Paper # Author Title  
We study a simple model of pre-electoral opinion formation that posits that interaction between neighbouring voters leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of the individual process, as well as in that of the aggregate process. We show that in different specifications of the model, there is a tendency for the process to show consensus, i.e. to approach a configuration of homogeneous support for one candidate, out of the two who run the electoral campaign. We point out that the process displays the feature that, after long time spans, a sequence of states occur which, when viewed locally, remain almost stationary and are characterized by large clusters of individuals of the same opinion. Download Paper
This paper studies a simple dynamic model of pre-electoral opinion formation, where individuals repeatedly form their opinions as to which (out of two) candidate to support. The behavioral rules we analyze allow for various forms of discontinuities, that we characterize in terms of threshold, and are defined in a locally interactive setting. We focus on both the long-run and short-run behavior of the process. It is shown that the asymptotics of the process depend crucially on the particular form of discontinuity that we postulate. In particular the process may show a tendency towards consensus, in the sense that all individuals conform in their opinion, or the system may be absorbed in configurations in which different opinions co-exist. We finally analyze various forms of asymmetries in the threshold. Download Paper
The paper develops a framework for the analysis of finite n-player games, recurrently played by randomly drawn n-tuples of players, from a finite population. We first relate the set of equilibria of this game to the set of correlated equilibria of the underlying game, and then focus on learning processes modelled as Markovian adaptive dynamics. For the class of potential games, we show that any myopic-best reply dynamics converges (in probability) to a correlated equilibrium. We also analyze noisy best reply dynamics, where players’ behaviour is perturbed by payoff dependent mistakes, and explicitly characterize the limit distribution of the perturbed game in terms of the correlated equilibrium payoff of the underlying game. Download Paper