"Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility"

by

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Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility*

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Abstract

Savage (1954) provides axioms on preferences over acts that are equivalent to the existence of a subjective expected utility representation. We show that there is a continuum of other “expected utility” representations in which for any act, the probability distribution over states depends on the corresponding outcomes and is first-order stochastically dominated by (dominates) the Savage distribution. We suggest that pessimism (optimism) can be captured by the stake-dependent probabilities in these alternate representations. We then extend the DM’s preferences to be defined over both subjective acts and objective lotteries. Our result permits modeling ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment using pessimistic probability assessments, the same utility over prizes for lotteries and acts, and without relaxing Savage’s axioms. An implication of our results is that the large body of existing research based on expected utility can, with a simple reinterpretation, be understood as modeling the behavior of optimistic or pessimistic decision makers.

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If one has really technically penetrated a subject, things that previously seemed in complete contrast, might be purely mathematical transformations of each other. —John von Neumann (1955, p. 496).

1 Introduction

Consider a decision maker (DM) who is faced with gambles on whether a coin flip will come up heads. He is told that if the outcome is heads (H) he will get $100 and if tails (T) he will also get $100. When asked what he thinks the probability of H is, he responds .5. He is then told about another gamble in which the outcome for T is unchanged but the outcome for H is increased to $1000, and is asked what he thinks the probability of H is now. He responds that he thinks the probability of H is now .4. When asked how he can think the probability of H can differ across the two gambles when it is the same coin, DM simply says that random outcomes tend to come out badly for him. After being offered a third gamble that gives $100 for T and $10,000 for H, he says that faced with that gamble, he thinks the probability of H is .2.

When faced with a choice between any two gambles, each of which specifies the amount received conditional on the realized state, DM says that he maximizes expected utility. He has a utility function over money, and for any two gambles \((x_1, x_2)\) and \((y_1, y_2)\), he will have two probability distributions over the states, \(p(x_1, x_2)\) and \(p(y_1, y_2)\). DM’s probability assessments reflect his belief that luck is not on his side. For each gamble he computes its expected utility under the associated probability, and then chooses the gamble with the higher expected utility.

Confronted by such a DM, one might well judge him irrational. But would that judgment change if one discovered that the DM’s revealed preferences satisfy Savage’s axioms? We show below that for any preferences over acts that satisfy Savage’s axioms, there will be representations of those preferences as described in the paragraph above: there will be a utility function over outcomes and, for any act, a probability distribution over states that depends on the payoffs the act generates, with preferences given by expected utility. Furthermore, the probability distribution depends on the payoffs as in the example above: the probability of the state with the good outcome is smaller than the Savage probability, and it decreases when the good outcome is replaced by an even better outcome.

We suggest that a DM who describes his decision-making process as above can be thought of as pessimistic. When good outcomes get better, he thinks it is less likely he will win them. In addition to the multitude of pessimistic representations of preferences that satisfy Savage’s axioms, there is a continuum of “optimistic” representations. Here, the probability distribution on states associated with a given act will, as in the pessimistic case, depend on the outcomes associated with
the act, but the probability of the state with the best outcome is higher than under the Savage probability distribution, and will increase if that outcome is replaced with an even better one.

We may still want to characterize the DM above as being irrational, but notice that we cannot make that determination on the basis of his choices: his preferences over acts are the same as those of a person who uses an analogous decision process using the Savage representation utility function and associated “standard” probability distribution. Any distinction between the rationality of the Savage representation and the alternative representation must be made on the basis of the underlying process by which the DM makes decisions and not only on the decisions themselves.

A consequence of the multiplicity of alternative representations of preferences that satisfy Savage’s axioms is that existing analyses of agents’ market behavior in the face of uncertainty may have a broader interpretation than would appear at first glance. It might have seemed as though a model that assumed that agents maximized expected utility with “standard” stake-independent probabilities had little or nothing to say about how a pessimistic agent, in the sense we outlined above, would behave. But since the choices of the pessimistic agent depend only on the underlying preferences, if those underlying preferences have in addition a representation with stake-independent probabilities, then the pessimistic agent’s behavior conforms precisely to any predictions that come from the standard model despite his unorthodox mental processing. In short, agents who are pessimistic or optimistic in our sense are observationally indistinguishable from the “standard” expected utility maximizing agent. This connection is based on our cognitive notion of pessimism, which is distinct from other notions of pessimism that are based solely on observed choice behavior. We will discuss this distinction in more detail in Section 5.

We lay out the model in Section 2 and demonstrate how pessimistic and optimistic representations can be constructed for the case in which there are two states, where our basic idea is most transparent. In Section 3 we show how the two-state case can be extended to an arbitrary finite number of states. In Section 4 we extend the DM’s preferences to be defined over both subjective acts and objective lotteries, and show how our result permits modeling ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment using pessimistic probability assessments, the same utility over prizes for lotteries and acts, and without relaxing Savage’s axioms. We conclude by discussing further implications of using different representations for the same underlying preferences.

2 Optimism and pessimism with two states

There are two states of nature, $s_1$ and $s_2$. Let $X \subset \mathbb{R}$ be an interval of monetary prizes. Consider a DM whose preferences over the set of (Savage) acts satisfy Savage’s axioms, and who prefers more
money to less.\footnote{Although Savage’s original work applies only to the case where the state space is not finite, it has been shown how to derive a Savage-type representation when there are only a finite number of states (see, e.g., Wakker (1984) or Gul (1992)).} Formally, an act is a function \( l : \{ s_1, s_2 \} \to X \). For notational convenience, in the text we simply denote an act by an ordered pair of state contingent payoffs, \( x = (x_1, x_2) \), where \( x_i \) is the payoff received in state \( i \). Let \( v(x) = p_1 u(x_1) + p_2 u(x_2) \) represent the DM’s preferences over acts. Here \( p = (p_1, p_2) \) is the subjective, stake-independent probability distribution.

We now consider a different representation of the same preferences, in which the probability distribution is \textit{stake-dependent}: that is, the probability assigned to each state \( i \) is \( P_i(x; p) \). We look for a representation \( \hat{v} \) of the form

\[
\hat{v}(x) = P_1(x; p) \hat{u}(x_1) + P_2(x; p) \hat{u}(x_2) ,
\]

where \( P_2(x; p) = 1 - P_1(x; p) \). Recall that \( \hat{v} \) and \( v \) represent the same preferences if and only if each is a monotonic transformation of the other. Consider a strictly increasing (and for simplicity, differentiable) function \( f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \), and define \( \hat{v} = f \circ v \). Then, we seek a probability distribution \( P(x; p) \) and a utility over prizes \( \hat{u} \) such that (1) is satisfied. By considering the case that the outcomes in each state are the same (that is, the case of constant acts), note that (1) implies that \( \hat{v}(z, z) = \hat{u}(z) = f(v(z, z)) = f(u(z)) \) for all \( z \). Then the desired representation (1) simplifies to

\[
\hat{v}(x) = f(v(x)) = P_1(x; p) f(u(x_1)) + (1 - P_1(x; p)) f(u(x_2)) .
\]

Solving for \( P_1(x; p) \), we get

\[
P_1(x; p) = \frac{f(v(x)) - f(u(x_2))}{f(u(x_1)) - f(u(x_2))} ,
\]

for \( x_1 \neq x_2 \). Note that \( P_1(x; p) \) is always between zero and one because, by properties of expected utility, \( v(x) \) is always between \( u(x_1) \) and \( u(x_2) \). As \( x_1 \to x_2 \), \( P_1(x; p) \) converges to \( p_1 \). Naturally, \( P_2(x; p) := 1 - P_1(x; p) \). When \( x_1 > x_2 \), the denominator of \( P_1(x; p) \) is positive. Thus, when \( f \) is convex, Jensen’s inequality implies that

\[
P_1(x; p) \leq \frac{p_1 f(u(x_1)) + (1 - p_1) f(u(x_2)) - f(u(x_2))}{f(u(x_1)) - f(u(x_2))} = p_1 .
\]

The probability of the bigger prize is thus distorted down. Similarly, when \( f \) is concave, the probability of the bigger prize is distorted up. (An analogous characterization holds when \( x_2 > x_1 \): the probability of the smaller prize is distorted up when \( f \) is convex, and distorted down when \( f \) is concave). Stated differently, the pessimist holds beliefs that are first-order stochastically dominated by the standard Savage distribution, while the optimist holds beliefs that first-order stochastically dominate it.
For specific classes of convex and concave functions, we can say more. Without loss of generality, we assume for the proposition below that the utility level \( u(x) \) is positive for each \( x \in X \).

**Proposition 1.** Consider \( x_1 \neq x_2 \) and the transformation \( f(z) = z^r \). Then \( \frac{\partial P(r|x)p)}{\partial x_i} < 0 \) for \( r > 1 \), and \( \frac{\partial P(r|x)p)}{\partial x_i} > 0 \) for \( r \in (0,1) \). \(^2\)

The proof appears in the appendix. The case \( r = 1 \) corresponds to the standard Savage formulation in which there is no stake-dependent probability distortion. When \( r > 1 \), the DM’s probability assessments reflect a stronger notion of pessimism. The better the consequence in any state, the less likely he thinks that this state will be realized. In particular, improving the best outcome reduces his assessment of its probability (as in the example in the introduction). Similarly, making the worst outcome even worse increases his assessment of its probability. When \( r \in (0,1) \) the comparative statics are flipped. For the optimist, the better is the best outcome, the more likely the DM thinks it is; and the worse is the worst outcome, the less likely he thinks it is. By construction, however, choice behavior in either case is indistinguishable from that of a DM with a Savage-type representation.

**Remark 1.** Based on Aumann’s 1971 exchange of letters with Savage (reprinted in Drèze (1987)), the following argument has often been used to point out that the Savage representation could have multiple state-dependent expected utility representations, leaving the (single) probability distribution ill-defined. Consider a Savage representation of the form \( p_1 u(x_1) + p_2 u(x_2) \). Then for any \( \tilde{p} \) with the same support as \( p \), this expression is equal to \( \tilde{p}_1 \tilde{u}(x_1, s_1) + \tilde{p}_2 \tilde{u}(x_2, s_2) \), where \( \tilde{u}(x, s) := p_s u(x) \) is a state-dependent utility function. This means that the Savage probability distribution is only unique under the assumption of state-independent utility. Notice that the same “multiply-and-divide” approach cannot be used to generate stake-dependent probabilities. To see this, fix a strictly positive utility function over prizes, \( \tilde{u} \) and let \( \tilde{p}(s,x) := \frac{p_s u(x)}{\tilde{u}(x)} \). While the expected utility \( p_1 u(x_1) + p_2 u(x_2) \) is the same as \( \tilde{p}(s_1, x_1) \tilde{p}(x_1) + \tilde{p}(s_2, x_2) \tilde{p}(x_2) \), note that \( \tilde{p}(s,x) \) is not a probability distribution unless we normalize it by \( \tilde{p}(s_1, x_1) + \tilde{p}(s_2, x_2) \). However, that scaling factor is not a constant – it generically depends on the stakes in all states (that is, unless \( u \) is a scalar multiple of \( \tilde{u} \)). Therefore, the resulting utility representation no longer represents the same preferences as the original Savage representation.

### 3 The general case

In the previous section, we showed how to construct a continuum of “expected utility” representations using distorted probabilities when there are two-states of nature. Under any of these
representations, the certainty equivalent of each act is the same as that under the original Savage representation. While the computation of alternative representations is particularly simple in the two-state case, the multiplicity of representations does not depend on there being only two states. We next show this can be done for any finite number of states.³

Let \( S = \{s_1, ..., s_n\} \) be the set of states and let \( x = (x_1, ..., x_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n \) be an act, where \( x_i \) corresponds to the outcome in state \( s_i \). Consider a Savage expected utility representation, with \( p \) the probability vector and \( u \) the utility function over prizes. We look for a stake-dependent probability distribution \( P(x; p) \) and a representation of the form

\[
\hat{v} (x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i(x; p)\hat{u} (x_i).
\]

(2)

For \( \hat{v} \) to represent the same preferences as the Savage expected utility function \( v \), there must exist an increasing transformation \( f \) such that \( \hat{v} = f \circ v \). As before, this implies that

\[
\hat{v} (x) = f (v (x)) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i(x; p)f (u (x_i)).
\]

(3)

Including the above equation and the obvious restriction that \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i(x; p) = 1 \), we have two equations with \( n \) unknowns. While this sufficed for a unique solution (given \( u \) and \( \hat{u} \)) in the case \( n = 2 \), when \( n \geq 3 \) there will generally be many ways to construct a probability distortion, corresponding to different ways a DM might allocate weight to events. More specifically, for an act \( x \), let \( ce(x; u, p) \) be the certainty equivalent of \( x \) given a utility function \( u(\cdot) \) and a probability distribution \( p: u(ce(x; u, p)) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i u (x_i) \). Consider a transformation \( f \) which is convex (concave). Since \( f \circ u \) is less risk averse than \( u \), \( ce(x; f \circ u, p) > ce(x; u, p) \) whenever \( x \) is non-degenerate (the reverse inequality holds if \( f \) is concave). We define

\[
P(x, p, u, f) = \left\{ q \in [0,1]^n : \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i = 1 \text{ and } ce(x; f \circ u, q) = ce(x; u, p) \right\}
\]

to be the set of probability distributions with the property that for any \( q \in P(x, p, u, f) \), the certainty equivalent of \( f \circ u \) with respect to the lottery \( q \) equals that of \( u \) with respect to the Savage distribution \( p \). Thus \( P(x, p, u, f) \) is the set of probability distributions that for the given prizes yield expected utility equal to the certainty equivalent, that is, the indifference curve in the space of probabilities that corresponds to that expected utility. Figure 1a illustrates this with the Machina-Marschak triangle for the case \( n = 3 \) (the probability of the highest prize \( x_3 \) is on the vertical axis and the probability of the worst prize \( x_1 \) is on the horizontal axis). The line \( P(x, p, u, f) \) is the set of probabilities for which expected utility is equal to \( ce(x; u, p) \), and must lie below \( p \). Otherwise, the certainty equivalent of \( p \) under \( f \circ u \) would be higher than the certainty equivalent under \( u \).

³Alternatively, it can be done for simple (finite support) acts on a continuum state space.
Figure 1: Constructing a pessimistic representation in the case $n = 3$. In the figures, $x_3 > x_2 > x_1$. The $x$-axis represents $p_1$, the $y$-axis represents $p_3$, and $p_2 = 1 - p_1 - p_3$.

The distortions in the bolded portion of $P(x, p, u, f)$ in Figure 1a are pessimistic: they lie southeast of $p$ on the indifference curve $P(x, p, u, f)$, and are thus both first-order stochastically dominated by $p$ and deliver the same certainty equivalent under $f \circ u$ as does the Savage representation.

As is apparent from the figure, there are multiple ways to select a pessimistic probability distortion. We will demonstrate one simple mapping from acts to pessimistic beliefs. For any two probability distributions $q, q'$ over $S$, let $d(q, q')$ be the Euclidean distance between them:

$$d(q, q') = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (q_i - q'_i)^2}.$$  

We associate with any act the probability distribution in $P(x, p, u, f)$ that is of minimal distance to the Savage distribution $p$:

$$P(x; p) = \arg\min_{q \in P(x, p, u, f)} d(p, q).$$  

This mapping is illustrated in Figure 1b for the case $n = 3$ and convex $f$. Note that the Savage distribution $p$ first-order stochastically dominates $P(x; p)$. This property is true for any convex $f$.\footnote{This can be shown geometrically. Fix any act $x$ and consider a Machina-Marschak triangle oriented as before. We already know that the line $P(x, p, u, f)$ is south of $p$, so it remains to show that the point $P(x; p)$ is also east of $p$. Given the orientation of the triangle, the slope of the line $P(x, p, u, f)$ is positive. Consequently, if we draw a line from $p$ down to $P(x, p, u, f)$, the angle formed between this line and $P(x, p, u, f)$ is less than $90^\circ$. Thus, the point $P(x; p)$ for which the line between $p$ and $P(x; p)$ is exactly $90^\circ$ must lie to the east.} It can be analogously shown that for any concave $f$ (the case of optimism), the probability
distribution \( P(x; p) \) constructed according to (4) will first-order stochastically dominate the Savage distribution \( p \). The argument above is valid independently of the ranking of the three prizes, that is, \( P(x; p) \) is a continuous function of the act. Different rankings generate different indifference curves, but a pessimist will always shift weight (relative to Savage) towards bad states, and the optimist will always shift weight towards good states. The argument also holds for any finite number of states \( n \).

4 Risky lotteries and uncertain acts

Consider a DM who is faced with choice objects, some of which are lotteries with objective probabilities and others that are subjective acts as in Savage. Suppose the DM’s preferences are defined over the union of \( \mathcal{L}^1 \), the set of (purely objective) simple lotteries over the set of prizes \( X \), and \( \mathcal{F} \), the set of (purely subjective) Savage acts over \( X \). On the subdomain of subjective acts, the DM satisfies the axioms of Savage, leading to a subjective expected utility representation with Bernoulli function \( v \) and probability distribution \( p \). On the subdomain of objective lotteries, the DM satisfies the axioms of vNM, leading to an expected utility representation with Bernoulli function \( u \). Each of the two subdomains contains deterministic outcomes: for any outcome \( x \in X \), \( \mathcal{F} \) contains the constant act that gives \( x \) in every state, and \( \mathcal{L}^1 \) contains the lottery that gives \( x \) with probability 1.

It is natural to assume that the DM is indifferent between these two objects. More formally, suppose the DM’s preferences \( \succeq \) are defined over the domain \( \Psi = \mathcal{L}^1 \cup \mathcal{F} \). The assumptions above imply that for any \( \xi \in \Psi \), there is an increasing transformation \( h \) such that the DM’s preferences over the domain \( \Psi \) are represented by

\[
U(\xi) = \begin{cases} 
    h(\sum_x \pi(x) u(x)) & \text{for } \xi = \pi \in \mathcal{L}^1 \\
    \sum_s p_s v(l(s)) & \text{for } \xi = l \in \mathcal{F}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( h(u(x)) = v(x) \) for all \( x \in X \). (5)

To discuss ambiguity aversion in the context of Equation (5), consider the hypothetical two-urn experiment introduced by Ellsberg (1961). There are two urns each containing 100 balls which could be black or red. The composition of Urn 1 (the ambiguous urn) is unknown. Urn 2 (the risky urn) contains exactly 50 red and 50 black balls. The DM can bet on the color of the ball drawn from an urn. Ellsberg predicts that given either urn, most people would be indifferent between betting on either red or black – indeed, by symmetry, it is reasonable to assume that the two colors are equally likely in Urn 1. Yet, he predicts that people would prefer bets based on Urn 2

\footnote{Note that this domain is essentially a strict subset of the domain of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), in which the outcome of an act in every state is an objective lottery. This domain is similar to the one used in Chew and Sagi (2008). Using their language, the sets \( \mathcal{L}^1 \) and \( \mathcal{F} \) can be thought of as two different sources of uncertainty, on which the DM’s preferences may differ. This domain allows us to talk about ambiguity while abstracting from the multistage feature of Anscombe and Aumann (1963)’s model.}
to corresponding bets based on Urn 1, because they would prefer knowing the exact probability
distribution. For a DM with a representation of the form (5), such a preference occurs if and only
if \( v \) is more concave than \( u \) (as seen using Jensen’s inequality).

Note that it is impossible to keep \( u \) and \( v \) the same without assuming ambiguity neutrality, as
preferences are entirely characterized by the utility for prizes under the conventions of the expected
utility representation. A natural focal point, however, is for the DM’s utility over prizes (which
captures his tastes for the ultimate outcomes) to be consistent across the objective and subjective
domains; that is, \( u = v \). Simply put, the prizes are the same in both domains; it is only the
probabilities that differ in the two situations.

Our model, on the other hand, may attribute the DM’s ambiguity aversion (in the sense of pre-
ferring bets on the risky urn to bets on the ambiguous urn) to pessimistic probability assessments,
rather than a change in his utility for prizes. Indeed, observe that if \( U(\cdot) \) in Equation (5) represents
the DM’s preferences, so does \( \hat{U} = h^{-1} \circ U \). If \( v = h \circ u \), where \( h \) is concave, we apply our previous
results of Sections 2 and 3 using the convex transformation \( h^{-1} \). That is, there exists a pessimistic,
stake-dependent probability distribution \( P(\cdot; p) \) that is first-order stochastically dominated by the
Savage distribution \( p \), such that the utility representation \( \hat{U} = h^{-1} \circ U \) may be written as
\[
\hat{U}(\xi) = \begin{cases} 
\sum_x \pi(x) u(x) & \text{for } \xi = \pi \in \mathcal{L}^1 \\
\sum_s P_s(\xi; p) u(l(s)) & \text{for } \xi = l \in \mathcal{F}.
\end{cases}
\]

Analogously, if a DM is discovered to be “ambiguity loving,” then he may be viewed as an optimist
using the same utility function over prizes in both domains. Much in the same way that probabilities
are identified under Savage’s convention of state-independent utility for prizes (as discussed in
Remark 1), we may detect the presence of optimism or pessimism under the convention of source-
independent utility for prizes. That is, in principle, one may be able to use preferences on objective
lotteries along with preferences on acts to determine whether a DM distorts probabilities.

While our approach differs from that taken by other researchers, it is quite standard in the
literature on ambiguity aversion to model the DM as if he evaluates outcomes according to expected
utility, with an unvarying utility function and a probability distribution that depends on

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6 To see this, observe that by applying \( h^{-1} \), \( \hat{U}(\xi) = \begin{cases} 
\sum_x \pi(x) u(x) & \text{for } \xi = \pi \in \mathcal{L}^1 \\
\sum_s P_s(\xi; p) u(l(s)) & \text{for } \xi = l \in \mathcal{F}
\end{cases} \), also represents
the DM’s preferences. For acts and lotteries with two possible outcomes as in Ellsberg’s example, and for which
\( \pi(x) = p_s = \frac{1}{2} \) for every \( x, s \), a direct application of Jensen’s inequality says that \( \sum_s \frac{1}{2} u(x) > h^{-1} \left( \sum_s \frac{1}{2} h(u(l(s))) \right) \)
for all prizes \( x, l(s) \) if and only if \( h^{-1} \) is convex, which in turn holds if and only if \( v \) is a concave transformation of \( u \).

7 This also corresponds to Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2002) definition of ambiguity aversion. According to their
definition, the DM is more risk averse in uncertain settings than in objective settings if there exists a probability
distribution \( p \) over \( S \), such that for all \( \pi \in \mathcal{L}^1 \) and \( l \in \mathcal{F} \), \( l \succeq \pi \) implies that \( \mu_{l,p} \succeq \pi \), where \( \mu_{l,p} \) is the objective
lottery under which the prize \( l(s) \) is received with probability \( p(s) \). The intuition behind this axiom is that if the DM
prefers an act to a given lottery, it would also be better to simply receive that “act” with the objective probabilities
that would ultimately be specified by the Savage distribution.

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the outcome being evaluated. Consider, for example, one of the most widely known models of decision making under uncertainty, the maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In their model, the DM behaves as though there is a set of possible probabilities that can be used, along with a fixed utility function, to compute the expected utility of any act. For any act, the probability used is the one that yields the lowest expected utility among those in their set. If the set of possible probabilities is a singleton, their model reduces to the standard model with stake-independent probabilities. A DM who is uncertain about the exact probability distribution to use (that is, a DM for whom the set of possible probabilities is not a singleton), will use probabilities that can vary with the act in question. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the shaded region is the set of probabilities the DM thinks possible. Orienting the Machina-Marschak triangle as before, with \( x_3 > x_2 > x_1 \), the probability that minimizes the expected utility over that set is \( q \). If the prize \( x_3 \) decreases, the indifference map becomes steeper and the probability that minimizes expected utility over the same shaded set moves up along the boundary. Observe that when there are at least three states and the set of probabilities the DM thinks possible is strictly convex, there will be a continuous function that assigns to each act a unique, stake-dependent probability which the DM uses to compute expected utility, just as is the case with the “least distance” mapping described in the previous section.

Thus, both the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and our model capture the choice behavior of agents who adapt the probability used in the expected utility calculation to the outcome being evaluated. There is, of course, a major difference between the
two models: the choices of agents who employ the maxmin method of choosing probabilities will typically violate Savage’s axioms, while ours satisfy those axioms by construction.

5 Discussion and related literature

Should we care? We have demonstrated the existence of alternative representations of preferences over acts that satisfy Savage’s axioms and that involve stake-dependent probabilities and a stake-independent utility function. Should we care about such alternate representations?

It is useful to distinguish between a utility representation (or model), which is a construct for imagining how a DM makes decisions, and choice behavior, which is the observable data. The standard point of view is that the representation is nothing more than an analytically convenient device to model a DM’s choices. In this approach, termed paramorphic by Wakker (2010), the representation does not suggest that a DM uses the utility function and a probability distribution to make choices, or indeed, that a DM even has a utility function or probability distribution. An alternative approach is that the models we employ should not only capture the choices agents make, but should match the underlying processes in making decisions. Wakker (2010) lays out an argument for this approach, which he terms homeomorphic. In his words, “we want the theoretical parameters in the model to have plausible psychological interpretations.” This stance is also common in the behavioral economics literature, where mental processes and psychological plausibility are of particular interest.8

As Dekel and Lipman (2010) note, a utility representation is, at minimum, useful for organizing our thoughts around the elements of that representation (e.g., in terms of probabilities, utilities, and expectations).9 Indeed, the expected utility representation has strongly influenced the view of “rational” behavior. Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2009) argue that given the axiomatic foundations provided by Savage, “one may conclude that we should formulate our beliefs in terms of a Bayesian prior and make decisions so as to maximize the expectation of a utility function relative to this prior.” This normative statement links Savage’s axioms to a particular process of decision making. In a recent survey, “Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm”, Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) express a similar idea, according to which Savage’s axiomatic foundations essentially say, “Even if

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8A similar discussion appears in Karni (2011). Karni distinguishes between the definitional meaning of subjective probabilities, according to which subjective probabilities define the DM’s degree of belief regarding the likelihood of events, and the measurement meaning, according to which subjective probabilities measure, rather than define, the DM’s beliefs. That is, the DM’s beliefs are cognitive phenomena that directly affect the decision-making process.

9They further argue that the “story” of a model is relevant and may provide a reason for preferring one model to the other, even if the two models predict the same choices. Dekel and Lipman emphasize that while the story’s plausibility (or lack thereof) may affect our confidence in the predictions of the model, it cannot refute or confirm those predictions; and that even if the story suggested by the representation is known to be false, it may still be valuable to our reasoning process.
you don’t know what the probabilities are, you should better adopt some probabilities and make decisions in accordance with them, as this is the only way to satisfy the axioms.”

In this paper, we show that a DM may want to satisfy Savage’s axioms but still view the world with (our notion of) optimism or pessimism, and in particular, without having a stake-independent prior. We should emphasize that this is a positive issue of how people actually think and behave. Looking at implied choice behavior, a model that assumes expected utility maximization accommodates people who might think in an “irrationally” pessimistic or optimistic way. Only by characterizing the full set of representations can we know the full range of possible decision processes that are consistent with the analysis in our standard models. This means that one need not always modify the standard model to include psychologically plausible decision processes. Hey (1984), for example, introduces a notion of pessimism and optimism very similar to our own: an optimist (pessimist) revises up (down) the probabilities of favorable events and revises down (up) the probabilities of unfavorable events. Hey incorporates consequence-dependent probabilities in a Savage-like representation, which can generate behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with expected utility because additional restrictions are not placed on the distorted probabilities. The notion that optimism and pessimism are inconsistent with Savage’s axioms is implicit in his analysis, whereas our paper suggests that this is not necessarily the case.

There are good arguments for the approach that takes the elements of the representation as actual entities in themselves. Consider a situation in which a DM may have little or no information about the relative likelihoods of outcomes associated with different choices she confronts. An expert who is informed about those likelihoods could determine which of the choices is best if he knew the DM’s utility function. Through a sequence of questions about choices in a framework that the DM understands, the expert can, in principle, elicit the utility function, which can then be combined with the expert’s knowledge about the probabilities associated with the choices in the problem at hand in order to make recommendations. Wakker (2008, 2010) and Karni (2009) treat problems of this type in the context of medical decision making. Under this point of view, it may be important to understand which representation is being elicited. If a DM had stake-dependent pessimistic beliefs but was assumed to have a “standard” Savage representation, the elicited utility function would exhibit greater risk aversion than the true utility function. Analogously, for an optimistic DM, the elicited utility function would exhibit less risk aversion than her true utility function.

**Behavioral notions of optimism and pessimism.** In this paper we discuss a cognitive notion of optimism and pessimism. A number of papers discuss optimism and pessimism as behavioral phenomena that are incompatible with expected utility. Wakker (1990), for example, defines pessimism through behavior (similarly to uncertainty aversion) and shows that within the rank-dependent expected utility (RDU) model, pessimism (optimism) holds if greater decision weights are given to
worse (better) ranks. (See also Wakker (2001)). In contrast to our model, in Wakker’s model changes in outcomes affect decision weights only when ranks change. Two recent papers also investigate behavioral notions of pessimism. Using the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, Dean and Ortoleva (2012) suggest a generalized notion of hedging, which captures pessimism and applies to both objective risk and subjective uncertainty. Gumen, Ok, and Savochkin (2012) introduce a new domain which allows subjective evaluations of objective lotteries. They use their framework to define a general notion of pessimism for objective lotteries in a way reminiscent of uncertainty aversion for subjective acts. Their definition of pessimism is not linked to any specific functional form and hence applies to a broader class of preferences than just the RDU (as in Wakker). It also can incorporate stake-dependent probabilities.

**Related literature.** The observation that the Savage-type representation and the optimist (or pessimist) case support the same underlying preferences, and hence cannot be distinguished by simple choice data, is related to general comments about model identification. In a series of papers, Karni (2011 and references therein) points out that the identification of probabilities in Savage’s model rests on the (implicit) assumption of state-independent utility, and proceeds to propose a new analytical framework within which state independence of the utility function has choice-theoretic implications. In the context of preference over menus of lotteries, Dekel and Lipman (2011) point out that a stochastic version of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)’s temptation model is indistinguishable from a random Strotz model. Chatterjee and Krishna (2009) show that a preference with a Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) representation also has a representation where there is a menu-dependent probability that the choice is made by the tempted (the “alter-ego”) self, and otherwise the choice is made by the untempted self. Spiegler (2008) extends Brunnermeier and Parker’s (2005) model of optimal expectations by adding a preliminary stage to the decision process, in which the DM chooses a signal from a set of feasible signals. Spiegler establishes that the DM’s behavior throughout the two-stage decision problem, and particularly his choices between signals in the first stage, is indistinguishable from those of a standard DM who tries to maximize the expectation of some state-dependent utility function over actions. In the context of preferences over acts, Strzalecki (2011) shows that for the class of multiplier preferences, there is no way of disentangling risk aversion from concern about model misspecification. Consequently, he points out that “...policy recommendations based on such a model would depend on a somewhat arbitrary choice of the representation. Different representations of the same preferences could lead to different welfare assessments and policy choices, but such choices would not be based on observable data.” Some of the papers above

10Grant and Karni (2005) argue that there are situations in which Savage’s notion of subjective probabilities (which is based on the convention that the utilities of consequences are state-independent) is inadequate for the study of incentive contracts. For example, in a principal-agent framework, misconstrued probabilities and utilities may lead the principal to offer the agent a contract that is acceptable yet incentive incompatible.
suggest additional choice data that is sufficient to distinguish between the models. For example, in Dekel and Lipman (2011) as well as in Chatterjee and Krishna (2009), the two indistinguishable models predict different choices from menus, suggesting that data on second-stage choice is needed.

**Can our model be distinguished from Savage’s?** In the spirit of the papers above, can we find a domain of choice in which optimism and pessimism may be distinguished both from each other and from a simple expected utility maximizer? One might think that a person with pessimistic (or optimistic) beliefs could be identified on the basis of choice by confronting the DM with choices over acts whose prizes are based on objective probabilities; for example, by soliciting enough responses to questions of the sort “Which do you prefer: a lottery that gives you $100 with probability .5 and $0 with probability .5 or getting $40 for sure?” The responses to such questions would allow one to elicit the DM’s utility function, and once this is known, one can determine whether the DM has stake-dependent probabilities over subjective events. (See the discussion in Section 4).

This argument, however, presumes that the DM takes these probabilities at face value. Her choices will depend on the likelihoods in her mind of getting the various prizes. She may well think “I’m very unlikely to get the $100 if I take the gamble - I never win anything.” There is no compelling reason to believe that a pessimistic or optimistic DM’s mental assessment of the likelihood of an event can be controlled by arguing what the DM “should” believe. This is reminiscent of a point in Pesendorfer (2006), who questions whether it is reasonable in the face of a failure of one aspect of the standard model to assume that the other aspects continue to apply.

Another approach for attempting to distinguish the models would be to study the DM’s behavior after receiving additional information, such as a signal about the true state. This involves specifying a somewhat arbitrary updating rule for optimists and pessimists. Since the DM is distorting the subjective probability distribution \(p\), the most standard choice that comes to mind is to distort the Bayesian updated subjective probability distribution (this is similar to the choice of Spiegler (2008) in extending Brunnermeier and Parker’s (2005) model to include signals). The updated beliefs of the optimist or pessimist would lead to choices that would, once again, be indistinguishable from an expected utility maximizer using Bayesian updating. Other choices of updating rules (for example, performing a Bayesian update on the distortion) may well lead to different behaviors. In general, it is not immediately clear why an individual who views the likelihood of events as dependent upon their consequences would employ standard Bayesian updating.

**A reduced form interpretation.** The pessimistic representation may capture a DM who suffers from performance anxiety. Consider a DM who is about to perform a task that yields high stakes upon succeeding. But the high stakes may increase his anxiety and stress, which, in turn, reduces
the probability of success.\textsuperscript{11} If the DM can foresee his performance anxiety and were to bet on his success, then he will bias down that probability. Alternatively, suppose that the probability of success depends monotonically on the amount of effort the DM exerts. In a stylized principal-agent model, the principal, who likes to induce the agent to exert high effort, will need to incentivize him by increasing the stakes. If the agent responds to these incentives and puts higher effort, then the probability of success is indeed higher. More generally, one can think of a situation in which the agent simply believes that he can affect the probabilities by putting more effort. Our notion of optimism captures such a situation, without explicitly modeling the effort dependence; the higher the stakes are, the more likely the DM believes the good state occurs.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}Ariely (2010) found that potentially large bonuses may lower employee performance due to stress.

\textsuperscript{12}A related idea appears in Drèze (1987). Drèze develops a decision theory with state-dependent preferences and moral hazard, based on the Anscombe and Aumann model, in which the reversal of order assumption (which requires indifference between ex-ante and ex-post randomization) is relaxed. The DM might display preferences for ex-ante randomization (that is, preferences to knowing the outcome of a lottery before the state of nature becomes known) if he believes that he can influence the outcome by his (unobserved) actions. Drèze derives a representation that entails the maximization of subjective expected utility over a convex set of subjective probability measures.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1

We start with some mathematical preliminaries. Consider \{s_1, s_2\}. Suppose that \(s_1\) occurs with probability \(p_1\) and \(s_2\) occurs with probability \(p_2 = 1 - p_1\). Let \(a \neq b\) be two positive real numbers. Define two random variables, \(X\) and \(Y\) as follows: \(X\) has value \(a\) in state \(s_1\) and \(b\) in state \(s_2\); and \(Y\) has value \(a\) in state \(s_2\) and \(b\) in state \(s_1\). We claim that for any number \(s\),

\[
(ab)^s = E \left[ X^{-s} \right]^{-1} E \left[ Y^s \right].
\]

(6)

To show this, note that

\[
E \left[ X^{-s} \right]^{-1} E \left[ Y^s \right] = (p_1a^{-s} + p_2b^{-s})^{-1}(p_1b^s + p_2a^s) = \frac{(p_1b^s + p_2a^s)}{(p_1a^{-s} + p_2b^{-s})} = (ab)^s.
\]

We focus on the derivative of \(P_1(x_1, x_2; p_1)\) with respect to \(x_1\), since the other case is identical. Taking the derivative and simplifying, we find that using the transformation \(f(z) = z^r\), equals

\[
\frac{\partial P_1(x_1, x_2; p_1)}{\partial x_1} = \frac{ru'(x_1)\left(u(x_1)^r u(x_2)^r - (p_1u(x_1) + p_2u(x_2))^{r-1}(p_2u(x_1)^r u(x_2) + p_1u(x_2)^r u(x_1))\right)}{u(x_1)(u(x_1)^r - u(x_2)^r)^2}.
\]

Since \(r, u'(x_1), u(x_1), u(x_2) > 0\), the sign of \(\frac{\partial P_1(x_1, x_2; p_1)}{\partial x_1}\) equals the sign of

\[
u(x_1)^r u(x_2)^r - (p_1u(x_1) + p_2u(x_2))^{r-1}(p_2u(x_1)^r u(x_2) + p_1u(x_2)^r u(x_1))\]

Let \(a = u(x_1)\) and \(b = u(x_2)\). Factoring out \(ab\), the last expression has the sign of

\[a^{r-1}b^{r-1} - E [X]^{r-1}E [Y]^{r-1}.\]

Using (6) with \(s = r - 1\), this is equivalent to \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} E \left[ Y^{r-1} \right] - E \left[ X \right]^{r-1} E \left[ Y^{r-1} \right]\), which has the same sign as \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} - E \left[ X \right]^{r-1}\).

For the case \(r > 1\), we would like to show that \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} - E \left[ X \right]^{r-1} < 0\), or equivalently, that \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} < E \left[ X \right]^{r-1}\). Applying Jensen’s inequality to the convex transformation \(g(x) = x^{1-r}\), we get \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right] > E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{1-r}\), or \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} < E \left[ X \right]^{r-1}\). For the case \(r \in (0, 1)\), we want to show that \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} - E \left[ X \right]^{r-1} > 0\), or equivalently, that \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} > E \left[ X \right]^{r-1}\). Applying Jensen’s inequality to the concave transformation \(g(x) = x^{1-r}\), we get \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right] < E \left[ X \right]^{1-r}\), or \(E \left[ X^{1-r} \right]^{-1} > E \left[ X \right]^{r-1}\). \(\blacksquare\)
References


