Description. This is a topics half-course on the economic theory of strategic information acquisition and transmission, designed for economics Ph.D. students in their second or third year. A bibliography of possible readings and topics is on the next page. The course methodology will consist primarily of the presentation of research papers, both published articles and unpublished manuscripts.

Prerequisites. Game and micro theory at the level of Econ 701 and 703.

Evaluation. Grades will be based equally on (1) class presentations, (2) a referee report on a paper not presented in class, and (3) a take-home exam. Optionally, (2) and (3) can be replaced by (4) a research paper that develops a model to address a novel question. If you wish to pursue this option, let me know by Thanksgiving, and your grade will then be based 60% on the paper, 40% on class presentations.

Office Hours. Fridays, 3:30-5 pm in 466 McNeil. But I’m in my office a lot and usually welcome all comers (especially in the afternoons) – just knock. Email me at stevenma@econ.upenn.edu.
Preliminary and In-Progress Bibliography

Survey


Cheap Talk

One-dimensional models


Multidimensional models


Wang, Yun (2013), “Going Public or Going Private? Cheap-Talk Game with Interacting Decision-Makers,” mimeo: [https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxVXl3_URCirOF9qNUd3U2pBUEk/edit](https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxVXl3_URCirOF9qNUd3U2pBUEk/edit)
Dynamic Models


Cheap talk refinements


Reputational cheap talk


Cheap talk applications


Verifiable Disclosure


Bayesian Persuasion


Miscellaneous


Information Acquisition


**Media Bias**


