The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Individual Learning
-Micro Theory Seminar
Yuichi Yamamoto
University of Pennsylvania
Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment
-Micro Theory Seminar
Rahul Deb
University of Toronto
Expected Uncertain Utility Theory
-Micro Theory Seminar
Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Princeton University
Coordination with Flexible Information Acquisition
-Micro Theory Seminar
Ming Yang
Duke University, Fuqua School of Business
Mortgage Origination and the Rise of Securitization: An Incomplete-Contracts Model
-Micro Theory Seminar
Rohan Pitchford
Australian National University
Incentives for Spot Market Labor When Output is Unverifiable
-Micro Theory Seminar
Aislinn Bohren
University of Pennsylvania
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information
-Micro Theory Seminar
George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania
Contracting with Disagreement on Deserved Performance Evaluation and Compensation
-Micro Theory Seminar
Anqi Li
University of Pennsylvania
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
-Micro Theory Seminar
Eduardo Azevedo
Wharton
Myopic Agency
-Micro Theory Seminar
John Yiran Zhu
Wharton