| 23-018 |
Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite |
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication |
| 11-029 |
Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version |
| 05-024 |
Ichiro Obara, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite |
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games |
| 01-014 |
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi |
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
| 00-20 |
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi |
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma |
| 00-16 |
V. Bhaskar, Ichiro Obara |
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring |
| 99-13 |
Ichiro Obara |
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case |
