Working Papers by Larry Samuelson

Paper Number Author Title
22-008 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology
22-013 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler Economic Theories and Their Dueling Interpretations
19-001 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference
19-018 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference
18-026 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler What Are Axiomatizations Good For?
16-004 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism, Second Version
16-003 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Memorable Consumption
15-012 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Buying Locally
15-005 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Memory Utility
15-034 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
14-026 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler A Model of Modeling
13-007 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler Economic Models as Analogies, Third Version
13-028 Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
13-044 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version
13-060 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
13-034 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Reputations in Repeated Games
12-001 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler Economic Models as Analogies
12-008 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
12-030 Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler Economic Models as Analogies, Second Version
12-032 Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Matching with Incomplete Information
12-042 Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version
11-012 Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence
10-037 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets, Second Version
10-003 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Pricing in Matching Markets
07-020 Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman Consumption Commitments, Fourth Version
07-018 Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Common Learning
06-028 Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Third Version
06-002 Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Second Version
04-008 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
04-007 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices, Second Version
04-031 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version
04-021 Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman Consumption Commitments and Preferences for Risk
03-021 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version
03-016 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version
03-014 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices
02-021 Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
02-004 George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria
98-009 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Who Wants a Good Reputation?
98-006 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be
98-002 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search
98-12 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Who Wants a Good Reputation?
98-11 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be
98-06 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search
97-011 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen Swinkels How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
97-006 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
95-16 George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions