Paper # Author Title
We characterize dynamic (not just steady state) equilibria in a search-theoretic model of fiat money, where buyers and sellers, upon meeting, enter bargaining games to determine prices.  Equilibrium in the bargaining game is approximated in terms of a tractable dynamical system, in much the same way that the Nash solution approximates equilibrium in bargaining games in stationary environments.  The model with our dynamic bargaining solution can generate outcomes (such as limit cycles) that never arise in the same model if one imposes a myopic bargaining solution, as has been done in the past.  Download Paper
We develop a model of commodity money and use it to analyze the following two questions motivated by issues in monetary history:  What are the conditions under which Gresham's Law holds?  And, what are the mechanics of a debasement (lowering the metallic content of coins)?  The model contains light and heavy coins, imperfect information, and prices determined via bilateral bargaining.  There are equilibria with neither, both, or only one type of coin in circulation.  When both circulate, coins may trade by weight or by tale.  We discuss the extent to which Grsham's Law holds in the various cases.  Following a debasement, the quantty of reminting depends ont  the incentives offered by the sovereign. Equilibria exist  with positive seigniorage and a mixtdure of old and new coins in circulation Download Paper
This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game. Download Paper