22-008 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Theory: Economics, Methods and Methodology |
22-013 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Theories and Their Dueling Interpretations |
19-001 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference |
19-018 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference |
18-026 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
What Are Axiomatizations Good For? |
16-004 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism, Second Version |
16-003 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Memorable Consumption |
15-012 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Buying Locally |
15-005 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Memory Utility |
15-034 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
14-026 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
A Model of Modeling |
13-007 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Models as Analogies, Third Version |
13-028 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
13-044 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version |
13-060 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
13-034 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Reputations in Repeated Games |
12-001 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Models as Analogies |
12-008 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets |
12-030 |
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler |
Economic Models as Analogies, Second Version |
12-032 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Matching with Incomplete Information |
12-042 |
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version |
11-012 |
Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence |
10-037 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets, Second Version |
10-003 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Pricing in Matching Markets |
07-020 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments, Fourth Version |
07-018 |
Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Common Learning |
06-028 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Third Version |
06-002 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts, Second Version |
04-008 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships |
04-007 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices, Second Version |
04-031 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version |
04-021 |
Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Dan Silverman |
Consumption Commitments and Preferences for Risk |
03-021 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version |
03-016 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version |
03-014 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices |
02-021 |
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations |
02-004 |
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson |
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria |
98-009 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
98-006 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be |
98-002 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search |
98-12 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
98-11 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson |
Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be |
98-06 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search |
97-011 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen Swinkels |
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? |
97-006 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
95-16 |
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked |
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |