01 unit) | $-0.035(0.007){ }^{* * *}$ | -0.748 (0.070) ${ }^{* * *}$ | $-0.774(0.113){ }^{* * *}$ |
| Seniors-teacher ratio | 0.041 (0.064) | 0.441 (0.606) | 0.137 (1.002) |
| Average years of teaching experience of teachers | -0.004 (0.012) | -0.084 (0.118) | -0.072 (0.188) |
| Average years of schooling attained of teachers | -0.028 (0.124) | 2.401 (1.166)* | 2.122 (1.937) |
| Private school (vs. public) | -0.012 (0.082) | 0.092 (0.763) | -0.480 (1.284) |
| Intercept | $-1.755(0.059){ }^{* * *}$ | $99.148(0.681)^{* * *}$ | $101.731(0.904)^{* * *}$ |
| Panel B. Non-Seoul Areas (Modified Random Assignment) ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |  |  |  |
| All-girls schools (ref: coedu) | -0.037 (0.049) | 2.564 (0.566) ${ }^{* * *}$ | 2.482 (0.815) ${ }^{* *}$ |
|  |  | (0.14 SD) | (0.15 SD) |
| Proportion of students receiving lunch support (0.01 unit) | -0.015 (0.005) ${ }^{* *}$ | $-0.502(0.055)^{* * *}$ | $-0.604(0.080){ }^{* * *}$ |
| Seniors-teacher ratio | 0.048 (0.039) | 0.948 (0.421) ${ }^{*}$ | 0.967 (0.619) |
| Average years of teaching experience of teachers | 0.014 (0.010) | 0.229 (0.111)* | -0.116 (0.156) |
| Average years of schooling attained of teachers | 0.167 (0.092) ${ }^{\wedge}$ | 2.832 (1.038)** | 2.673 (1.520) ${ }^{\wedge}$ |
| Private school (vs. public) | 0.204 (0.064)** | 2.507 (0.739)** | 2.420 (1.064) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Intercept | -0.037 (0.049) | 97.795 (0.595) ${ }^{* * *}$ | 97.839 (0.811) ${ }^{* * *}$ |

$a \mathrm{~N}=39,446$ female seniors in 132 high schools in 11 school districts in Seoul.
$b \mathrm{~N}=92,593$ female seniors in 347 schools in 27 school districts in non-Seoul areas.
*** p < . 001 ** p $<.01$ * p $<.05 \wedge$ p $<.10$

Table 3. Three-Level Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models for College Entrance Exam Math Tests and Scores by Region (Boys)

|  | Binary Logit | Linear Models |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Taking a calculus, Probability or discrete math test (vs. general-math test) ${ }^{\mathrm{a}}$ | Score on the general-math test (among those who took the general math test) | Score on the calculus test (among those who took the calculus test) |
| Panel A. Seoul ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |
| All-boys schools (ref: coedu) | 0.042 (0.057) | $\begin{aligned} & 2.071(0.826)^{*} \\ & (0.10 \mathrm{SD}) \end{aligned}$ | -0.333 (1.059) |
| Proportion of students receiving lunch support (0.01 unit) | -0.005 (0.004) | -0.158 (0.054) ${ }^{* *}$ | -0.241 (0.067) ${ }^{* *}$ |
| Seniors-teacher ratio | 0.071 (0.051) | 1.055 (0.745) | 0.296 (0.956) |
| Average years of teaching experience of teachers | 0.015 (0.010) | -0.056 (0.154) | 0.037 (0.195) |
| Average years of schooling attained of teachers | 0.112 (0.094) | 0.160 (0.094) | -1.167 (1.771) |
| Private school (vs. public) | $0.129(0.064){ }^{*}$ | 0.793 (0.929) | 0.525 (1.204) |
| Intercept | $-0.960(0.067){ }^{* * *}$ | 95.877 (1.121) ${ }^{* * *}$ | 100.994 (1.128) ${ }^{* * *}$ |
| Panel B. Non-Seoul Areas ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |  |  |  |
| All-boys schools (ref: coedu) | 0.112 (0.049)* | 4.569 (0.553) ${ }^{* * *}$ | 3.143 (0.750) ${ }^{* * *}$ |
|  |  | (0.24 SD) | (0.18 SD) |
| Proportion of students receiving lunch support (0.01 unit) | $-0.019(0.004)^{* * *}$ | -0.270 (0.044) ${ }^{* * *}$ | -0.254 (0.061) ${ }^{* * *}$ |
| Seniors-teacher ratio | $0.061(0.036){ }^{\wedge}$ | 1.298 (0.393)** | 1.175 (0.546) ${ }^{*}$ |
| Average years of teaching experience of teachers | 0.006 (0.010) | 0.237 (0.104) ${ }^{*}$ | 0.074 (0.140) |
| Average years of schooling attained of teachers | 0.123 (0.085) | 2.232 (0.952)* | 1.186 (1.297) |
| Private school (vs. public) | 0.125 (0.062) ${ }^{*}$ | 1.689 (0.699)* | $1.750(0.944)^{\wedge}$ |
| Intercept | $-1.037(0.077){ }^{* * *}$ | 98.114 (0.614) ${ }^{* * *}$ | $98.403(0.804)^{* * *}$ |

$a \mathrm{~N}=44,823$ male seniors in 140 high schools in 11 school districts in Seoul.
$b \mathrm{~N}=101,985$ male seniors in 370 schools in 27 school districts in non-Seoul areas.
*** p < . $001{ }^{* *}$ p $<.01$ * p < . 05

Table 4. Causal Effects of All-Girls Schools on STEM Outcomes by Region (Girls)

| OLS Regression |  |  |  | Multinomial Logit Model |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Math |  | Science |  | Expecting university \& |  <br> a non-STEM | Actually attending university \& |  |
| Interest | Selfefficacy | Interest | Selfefficacy | major <br> (vs. expe | major no university) | major (vs. no u | major <br> ity attendance) |

## Panel A. Seoul (Intact Random Assignment) ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| 0.347 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: |
| All-girls schools (vs. Coed) | -0.163 | -0.063 | -0.110 | -0.198 | -0.100 | 0.411 | -0.154 |  |
|  | $(0.438)$ | $(0.279)$ | $(0.306)$ | $(0.178)$ | $(0.712)$ | $(0.447)$ | $(0.596)$ | $(0.286)$ |
| Private schools (vs. Public) | -0.192 | -0.047 | -0.214 | -0.115 | -0.100 | -0.382 | -0.044 |  |
|  | $(0.339)$ | $(0.224)$ | $(0.302)$ | $(0.167)$ | $(0.755)$ | $(0.433)$ | $(0.652)$ | $(0.309)$ |
| Intercept | $3.487^{* * *}$ | $2.464^{* * *}$ | $3.141^{* * *}$ | $2.6366^{* * *}$ | 0.336 | $2.2611^{* * *}$ | -1.429 | -0.587 |
|  | $(0.246)$ | $(0.207)$ | $(0.371)$ | $(0.230)$ | $(1.124)$ | $(0.589)$ | $(0.880)$ | $(0.435)$ |

Panel B. Non-Seoul Areas (Modified Random Assignment) ${ }^{\text {b }}$

| All-girls schools (vs. Coed) | 0.238 | 0.047 | 0.085 | 0.033 | 0.610 | -0.755 | 1.041 | 0.265 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (0.245) | (0.158) | (0.301) | (0.196) | (0.679) | (0.509) | (0.997) | (0.381) |
| Private schools (vs. Public) | 0.286 | 0.186 | 0.182 | 0.157 | 0.379 | 0.558 | -0.046 | -0.227 |
|  | (0.228) | (0.152) | (0.316) | (0.205) | (0.603) | (0.437) | (0.986) | (0.357) |
| Intercept | $2.292^{* * *}$ | $1.913{ }^{* * *}$ | $2.331{ }^{* * *}$ | $1.985{ }^{* * *}$ | -1.413 | $1.689{ }^{* *}$ | -1.336 | $0.848{ }^{\wedge}$ |
|  | (0.226) | (0.152) | (0.375) | (0.252) | (0.887) | (0.558) | (1.101) | (0.439) |

a $\mathrm{N}=232$ female students
b $N=323$ female students

Table 5. Causal Effects of All-Boys Schools on STEM Outcomes by Region (Boys)

| OLS Regression |  |  |  | Multinomial Logit Model |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Math |  | Science |  | Expecting university \& |  | Actually attending university \& |  |
| Interest | Selfefficacy | Interest | Selfefficacy | $\begin{gathered} \text { major } \\ \text { (vs. exped } \end{gathered}$ | major no university) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { major } \\ & \text { (vs. no ur } \end{aligned}$ | major <br> ity attendance) |

## Panel A. Seoul (Intact Random Assignment) ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All-boys schools (vs. Coed) | 0.011 | -0.067 | $\mathbf{0 . 9 7 8}^{* *}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 7 1 9}^{*}$ | $\mathbf{0 . 9 1 0}^{*}$ | -0.050 | $\mathbf{0 . 8 9 7}^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.150)$ | $(0.438)$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 3 0 2 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 3 0 1 )}$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 4 4 4 )}$ | $(0.430)$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 2 6 3 )}$ | $(0.444)$ |
| Private schools (vs. Public) | 0.056 | 0.186 | $-0.683^{*}$ | $-0.487^{\wedge}$ | -0.288 | 0.123 | -0.095 | -0.642 |
|  | $(0.182)$ | $(0.420)$ | $(0.420)$ | $(0.262)$ | $(0.520)$ | $(0.347)$ | $(0.304)$ | $(0.537)$ |
| Intercept | $2.944^{* * *}$ | $2.1299^{* * *}$ | $3.754^{* * *}$ | $3.030^{* * *}$ | 0.981 | $1.627^{*}$ | $-1.196{ }^{*}$ | -0.103 |
|  | $(0.359)$ | $(0.449)$ | $(0.375)$ | $(0.393)$ | $(0.949)$ | $(0.687)$ | $(0.570)$ | $(0.347)$ |

## Panel B. Non-Seoul Areas (Modified Random Assignment) ${ }^{\text {b }}$


a $\mathrm{N}=208$ male students
b $N=497$ male students

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics from the National College Entrance Exam (CSAT) Data

|  | Seoul | Non-Seoul Areas |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Students | $\mathrm{N}=84,269$ | $\mathrm{N}=194,578$ |
| School Type (\%) |  |  |
| All-boys schools | 35.0 | 31.8 |
| All-girls schools | 30.2 | 27.4 |
| Coed schools | 34.8 | 40.8 |
| Mathematics Exam Type (\%) |  |  |
| General mathematics | 76.5 | 76.0 |
| Calculus | 23.0 | 23.6 |
| Probability or Discrete | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| General Mathematics Test Score | 99.3 (19.8) | 101.1 (18.6) |
| Calculus Test Score | 102.3 (18.7) | 101.2 (17.5) |
| Schools | $\mathrm{N}=200$ | $\mathrm{N}=509$ |
| School Type (\%) |  |  |
| All-boys schools | 34.0 | 31.8 |
| All-girls schools | 30.0 | 27.3 |
| Coed schools | 36.0 | 40.9 |
| Private vs. Public Schools (\%) |  |  |
| Private | 63.0 | 46.2 |
| Public | 37.0 | 53.8 |
| \% of students receiving public support for lunch | 9.84 (5.78) | 8.67 (5.87) |
| Seniors-teacher ratio | 5.91 (0.51) | 5.79 (0.66) |
| Teacher's years of experience | 18.1 (2.55) | 16.6 (3.50) |
| Teacher's years of schooling attainment | 16.8 (0.28) | 16.8 (0.29) |

Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
Source: Authors' own calculations

Appendix B. Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP) Data

|  | Seoul | Non-Seoul Areas |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Students | $\mathrm{N}=440$ | $\mathrm{~N}=820$ |
| School Type (\%) |  |  |
| All-boys schools | 27.3 | 39.0 |
| All-girls schools | 36.4 | 24.4 |
| Coed schools | 36.4 | 36.6 |
| Math Interest | $3.05 \quad(1.28)$ | $2.92 \quad(1.31)$ |
| Math Self-Efficacy | 2.37 | $(1.08)$ |
| Science Interest | $2.94 \quad(1.41)$ | 2.30 |
| Science Self-Efficacy | 2.47 | $(1.17)$ |
| During High School Senior, Expecting (\%) | 2.93 | $(1.36)$ |
| $\quad$ university and a STEM major | 2.43 | $(1.13)$ |
| university and a non-STEM major | 20.2 |  |
| no university | 69.1 | 19.8 |
| 2 Years After High School, Attending (\%) | 10.7 | 69.6 |
| university and a STEM major |  | 10.6 |
| university and a non-STEM major | 18.9 |  |
| no university | 27.7 | 25.9 |
| Schools | 53.4 | 44.6 |
| School Type (\%) | $\mathrm{N}=22$ | 29.5 |
| All-boys schools |  | $\mathrm{N}=41$ |
| All-girls schools | 27.3 | 39.0 |
| Coed schools | 36.4 | 24.4 |
| Private vs. Public Schools (\%) | 36.4 | 36.6 |
| Private | 63.6 | 53.7 |
| Public | 36.4 | 46.3 |

Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
Source: Authors' own calculations

